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AJBLPSTRACT 
My thesis emerges out of the new disciplines of trauma studies and gender 
theory, both of which explore the coming into being of the subject. The traumatic 
event is that which overwhelms the subject and cannot be integrated into a sense of 
self Gender theory explores the ways in which woman is positioned as object in the 
patriarchal culture, and so cannot fully experience herself as subject. Both disciplines 
have mobilized narrative as a goal - narrative depends upon the adoption of a position 
as subject. 
I aim to theorize the body of the survivor of trauma and to explore the means 
by which the traumatic symptom might be transformed into narrative. Post-1980 
psychiatrists have linked the traumatic symptom to the work of Pierre Janet (1859- 
1947) on hysteria. Janet regarded the body as inseparable from consciousness and was 
concerned with the ways in which the whole organism engaged in the performance of 
activity. 
Janet's writing stood at the beginning of a tradition of thought on the 'body 
image', in which the performance of activity on a psycho-physical level was regarded as 
the basis of subjectivity. I am interested in mobilizing this theoretical framework as a 
therapeutic strategy for trauma. Through bodily movement, elements of narrative are 
explored - temporal sequence and flow, occupying new positions or perspectives - as a 
means of approach to a more integrated sense of self 
I also propose to conceptualize the gendering of the subject as a mode of 
somatic performance. The transformative potential of physical movement provides a 
means by which the objectified body, which is positioned outside of its own 
intentionality, can explore the possibility of occupying new positions as a subject. 
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For Judith 
and 
for Mark 
AIMCBETH. ' Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased, 
Pluckftom the memory a rooted sorrow, 
Raze out the written troubles of the brain, 
And with some sweet oblivious antidote 
Cleanse the ftaught bosom of that perilous stuff 
Which weighs upon the heart? 
DOCTOR: Therein the patient 
Must minister to himself 
(M Agcbeth, V iii. 42-48) 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE SYMPTOMATIC BODY 
AN INTRODUCTION TO TRAUMA THEORY 
IRSTORY AS SYWTOM 
It is indeed this truth of traumatic experience that forms the center of its 
pathology or symptoms; it is not a pathology, that is, of falsehood or displacement of 
meaning, but of history itself If PTSD must be understood as a pathological 
symptom, then it is not so much a symptom of the unconscious, as it is a symptom of 
history. I 
The introduction to any piece of writing inevitably raises questions of origin and 
of narrative process. Where would be a suitable point to begin? What constitutes the 
easiest mode of approach to the subject? How should the narrative be structured in 
order that ideas might be most effectively expressed? This is true even of the most 
experimental modes of writing, which define themselves in a series of resistances, the 
beginning does not reflect an obvious point of origin, the mode of approach is 
deliberately obscured and rendered difficult, and narrative forms become a source of 
expenmentation. In a work of theoretical criticism, the questions become crucial: the 
introduction lays out ideas which form the basis of the reader's understanding throughout 
the discussions which follow. However, a problem immediately arises in relation to the 
subject of trauma, for it is a 'pathology' which not only 'displaces meaning' but also 
radically disrupts the possibility of 'history'. The location of a point of origin at which to 
begin to articulate issues around trauma, the structuring of a coherent and fluent 
narrative - these are tasks which are not only rendered particularly difficult by the 
overwhelming nature of the subject, but which also profoundly place at risk the 'truth' of 
the traumatic experience itself it is by definition that which it is impossible to articulate 
or recount in a narrative formulation. 
Contemporary writers on trauma, who are primarily based in the United States 
and whose work originates in the 1980's, have centred their research on the profoundly 
I Cathy Caruth, 'Introduction', American Ima , 48 (1991), 1-12 and 417-424 (p. 4). Further 
references to this article are given after quotations in the text. 
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disruptive and inarticulable nature of the traumatic experience. At Yale University,, 
Shoshana Felman (whose background is in literary theory and criticism) has worked 
alongside the psychiatrist Dori Laub, in the Yale Video Archives for Holocaust 
Testimonies. Their work has engaged with the issue of bearing witness to the traumatic 
event, and has indicated the impossibility of giving testimony to that which overwhelms 
all modes of understanding and conceptualization. Felman has formulated the genre of 
testimony in literary terms, as that which relates events which are in excess of the 
individual's frame of reference; the traumatic experience is unable to be construed as 
knowledge or remembrance, and consequently the language which strives towards its 
expression is fragmentary and disjointed. 2 Cathy Caruth, also based at Yale University 
and also with a background in literary theory, has highlighted the implications of trauma 
in relation to history. 3 She has argued that the traumatic event profoundly disrupts the 
chronological process which is integral to history - and to narrative - because it is only 
experienced belatedly. The traumatic experience thus no longer coincides in temporal or 
spatial terms with the precipitating event: it is experienced in its possession of the 
individual after an interval of time has elapsed and (usually) in a different place. It is 
thus not only meaning which is problematized, but history itself, which enters the 
'pathology' of trauma and becomes 'symptomatic'. 
The profoundly disruptive nature of trauma in relation to the theorist can be 
readily demonstrated by attempting to fix a point of origin for the development of 
contemporary trauma studies. The logical date for beginning a chronological survey of 
the most recent developments in the field would be 1980, which witnessed the first 
inclusion of the syndrome of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the diagnostic 
2 Shoshana Felman, 'Education and Crisis, or the Vicissitudes of Teaching ', American Imago, 48, 
(1991), 13-73. The collaborative work between Felman and Laub is published in Shoshana Felman and 
Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Pýygho4qa sis d sto , ew York and y an Hi Ky (N 
London: Routledge, 1992). Also based on the video archives at Yale and exploring similar themes is 
Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memoly (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 199 D. 
3 Cathy Caruth, 'Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History ', Yale French Studies, 
79 (1990,181-192. 
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canon. 4 The move by the American Psychiatric Association to include this new category 
in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DS -111) marked the first 
time that the syndrome of psychological trauma achieved diagnostic value and attained 
formal recognition. Immediately it was formulated in diagnostic terms, the condition 
was an anomaly. As an overall policy, DSM-111 sought to eliminate aetiological 
explanations, substituting an approach which was descriptive of the symptoms. The 
importance of PTSD, however, was that it recognized for the first time that a psychiatric 
disorder could be wholly environmentally determined. The presence of symptoms 
without the occurrence of a highly stressful event was not seen to constitute the 
disorder. The focus on aetiology in the definition of PTSD therefore made it an unusual 
exception in DSM-111. 
Perhaps because of an unease at this incongruous focus on the aetiology of the 
disorder, the compilers of DSM-111 were very specific in relation to the precise criteria 
required in the environmental stressor which precipitated the condition. The traumatic 
event was defined by the presence of two characteristic features. The first requirement, 
the so-called 'category A' of PTSD, was that the stressor should be 'outside the usual 
range of experience'. The manual cites examples from both natural and man-made 
disasters. The disorder should therefore follow an experience such as involvement in 
combat, or a hostage situation; or some natural disaster, for example a flood or an 
earthquake. The stressor was therefore confined to a situation which was rare. The 
second criterion was that the stressor should be an event 'that would evoke symptoms in 
almost anyone'. This marked an attempt to classify the traumatic event in terms of the 
severity of the experience. Clearly, some precision was sought in the definition of the 
disorder; but the effect was to introduce the idea that trauma could be quantified. 
4The information on the categories of PTSD, which inform the following discussion, is derived from the 
following three articles. Elizabeth A- Brett, Robert L. Spitzer and Janet B. W. Williams, 'DSM-111-R 
Criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder', American Journal of PUchiatly, 145 (1988): 1232-1236. 
Elizabeth A. Brett, Robert Laufer and M. S. Gallops, 'Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Reconsidered: PTSD Among Vietnam Veterans', Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: fýychological and 
pipjqgigg_ýý, ed. Bessel A. van der Kofic, (Washington: American Psychiatric Press, 1984), pp. 
60-79. Bonnie L. Green, Jacob. D. Lindy and Mary C. Grace, 'Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Towards 
DSM-IV, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 173 (1985), 406-411. Further reference to these 
articles are given after quotations in the text. 
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Despite the specificity of the diagnostic criteria, however, PTSD rapidly broke 
through these restrictions, or overwhelmed the categories by which it was understood. 
Caruth has observed that once it was introduced into the canon, the category of 
diagnosis proved so powerful that it appeared to engulf everything around it 
('Introduction', 1). In terms of the requirement that the stressor should 'evoke symptoms 
in almost anyone', PTSD rapidly expanded to include in its categories incidences of rape 
and child (sexual) abuse. This in turn rendered meaningless 'category A! of the 
diagnostic canon. The tendency of PTSD to overflow its own boundaries led the 
psychiatrist Judith Lewis Herman to observe that it can no longer be considered a rare 
phenomenon: 
In 1980, when post-traumatic stress disorder was first included in the diagnostic 
manual, the American Psychiatric Association described traumatic events as 'outside 
the range of usual human experience'. Sadly, this definition has proved to be 
inaccurate. Rape, battery, and other forms of sexual and domestic violence are so 
common a part of women's lives that they can hardly be described as outside the 
range of ordinary experience. And in view of the number of people killed in war over 
the past century, military trauma, too, must be considered a common part of human 
experience; only the fortunate find it unusual. 5 
The theorist is here located in a position of indicating the 'inaccuracy' of attempts 
at 'definition'. Once again, trauma is that which exceeds frames of reference and 
categorization. Herman continues her account of PTSD by arguing that the traumatic 
event is not extraordinary because of its rare occurrence, but rather because it 
overwhelms ordinary human adaptation (Herman, 33). She defines the traumatic event 
as that which renders the individual powerless; at the moment of trauma, the victim 
becomes helpless in the face of an overwhelming force, which usually threatens life or 
bodily integrity. When the overwhehning force is that of nature, she categorizes the 
event as a disaster; when it is that of other humans, the event becomes an atrocity. For 
Herman,, the traumatic event is therefore that which overwhelms ordinary systems of 
meaning, which give the individual a sense of control and connection. One effect of this 
5 judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovely: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1992. repr. London: Pandora, 1994), p. 33. Further references to this book are given after 
quotations in the text. 
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re-categorization of trauma is to shift the focus from the stressor,, or the event which 
precipitated the disorder, to the response of the individual, who is rendered passive and 
helpless. This pre-empts the change in emphasis in the diagnostic categories for PTSD; 
Ann Scott has indicated that in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DS -IV), published in 1994, there was a notable shift in attention towards the 
subject. 6 It was no longer a neutral observer who determined what should or should not 
be classified as traumatic (or quantified the severity of the stressor), but the individual's 
own reactions to the event. 
However,. this change in focus from the environmental stressor to the internal 
responses of the individual is problematic in relation to the project of theorizing trauma, 
for it threatens to re-locate the argument in the contentious and highly-charged debate 
concerning the location of the origin of traumatic experience as inside or outside the 
psyche. This will be discussed in some detail below; I merely wish to note here that once 
again, in this discussion, the theorist is faced with the questions of origin and historical 
process; and once again, the uncategorizable nature of trauma renders resolution of the 
issues concerned almost impossible. I would like to indicate at this point, however, the 
crucial role that this question of origin played in the categories of DSM-111. In the 
diagnosis of PTSD, DSM-111 asserted for the first time that a traumatic experience 
undergone in adult life is in itself sufficient cause for the subsequent development of a 
neurosis. David Healy has pointed out that in previous editions of the DiagnostiC and 
Statistical Manual, long-lasting or significant trauma could only be provoked by an 
external stressor in conjunction with previous internal pathology. 7 For example, DSM-1 
(1952) contained a diagnosis called 'gross stress reaction', which was thought to diminish 
rapidly unless it was accompanied by pre-existing character pathology. DSM-H (1968) 
contained a diagnosis termed 'transient situational disturbance' or 'anxiety neurosis'; again 
the implication was that the stress response was by nature 'transient' unless it was 
6Ann Scott, FantaU, Memog and PUchogn&sis, (London: Virago, 1996), pp. 
xx-X-Xl. Further references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
713avid Healy, Images of Trauma: From Hysteria to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (London: Faber. 
1993). p. 105. Further references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
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accompanied by previous psychological weakness. An assumption was thus made that 
prolonged responses to stress were a result of internal factors and had their roots in early 
individual history and pathology. The notion that a severely traumatic external stressor 
occurring in adulthood might have lasting psychological consequences was only formally 
conceptualized in 1980. 
This emphasis on the external stressor was immediately surrounded by intense 
debate, and attempts were made to categorize the precise nature and effect of the 
traumatic event. The diagnostic community quickly recognized the tendency of PTSD to 
overflow its boundaries and in 1987 published a Revised Edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DS -111-R), which sought to re-define its categories. Brett and 
others have indicated that this volume retained the two characteristics by which the 
condition was previously defined, but also added a list of generic categories of stressors, 
in an attempt to conceptualize the disorder more clearly (DSM-HI-R Criteria for PTSD', 
1233). In addition to situations in which personal injury or loss of community and home 
were experienced, the new diagnosis included situations in which serious threat or harm 
was experienced by close friends or relatives (for example, the kidnapping of a family 
member or witnessing the torture of a loved one). DSM-IH-R was thus concerned to 
emphasize that PTSD occurs in response to events of an increasingly specifiable type. 
However, the more satisfactorily the diagnostic categories of PTSD are located 
and classified, the more dislocated our modes of understanding of the condition appear 
to become. At the same time as its borders are fixed and defined,, it overflows its own 
categories and resists boundaries. It brings us to the limits of our understanding. It 
seems to be this sense of dislocation that Herman indicates in her analysis: that trauma 
overwhelms and renders helpless not only those who undergo trauma, but also those 
who are involved in treating survivors and those who attempt to theorize about trauma. 
Caruth is interested in precisely this sense of dislocation in relation to the 'study of 
trauma',. which she describes as a site of 'radical disruption and gaps' ('Introduction', 2). 
She indicates that the difficulty in theorizing trauma can be traced to its resistance to 
being located. The pathology of PTSD cannot be adequately defined by the event itself - 
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which may or may not be catastrophic and may or may not traumatize everyone equally - 
nor by the distortion of the event by personal significances. For Caruth, the event cannot 
be located either outside or inside the psyche of the subject. The stressor or traumatic 
event is precisely that which is not experienced or assim ilated by the subject at the time 
or in the place of its occurrence. It is only experienced belatedly in its repeated 
possession of the subject; consequently, it literally has no place, but is dislocated at the 
most fundamental level. This radical disruption refers also to the temporal aspect of 
trauma, which is Caruth's primary interest'. the traumatized person is possessed by the 
event, and consequently, temporal or chronological sequence is profoundly disturbed. 
History itself becomes the symptom of the traumatic neurosis. 
For Judith Herman, the notion of history as symptom is critically implicated in 
the theorization of trauma. The chronology of trauma theory is thus inseparable from 
the symptomatology of the traumatized subject - it is prone to fits and starts, 'episodic 
amnesias', compulsive repetitions. There is no easy point of access for the theorist to 
enter its debates. The problem is eloquently expressed by Herman: 
The study of psychological trauma has a curious history - one of episodic 
amnesia. Periods of active investigation have alternated with periods of oblivion. 
Repeatedly in the past century, similar lines of inquiry have been taken up and 
abruptly abandoned, only to be rediscovered much later. Classic documents of fifty 
or one hundred years ago often read like contemporary works. Though the field has 
in fact an abundant and rich tradition, it has been periodically forgotten and must be 
periodically reclaimed. (Herman, 7) 
This is a 'curious history' indeed: trauma has overwhelmed its categories, so that it can 
claim no progressive chronology, no single point of origin. However, despite its 
difficulties and resistances, Herman indicates that the 'field' of trauma studies is 'rich' and 
'abundant' and deserves to be 'periodically reclaimed'. Since the formulation of PTSD in 
1980, there has been an interval of intense and 'active investigation' into the area of 
trauma theory; like the doctors at the end of the last century, charting the 'curious 
histories' of their hysterical patients, contemporary theorists recover the 'forgotten' 
researches of the previous century and map the fits and starts which have characterized 
its 'lines of inquiry'. 
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FALSE MEMORY SYNDROME- THE PROBLEM OF MEMORY AND THE 
EVENT 
In addition to illustrating the difficulties and complexities of the 'curious history' 
of trauma studies, Judith Herman also offers a point of access to its 'vast literature'. She 
points out that the fluctuations of interest in the condition (its 'fits and starts') have 
invariably coincided with the support of a political movement. It is when a particular 
form of psychological trauma has been affiliated with the interests of a political 
movement, and so surfaced into public consciousness, that its investigation has 
flourished. The synthesis of the interests of the various political movements which have 
engaged with psychological trauma provides for Herman a point of access to the debates 
surrounding issues of trauma and establishes a basis for 'systematic study. She indicates 
three distinct instances of the affiliation of a form of psychological trauma with a specific 
political movement: 
The first to emerge was hysteria, the archetypal psychological disorder of 
women. Its study grew out of the republican, anticlerical political movement of the 
late nineteenth century in France. The second was shell shock or combat neurosis. 
Its study began in England and the United States after the First World War and 
reached a peak after the Vietnam War. Its political context was the collapse of a cult 
of war and the growth of an antiwar movement. The last and most recent trauma to 
come into public awareness is sexual and domestic violence. Its political context is 
the feminist movement in Western Europe and North America. (Herman, 9) 
Herman's analysis serves as a dual reminder. Firstly, it indicates the fluctuating 
nature of trauma studies, which holds interest and attention only as long as the political 
movement with which it is affiliated. Secondly, it serves as a reminder that the theorist is 
not an innocent or naive reader of the body of literature associated with trauma, but is 
always historically and politically positioned. The 'political context' from which this 
thesis arises is thus the 'feminist movement in Western Europe and North America', while 
it is historically situated at a point of crisis in the 'public awareness' of 'sexual and 
domestic violence', which originated in 1987 with the Cleveland child sexual abuse crisis 
and has culminated in the recent phenomenon of 'False Memory Syndrome'. Trauma 
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theory, then, writes of a history which has become pathological, but it is simultaneously 
(and paradoxically) heavily invested in a historical and political movement which defines 
and outlines the interest and motivations of the theorist. 
Herman's outline for a history of trauma theory implies a straightforward relation 
between the study of trauma and the affiliation of a political movement: political 
involvement allows a specific form of psychological trauma to surface into public 
consciousness and hence its investigation flourishes. While this model appears 
satisfactory in relation to the anti-combat movement, I would suggest that issues of 
sexual and domestic violence have problernatized the political affiliation with trauma. In 
this instance, public awareness and reaction to the issues involved has not necessarily 
coincided with the political interests of the feminist movement: in the space opened up 
by this divergence, the furious debates and legal crises which mark the contemporary 
public anxiety around issues of trauma have arisen. This anxiety can be explained in part 
as a backlash phenomenon - since the Cleveland Crisis in 1987 opened up the issue of 
child sexual abuse and allowed public discussion and debate, there have been soaring 
estimates of the incidence of domestic and sexual violence and a flood of memoirs and 
testimonies by adult survivors. Again, trauma is overwhelming its own categories and 
threatening to engulf everything in its vicinity, and in part, perhaps, the contemporary 
crisis marks an emergent public resistance to the escalating scale of the problem. 
However, it is also instructive to note the precise terms of the debate which is occurring 
and which revolves around issues of origin, narrative, and the status of the event. 
Confusion centres on the operations of memory and the most urgent project for 
contemporary trauma theory has become a clear elucidation of the nature of memory, the 
status of the recovered event, and the validity of the contribution of the various modes of 
therapy which offer treatment to the trauma victim. 
The anti-combat movement,, which culminated in the Vietnam conflict and 
directly resulted in the inclusion of PTSD in the 1980 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 
relied to a large extent on the assumption of a straightforward relation between memory 
and the traumatic event. As Herman has indicated, the conflict represented the climax of 
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an anti-war movement which had been gaining momentum throughout the two World 
Wars. Vietnam differed crucially from the previous conflicts in the level of public 
awareness of what was occurring at the front-line which contributed to a political 
atmosphere in which the problems encountered by returning veterans were given serious 
attention (Healy, 104). This was supported by the position of the psychiatrist in this war; 
unlike previous conflicts, Vietnam did not rely on mass-mobilization. Formerly, the 
primary task of the psychiatrist was to return the soldier to active duty; in the Vietnam 
War, this commitment no longer applied and psychiatrists were able to assume a more 
supportive and neutral role (Healy, 105). 
It was in this Political context that returning Vietnam veterans organized into 
agitation groups against the continuation of the war (Herman, 26-27). The first of these C? I- 
Vietnam Veterans Against the War, originated in 1970 while the conflict was still at its 
height. This small group of soldiers returned the medals they had been awarded for 
bravery and offered public testimony of the war crimes they had committed. The 
purpose of the group was seen to be twofold: to raise public awareness about the effects 
of the war and to offer support and counselling to the returning soldier. This initially 
small organization provided a model which was soon emulated throughout America in 
the formation of 'rap groups'. These were intimate meetings of veterans which retained 
the dual purpose of the initial organization: soldiers recounted their traumatic 
experiences of war in order to raise public awareness, but also for individual therapy, 
which was professionally assisted by supportive psychiatrists who were invited to attend. 
The organizations were thus based on the dual nature of testimony, which in its private 
aspect is an individual form of witness but in its public aspect carries legal implications. 
Herman indicates the success of this political protest: by the mid-1970's hundreds 
of 'rap groups' had been organized and the resulting political pressure provided the 
impetus for the public recognition of an environmentally determined psychological 
disorder (Herman, 27). By the end of the decade, a legal mandate was awarded for a 
psychological treatment programme, called Operation Outreach, which was organized by 
the Veterans' Administration. Over one-hundred outreach centres were established 
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throughout America and staffed by veterans. Alongside this, the Veterans' 
Administration commissioned research into the impact of wartime experiences on 
returning soldiers. The result was a comprehensive five-volume study on the 
psychological legacies of Vietnam, which delineated the syndrome of post-traumatic 
stress disorder and demonstrated the direct relationship to combat exposure. This led 
directly to the inclusion of PTSD in DSM-111 and the formal recognition that exposure to 
a traumatic experience was sufficient in itself to result in pathology. 
The problem with this highly effective political engagement with issues of trauma 
was that it relied on a straightforward relation between memory and the traumatic event. 
The public testimony of the veterans to the atrocities in which they were involved belied 
the difficulty of access to the traumatic event, or its dislocatedness. It has been in the 
contentious issue of sexual and domestic violence against women and children that the 
elusive and resistant nature of trauma has come problematically to the fore. Initially, 
there appeared to be a straightforward conjunction between testimony to the event of 
childhood sexual abuse and growing public awareness and acceptance of its occurrence. 
This applied on both sides of the Atlantic. In America, an increasing knowledge of the 
extent of the problem mobilized an organizational structure which clearly reflected the 
'rap groups': extensive support networks emerged, which established local groups for 
recent and former victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence, and which served the 
dual purpose of providing therapeutic aid and raising public awareness on the issues 
(Healy, 109). In Britain, the rise in public recognition of the extent of sexual abuse was 
centred on the Cleveland crisis of 1987. In a recent study of trauma and the event, Ann 
Scott has observed that the publicity which surrounded Cleveland 'enabled people to talk 
about childhood memories previously suppressed or repressed, and... enabled a fresh 
focus on definition' (Scott, xvi). This implies that once political change has made it 
possible to speak of abuse, there is somehow an unproblematic access to memories 
which were previously unavailable ('suppressed or repressed'). Scott's model is of a 
chronological progression towards recognition of the event- 'The culture had moved 
17 
from an initially nervous but increasingly steady acceptance of the recognition of child 
sexual abuse' (Scott,. xxvi). 
However, this progressive chronology is abruptly broken in Scott's text by the 
intrusion in 1993 of the phenomenon of Talse Memory Syndrome' (FMS), which 
radically changed the terms of the debate, first in America and soon after in Britain. 
Scott outlines the background to FMS, which originated in Philadelphia with the Talse 
Memory Syndrome Foundation' (Scott, xxvi). Here, parents of adult survivors of sexual 
abuse came together to protest against what they claimed to be their grown daughters' 
false accusations. The stakes in this debate were high from the outset, because criminal 
proceedings were involved: changes to the statute-of-litnitations enabled lawsuits to be 
brought against parents on the basis of adult survivors' testimony. What FMS 
emphasized was the radically uncertain status of the event which was remembered or 
'recovered' in therapy. Memory - its reliability, its nature, its formation, its susceptibility 
to distortion - became a crucial issue in public debate and ultimately in the American 
courts (Scott, xxvi). It was suggested that memories of abuse which resulted from the 
therapy session may also have originated there: that the therapist had somehow 
implanted in his patient's head the 'false' memory of an event. The forms of therapy 
which were particularly implicated in this process were those in which suggestion was 
seen to play a significant role (for example, those involving the use of hypnosis); yet the 
effect was also to place the question of the validity of psychoanalysis high on the public 
agenda. 
The fierce debate which has arisen around FMS can be attributed in part to the 
centrality of questions of psychoanalytic method. Although psychoanalysis was not the 
explicit target of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, it quickly became a crucial 
point of discussion. The question was again one of origin - the origin of the traumatic 
neurosis as inside or outside the psyche, and the origin of psychoanalysis itself The 
central debate in FMS - the status of the event in relation to the recovered memory - 
thus formed the basis for Freud's foundation of psychoanalysis in 1896. Scott observes 
the conjunction of issues involved: 
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For there is no doubt that the current, unprecedented concern with the reality of 
child abuse must lead one to look again at the methodological implications of Freud's 
work during the period which resulted in his writing, of the women patients who 
spoke of having been seduced as girls by their fathers, 'I no longer believe in my 
neurotica'. (Scott, 1) 8 
FMS is concerned with the historical truth it accords to the traumatic memory and so it 
precisely replays the debates which beset Freud in his founding of psychoanalysis. In 
relation to trauma, history has once again become strangely symptomatic, so that it 
compulsively and exactly repeats the past, just as the traumatized patient 'relives' former 
events in minute and inflexible detail. Caruth has observed that at the beginning of his 
career, Freud was concerned with the relation between real traumatic events and the 
experience of pathology ('Introduction', 7-8). This is evidenced most famously in his 
early Studies on Hysteria (1895) and the 'Preliminary Communication', but also in his 
first published piece 'On Aphasia', which explores the effects of physical trauma to the 
brain. With the founding of psychoanalysis in 1896, however,, Freud 'gave up' the reality 
of childhood seduction and relocated the origins of trauma inside the psyche, in the 
individual's fantasy life, and hence disavowed the historical reality of violence. The 
question of origin is thus one of spatial location (whether the trauma originates inside or 
outside the psyche), but also crucially widens out to become a question of historical 
truth. 
The ferocity of debate around the question of origin thus becomes explicable in 
terms of political investment. The location of the contemporary theorist in the 'political 
context' of feminist thought entails an investment in locating the origin of trauma outside 
the psyche, for this legitimates the historical reality of the violence and abuse which is so 
frequently perpetrated in the domestic sphere. Ethically and politically, this insistence on 
the external and locatable traumatic experience is a necessary corrective to previous 
relegations of trauma to the individual's fantasy life. Herman's insight into the highly 
political nature of the study of trauma theory assumes a particular relevance here- she 
points out that readings of its 'literature' have never been neutral or naive. However, this 
8 please note that throughout this thesis, emphasis in quotations is the derived from the original text, 
unless it is explicitly stated to the contrary. 
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Political investment in the externally locatable origin of trauma must co-exist alongside a 
respect for and recognition of the inherent nature of trauma as profoundly disruptive and 
non-locatable. Caruth eloquently articulates the delicate balancing act which is required: 
Freud's late insight into this inextricable and paradoxical relation between history 
and trauma can tell us something about the challenge it presently poses for 
psychoanalysis; for it suggests that what trauma has to tell us - the historical and 
personal truth it transmits - is intricately bound up with its refusal of historical 
boundaries; that its truth is bound up with its crisis of truth. This is why, I would 
suggest, psychoanalysis has been beset by problems surrounding, precisely, the 
historical truth it accords to traurna, or whether it locates its ultimate origin inside or 
outside the psyche... While the insistence on the reality of violence is a necessary and 
important task, particularly as a corrective to analytic therapies that would reduce 
trauma to fantasy life or adult trauma to the events of childhood, nonetheless the 
debate concerning the location of the origins of traumatic experience as inside or 
outside the psyche may also miss the central Freudian insight into trauma, that the 
impact of the traumatic event lies precisely in its belatedness, in its refusal to be 
simply located, in its insistent appearance outside the boundaries of any single place 
or time. ('Introduction', 7-8) 
Caruth argues that the 'central... insight into trauma', that it cannot be 'simply 
located', must paradoxically combine with an 'insistence on the reality of violence'. In 
discussing the phenomenon of FMS, I would like to focus in some detail on Scott's 
account and indicate how this balancing act of interpretation can be utilized. In her 
analysis of FMS, Scott focuses on the 'belatedness' of trauma as profoundly negative; for 
her, the temporal delay which separates the traumatic event from its recovery as memory 
in the therapeutic session can only serve to place in question the validity of the event 
itself 
The legal process around child cases may be simpler for us to think about, 
because of the number of cases where the judge has ruled that the account of 
experience that a child has offered has been so graphic that there is a high level of 
probability that sexual abuse has taken place. This poses a question about the 
immediacy of memory. the closeness in time to an experience perhaps guaranteeing 
the sense of that experience. It brings us to the heart of questions of temporalisation, 
and the heart of trauma. How do we guarantee the validity of an adult's experience? 
We need to think about it carefully. (Scott, 73-74) 
It is undeniable that FMS brings us to 'the heart of questions of temporalization' and 
therefore to 'the heart of trauma' itself However, Scott appears to omit the central issue 
in her account. The belatedness' with which the memory of abuse is recovered, which 
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Scott interprets as a loss of 'guarantee' in relation to the validity of the event, is inherent 
in the nature of trauma itself, in which the stressor is experienced only after a delay or 
temporal hiatus. Consideration of the 'closeness in time' to the traumatic event is 
therefore a redundant and counter-productive exercise; the event cannot be said to have 
been 'experienced' at all until a gap in time has allowed for its assimilation. Again, 
trauma is profoundly disruptive of notions of chronological sequence. 
In attempting to negotiate the complicated and highly-charged issues that arise 
around FMS, it is worth bearing in mind its origin as a legal problem: it arose directly 
out of the judicial sentencing of the parents of adult survivors. The law is inevitably 
accompanied by the machinery of evidence and truth: it demands that the event be 
proved. This is clearly problematic in relation to childhood sexual abuse, in which there 
is frequently a separation of many years between the event and legal proceedings. 
Scott's reliance on a 'guarantee' of 'immediacy' seems to me to arise from the same legal 
discourse: her demand is that the 'validity' of the traumatic event be proved with a 'high 
level of probability'. It is notable that her account entirely ignores the problem of 
evidence which was so prominent a feature of the Cleveland crisis. It was clearly 
demonstrated in 1987 that temporal 'closeness' to the traumatic event does not act as a 
'guarantee' of 'the sense of that experience'. The crisis centred on the status of the 
diagnostic category of the 'anal dilatation reflex' as an indicator of sexual abuse. 9 The 
'dilatation reflex' was recognized in forensic medicine as an indication that anal 
penetration had occurred; the Cleveland crisis arose out of the revelation that the 
symptom was widespread on the bodies of children. Although indications of abuse were 
9The 'anal dilatation reflex' is a function of damage to the internal sphincter muscle in the anal canal. If 
this muscle is damaged, the external sphincter muscle acts to close off the bowel. However, this muscle 
can only sustain a contraction for a relatively short period of time; as that muscle gradually relaxes, the 
damage to the internal muscle is revealed and there is a characteristic 'gaping' of the anus, so that it is 
possible to see inside. Dilatation can only be caused by something large enough to rupture or stretch the 
sphincter muscles; clearly this implies anal penetration or intercourse as one possibility. While severe 
constipation can also cause the dilatation reflex, the condition quickly resolves itself, and it is not 
accompanied by any of the other characteristic signs of abuse - these include not only sores, swellings 
and bruises, but also a characteristic smooth surface around the anal edge, rather than the normal 
puckering. healed lacerations, and a thickening of the skin produced by regular rubbing. See Beatrix 
Campbell, Un ricial Secrets: Child Sexual Abuse - The Cleveland Case, (London: Virago, 1988), pp. 
60-62. Further references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
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clearly visible on the anuses of many of the children, the crisis in 1987 was marked by 
the central dilemma in relation to the traumatic event: whether that which was seen was 
also able to become known. Beatrix Campbell has observed the familiar complex of 
problems raised in 1987, so that trauma is related to 'what is knowable', but it is also 
'dependent on political consciousness': 
Detection is always contingent. It depends on co-operation and a consensus 
about what matters,. what is wrong, what hurts, what is visible and what is knowable. 
Detection is above all about what is evident and what is evidence. But all this is 
dependent on political consciousness. Seeing is believing, we're told, and yet 
evidence, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. If you don't believe it is possible 
for children to be sexually abused en masse by the men in their lives, then you don't 
see the signs, even when they stare you in the face. (Campbell, 70-7 1) 
One of the most remarkable features of the judicial inquiry into the Cleveland 
crisis was that it did not aim to investigate the truth or falsity of the claims of abuse or 
the validity of the diagnostic criteria. Lord Butler-Sloss explicitly stated: 'It is not the 
function of the inquiry to evaluate the accuracy of any diagnosis nor to resolve 
conflicting evidence nor to assess whether an individual child was or was not sexually 
abused'. 10 Nevertheless, the diagnostic category of the 'anal dilatation reflex' was 
cautiously vindicated in the inquiry as an indication that abuse may have occurred. In 
the Cleveland Report, Butler-Sloss concluded from the evidence that 'the consensus is 
that the sign of anal dilatation is abnormal and suspicious and requires further 
investigation. It is not in itself evidence of anal abuse' (Butler-Sloss, 193). This finding 
was contrary to media assumptions that the diagnosis would be discredited. The report 
also stated that Drs. Wyatt and I-Eggs had acted within these constraints in their handling 
of the children. The media had claimed that the pediatricians had screened all children 
for sexual abuse, whether or not there was any suggestion that it had taken place, and 
that sexual abuse was diagnosed solely on the basis of the sign of anal dilatation. Both 
of these claims were refuted in the Butler-Sloss report. She emphasized that there was 
no screening and stated of the anal dilatation reflex: 'in only 18 cases out of the 121 
IORight Honorable Lord Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, Rep! 2rt of the lpguia into Child Abuse in Cleveland 
1987, (London: H. M. S. O., 1988), p. 183. Further references to this report are given after quotations in 
the text. 
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cases was it the sole physical sign, and in no case was it the sole ground for the 
diagnosis' (Butler-Sloss, 165). The diagnosis relied on a broad range of factors, taking 
into account the physical and psychological behaviour of the children (for example, 
whether they displayed unusual sexual knowledge or behaviour), and whether the 
children were in contact with an individual already convicted on a charge of buggery. 
The psychologist David Healy has indicated a constructive approach to the 
traumatic event, which clearly reflects the problems arising out of Cleveland, in his 
volume Images of Trauma. He creatively combines a respect for the historical reality of 
the traumatic event with a simultaneous recognition of its resistances and difficulties: 
Applying all these factors to the question of establishing what happened in 
situations of possible abuse leads us to expect that even if the abuse did happen the 
child's story is likely to be inconsistent and contradictory. This follows as the truth of 
the matter is in a sense as much a fabrication as any possible other version of events. 
This will apply even to those cases in which subjects appear to be reliving events 
rather than just remembering them. Indeed the wealth of concrete detail that some 
subjects provide may seriously mislead the unwary. Interpretation will therefore 
inevitably remain a hazardous enterprise. It is ever a matter of establishing a probable 
account of what happened rather than supposedly scientifically 'proving' a point. 
(Healy, 113) 
Healy indicates that the most constructive approach to the traumatic event lies in 
'interpretation', which is concerned not with the 'provable' but with the 'probable'. His 
account allows for the findings of the Butler-Sloss report, so that the anal dilatation 
reflex would count not as 'proof that the event of sexual abuse had occurred, but as a 
marker in the 'hazardous enterprise' of 'interpretation'. It is precisely in the creation of 
this gap between 'proof ' and 'interpretation' that the recovery of the traumatic event can 
become a viable possibility in practical terms, for it allows for the 'inconsistent and 
contradictory' nature of any narrative or 'story' of events (whether it is told by a 'child' or 
an adult survivor). 
Scott's account focuses not only on questions of temporality but also on the issue 
of 'Place' we concentration on these boundaries' ignores the inherent resistance of -I ler 
trauma 'to be simply located in... any single place or time' (Caruth, 'Introduction', 8). 
The 'place' of sexual abuse is thus within the private sphere of the family. Scott points 
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out that the domestic nature of the events means that they are not documented; there are 
no witnesses to their occurrence and no evidence that they have taken place. Even if the 
po itical climate has shifted towards an awareness of the prevalence of sexual abuse, 
there is still no evidential basis. This leads Scott to conclude: 'It continues to be... an 
uncertain event' (Scott, 72). Scott juxtaposes the private nature of sexual abuse with the 
more public events of the Holocaust, and argues that the contrast is 'instructive'. The 
'place' in which the Holocaust is sited is public: it is a 'documented' form of trauma, with 
a clear 'evidential basis' and it is by implication a 'certain event'. She indicates the work 
of Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub at Yale University, which is concerned precisely with 
the documentation of the Holocaust for public reference (they research in 'a centre for 
videotaping and memory work). Scott establishes a contrast between the memories of 
Holocaust survivors,, which are 'remembered' by the individual, so that 'we are not 
talking about repression of the event itself, and the memories of childhood sexual abuse 
which are not 'remembered' by the individual but recovered in therapy. The testimonies 
of the Holocaust survivors are likewise documented and accepted into a research 
collection and consequently 'validated' as historical reality, while the testimonies of adult 
survivors are 'violently disconfirmed' by the opposing claims of their parents. 
In establishing this contrast, Scott appears to circumvent the central insight into 
trauma that the work of Felman and Laub has produced: namely, that all trauma 
overwhelms the individual's frame of reference and meaning and so is not available for 
'remembrance'. Psychological access to the events of the Holocaust is no more direct or 
guaranteed than in the case of sexual abuse. Felman and Laub have demonstrated that 
there is no easy or straightforward 'joint acceptance of a shared realit)ý even in the more 
public events of the Holocaust. The 'violent disconfirmations', which have greeted the 
testimonies of adult survivors of sexual abuse, have also surrounded the historical reality 
of the Holocaust, in the form of revisionist historians. An assumption is made by Scott 
that an event which is witnessed is thereby 'validated' and made 'real'. The focus of the 
research carried out by Felman and Laub has been to indicate the extreme difficulty of 
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bearing witness to any traumatic event, which overwhelms categories of understanding 
and severs the individual's sense of connection and meaning. 
Scott's reliance on the public status of the event and the independent evidence of 
witnesses again appears to arise from the legal discourse in which FMS is embedded. 
She mispronounces the unprovable nature of the traumatic event as evidence of its 
'uncertain' status. Again, a more constructive approach would seek to establish a 
'probable' account of the event through a process of 'interpretation'. Healy has indicated 
that this 'hazardous enterprise' is not properly a 'scientific' process: the engagement with 
issues of trauma requires a clear recognition of the limits of language and the articulable. 
I have already noted the literary-theory background of many of those who are eminent in 
the contemporary field of trauma studies - at Yale alone, researchers into trauma include 
Shoshana Felman, Cathy Caruth, Lawrence Langer. There is a clear indication that this 
training in the strategies and (particularly) the limits of interpretation is especially suited 
to the discipline of trauma studies and is integral to the practices of the contemporary 
theorist. II 
COMPENSATION AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE PROBLEM OF TRAUMA AND 
THE LAW 
The phenomenon of FMS has arisen out of legal proceedings: the furious debates 
by which it is currently surrounded indicate the tensions and incompatibilities which 
accompany the law's engagement with issues of trauma. However, if the entry of the 
traumatic event into judicial proceedings is problematic, it is also unavoidable: regardless 
II Cathy Caruth has explicitly indicated a connection between her own literary-theory background and 
her work on trauma. She has argued that the recent developments in poststructuralist criticism, and 
particularly deconstruction, have re-positioned the 'referentiality' of the text, so that it no longer refers to 
something which can be straightforwardly grasped outside the text, but is realigned with that which is 
not fully knowable. This shift in focus in contemporary critical theory has not only demonstrated the 
resistance of texts to the model of inside and outside, but it has also severed the connection between 
reading and certainty, so that interpretation may arise where understanding and knowledge cannot. 
Caruth states clearly that the interruption of cognitive frameworks which has marked the enterprise of 
deconstruction has given rise to her thinking about issues of trauma. The article to which I refer can be 
found in the following volume. Cathy Caruth, 'Introduction: The insistence of Reference, Critical 
Encounters. -Reference 
and Re5V_Asib-i1AY' in _DecOnstructiYLe -WIjifi-ng, eds. 
Cathy Caruth and Deborah 
Esch, (New Brunsi&ick. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1995), pp. 1-10. 
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of whether the traumatic stressor is caused by natural or human agency, the victim is 
necessarily confronted with the question of compensation. In The Body In -Pain. 
The 
Making and Unmaking of the World (1985), Elaine Scarry writes of compensation in 
relation to the law. 12 She argues that, confronted with an injury over which it must 
litigate, the law registers both the physical fact of the injury and the suffering or pain that 
is involved. For her, the court of law represents an arena in which the internal and 
incommunicable experience of pain is beginning to achieve expression. The litigation 
involved in a case in which compensation may be awarded demands a precise 
determination of the degree of suffering undergone by the plaintiff. Scarry contends that 
this has forced a detailed language of pain to be forged in the context of the courtroom: 
such litigation provides a situation that... requires that the impediments to 
expressing pain be overcome... [T]he lawyer... becomes an inventor of language, one 
who speaks on behalf of another person (the plaintiff) and attempts to communicate 
the reality of that person's physical pain to people who are not themselves in pain (the 
jurors). (Scarry, 10) 
Counter to Scarry, I would contend that the 'inventor' of the 'language' of pain is not the 
'lawyer', but the medical diagnostician. As I have demonstrated, diagnostic 'language' is 
formulated not only by psychiatrists and medical professionals, but by the trauma victims 
themselves, who have 'communicated the reality' of their suffering in politically 
organized pressure groups. In 'speaking on behalf of another person' in the lawcourt, it 
is precisely this diagnostic language which the lawyer adopts. In their article on the 
diagnostic category of PTSD, Elizabeth Brett and others indicate that in compensation 
cases,, a 'thorough understanding' of the experience and situation of the plaintiff derives 
not fi7om legal vocabulary but from a medical 'diagnosis': 
A thorough understanding of the diagnosis is important... because... a wide range 
of compensation issues arise for individuals with PTSD - from claims based on 
exposure to war, including veterans benefits and wartime reparations, to tort claims 
for civilian disasters and rape. ('DSM-111-R Criteria for PTSD',. 1232) 
Compensation proceedings in relation to issues of trauma rely on a precise and 
detailed medical diagnosis of the condition, which clearly delineates its symptoms and 
12 Elaine Scarry, The Bgt In Pain: The Maldng and Umnaking of the World, 2nd ed-, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987). Further references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
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aetiology. ScarrY is concerned to emphasize the viability of such an accurate articulation 
Of physical and psychological pain. She insists on the ability of language to express pain 
comprehensively: 'the human voice, far from being untrustworthy, is capable of 
accurately exposing even the most resistant aspects of material reality' (Scarry, 8). In 
terms of medicine, she contends, - the central 
issue in this project of articulation is the 
dynamic that is established between patient and physician. The relationship between 
them must first of all be one of 'intimacy', for it is only in close collaboration that the 
'human voice' can be heard to express suffering. Further, the language of pain is one 
which is 'fragmentary' and disjointed; consequently, the physician must listen with'acuity' 
to what is spoken. The success of the enterprise relies on a sympathetic mode of 
interpretation by which the incomplete language of trauma may be rendered articulate 
and comprehensible. Scarry's emphasis on the articulability of pain outlines a vital 
project for those who seek to treat survivors of trauma. However, it is worth noting that 
she perhaps underestimates the profoundly disruptive nature of trauma, which resists 
categorization and is not entirely susceptible to narrative or linguistic formulation. 
In Discriminatory Aspects of the German Indemnification Policy' (1982), Milton 
Kestenberg describes in detail the attempts of Holocaust survivors to claim 
compensation from the German government for the suffering which they have 
undergone. 13 He is concerned to register in his article the seemingly irreconcilable 
differences which arise between the representatives of the law and the Holocaust 
survivors who seek to obtain reparations. It is clear from his writing that these 
differences arise, in large part, from the absence of any clear diagnostic description of the 
suffering undergone by the plaintiff. The struggle of Holocaust survivors to obtain 
reparations from the German government simultaneously acts as a representation of the 
difficulties of formulating a diagnostic category for the sequelae of such overwhelming 
atrocities. It is not only the individual claims of the survivors which are on trial, but the 
13 Nfilton Kcstcnberg, 'Discriminatory Aspects of the German indemnification Policy: A Continuation 
of the Persecution', Generations of the Holocaust. eds. M. S. Bergmann and M. E. Jucovy (New York: 
Basic Books. 1982). pp. 62-79. Further references to this article are given after quotations in the text. 
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competing claims of differing modes of psychiatry to describe the condition of the 
survivor of massive trauma. 
In 1953,. West Germany instituted the Federal Indemnification Law, in which 
provision was made to award reparations to those whose working capacity was 
permanently impaired due to Nazi persecution. Initially, claims were restricted to those 
who had suffered physical injury. However, in a familiar pattern, trauma overwhelmed 
its own limits or modes of categorization; and from 1965, psychiatric conditions were 
also recognized as being caused by the persecution. A problem rapidly arose in the legal 
proceedings, in relation to the psychological after-effects of the Holocaust, for there was 
no precise and detailed diagnosis by which a 'thorough understanding' of the suffering 
and condition of the plaintiff might be articulated. A clear divide arose in the judicial 
proceedings between the competing claims of the German medical establishment and 
American procedures. In German psychiatric medicine, the psychological effects of a 
traumatic experience, no matter how severe, were immediate and temporary; pain could 
have no lasting effect on the individual. In contrast, the American psychiatric 
community emphasized that the psychological damage caused by trauma was not only 
lasting, but was also commonly delayed in effect. The crucial debate in the litigation 
procedures centred on the temporal delay of the traumatic experience, or the 
'belatedness' of its effect. The privileging of German psychiatric procedures by the 
representatives of the law effectively limited compensation to those few individuals who 
were able to provide evidence of continuous psychiatric disturbance from the date of 
release from the camp. Kestenberg notes: 'Only BrackenUmptome ("bridge symptoms") 
were recognized as valid; they had to be present at the time of liberation and treated at 
that time and since. So-called Spdtschdden ("delayed damages") were not recognized, at 
least not at first' (Kestenberg, 7 1). In practical terms, this meant that it was virtually 
impossible to claim compensation for psychological damages, which were commonly 
manifested only after a temporal hiatus. In terms of the Holocaust survivor, the 
symptom-free period typically co-incided with emigration to America, and an interval in 
which there was still the possibility that relatives might appear. Even though the 
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symptoms were delayed, they were nevertheless clearly related to experiences of 
persecution, and were often triggered by events which were reminiscent of conditions in 
the concentration camps. 
This confusion in relation to diagnostic procedure was heightened by the role of 
the physician in the legal proceedings. Scarry has noted two requirements in order that 
pain might be successfully articulated - the dialogue of patient and physician ought to be 
one of 'intimacy', and the physician must engage in an interpretative process which is 
based on a sympathetic and intuitive mode of hearing. In his article, Kestenberg maps 
the precise relation between medicine and the law in the indemnification trials. He notes 
that the 'intimate' conversation of patient and physician was gradually replaced by a more 
authoritarian approach. Initially, the medical profession was represented in the legal 
proceedings by the Vertrauensarzt (confidential physician'), who supplied the 
representatives of the law with a medical report: 
[The German Indemnification Authority] referred the claimant to a physician,, 
appointed and sworn in by the German consulate. This physician, referred to as 
Vertrauensarzt ('confidential physician'), had to be licensed in the country in which he 
practiced. However, since he had to give his reports in German, he was usually 
German-born. The Vertrauensarzt furnished the authority with his medical findings. 
(Kestenberg, 64) 
In the early years of the litigation, the physician therefore subtnitted to the 
Indemnification Authority his own 'medical findings'. Even at this early stage, however, 
the divide between German and American diagnostic procedures was evident. A large 
proportion of the claimants for compensation had emigrated to America in the years 
following the Second World War, in order to attempt to rebuild their lives. The 
Vertrauensarzt was thus typically 'German-born', but 'licensed' in America ('the country 
in which he practiced'), and was therefore likely to be influenced by American diagnostic 
procedures. 
In the 1960's, the Beratender Arzt ('consulting physician') was introduced into 
the legal proceedings, although his role was not provided for in the 1953 Indemnification 
Law. He based his diagnosis, not on an 'intimate' dialogue or conversation with the 
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patient, but on the basis of the medical records alone. Although he did not see the 
claimant, he retained the authority to overrule the opinion of the Vertrauensarzt. 
Kestenberg states explicitly that this was because his task was not to arbitrate over 
individual cases, but over the competing claims of medicine itself He was not concerned 
with the degree of suffering undergone by the plaintiff, but with its diagnostic 
categorization. Kestenberg notes of the institution of the 'consulting physician': 
Behind this procedure lay the contention that medical science is not universal: 
there is an American medical science and a German one. In cases where a claimant 
was examined by a doctor who practiced in the United States, the Beratender Arzt 
evaluated the record and scrutinized the report of the doctor for fear that he had been 
contaminated by American psychiatry. (Kestenberg, 73) 
THE INTERVENTION OF AMERICAN PSYCFHATRY: TOWARDS A DIAGNOSIS 
OF HYSTERIA 
While the Indemnification Authority was concerned to uncover and eliminate the 
'contamination' of German psychiatry by American procedures, psychiatric practitioners 
in America were simultaneously campaigning vigorously against the existing restitution 
laws. Based in New York, a group of psychiatrists and psychotherapists - which 
included such eminent names as Henry Krystal, William Niederland, Milton and Judith 
Kestenberg, Martin Bergmann, Hillel Klein, Marion Ofiner and James Herzog - reviewed 
case after case of the Gennan proceedings. 14 They found that although these cases were 
based on so-called 'expert' medical testimony, the findings ran counter to their own 
clinical experience. Milton Kestenberg, writing of the German psychiatrists' belief in the 
temporary emotional damage caused by the Holocaust, observed: No modem 
psychiatric research supports this view' (Kestenberg, 69). Henry Krystal enlarged on this 
- he noted that in order to counteract the outdated modes of psychiatry utilized by the 
German authonties,. it was necessary to supply 'hard facts, about contemporary research 
14 The findings of this group are collected in the fOllowing volumes. Generations of the Holocaust, eds. 
M. S. Bergmann and M. E. Jucovy, (New York: Basic Books, 1982). Massive Pvchic Trauma, ed, 
Henry Krystal (New York: International Universities Press, 1968). Further references to these volumes 
are given after quotations in the text. 
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into the after-effects of trauma. It was vital, in other words, that a new diagnostic 
category should be formulated- 
I found in a study of 367 consecutive cases of survivors of the Nazi Holocaust 
that there was no correlation between pension or restitution and diagnosis of degree 
of damage or extent of suffering of the survivors... Restitution determinations were 
made by bureaucrats who had set up their own policies and procedures, which 
reflected the orientation of a particular branch of the restitution authorities. To 
counteract such forces in public policy we must have hard facts about human damage 
and rehabilitation. 15 
In 1973, psychiatrists meeting at the Twenty-Eighth International Congress in 
Paris discussed the diagnosis of hysteria, in order to account for the symptomatology of 
the survivor of massive trauma. 16 This diagnostic category was useful to psychiatric 
practitioners in two respects. Firstly, hysteria provided a clear medical example of a 
condition in which the emotional impact of an event was not manifested until after a 
considerable period of time had elapsed. It also accounted for the wide range of 
symptoms and disturbances displayed by the survivor, which could not easily be 
formulated into a single diagnosis. Discussion at the Congress centred on Freud's early 
formulations of hysteria, because these were regarded to be particularly concerned with 
the notion of the event. However, despite the clear analogies between the physical and 
psychological sequelae of the Holocaust and the condition of hysteria, the diagnosis was 
immediately considered problematic and surrounded by qualifications. William 
Niederland stressed the uniqueness of the symptomatology of the Holocaust survivor, 
noting the particular prevalence of hypochondria in symptom-formation, which he traced 
back to the camp 'selections', in which survival depended on appearing healthy. He also 
noted new symptoms which were presented by the Holocaust survivor, in particular 
15 Henry Krystal, 'Psychoanalytic Views on Human Emotional Damages', Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder: Pýychological and Biological SNuelae, ed. Bessel. A. van der KonL, (Washington: American 
Psychiatric Press, 1984), 2-28 (pp. 21-22). Further references to this volume are given after quotations 
in the text. 
1611se Grubrich-Simitis, 'From Concretism to Metaphor: Thoughts on Some Theoretical and Technical 
Aspects of the Psychoanalytic Work with Children of Holocaust Survivors,. ps 
the Child, 39, (1984), 301-319 (pp. 308-309). 
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I survivor guilt'. 17 Niederland explicitly related the unique clinical profile of the 
concentration-camp survivor to the extreme historical situation from which it emerged. 
His concern was that too straightforward an analogy might be drawn between the 
situation of the Holocaust survivor, who has undergone an extreme war atrocity, and the 
runeteenth-century hysteric, whom he described as the product of the longest and most 
secure period of peace in European history (Niederland, 28). 
It is notable that Niederland's anxiety regarding the diagnosis of hysteria 
immediately centred on the status of the traumatic event - his emphasis on the unique 
historical atrocity of the Holocaust was concerned to securely delineate the traumatic 
event as external and locatable. The problem for psychiatrists with the diagnosis of 
hysteria was that, since Freud's abandonment of the 'seduction theory', it had become 
pejorative in association, related to events internal to the psyche and not grounded in 
historical reality. Its reinstatement revived uncertainties about the status of the event - 
hysteria carried implicit within it suggestions of an internal pathology which originated in 
childhood. Niederland strongly reproached those psychiatric practitioners who, in 
assessing the aetiology of the survivor's condition, virtually ignored the experience of 
internment in a concentration camp, and focused almost exclusively on childhood and 
family background: 
As important as early developmental factors for the pathogenic manifestations of 
neurotic and psychotic conditions are, they can never be the sole consideration in the 
psychiatric evaluation of mental disorders in concentration-camp survivors. Even 
reports from competent specialists or reputable psychiatric institutions sometimes 
contain only a sentence or two on the persecution experiences of such patients, but 
they hardly ever fail to describe in detail certain features of their sexual behavior, 
family difficulties, and other problems. (Niederland, II- 12) 
This shift of interest to the internal pathology of the suvivor, which originated prior to 
the experiences of the Holocaust, provoked Niederland into a renewed insistence on the 
extremity of the persecution experience, which is in itself sufficient to cause pathology. 
17William G. Niederland, 'The Problem of the Survivor', Massive Rgychic Trauma, ed- Henry Krystal 
(New York: international Universities Press, 1968), 946 (p. 32). Further references to this article are 
given after quotations in the text. 
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He argued that survival in the camps was dependent on a high level of adaptability, 
which was not commensurate with early psychological disturbance: 
those who managed to survive showed an unusual adaptability, alertness, and 
ability for quick decisions and execution of action that were decisive to their survival. 
The pertinence of this observation lies in the fact that it is a rafLty to observe among 
survivors agy prepersecution depression or serious predisposition to endogenous 
depression or pVchosiS. (Niederland, 34) 
Concern about the status of the event in relation to hysteria led many 
psychiatrists to question the diagnosis as a description for the pathology of 
concentration-camp survivors. In 1984, Henry Krystal observed that although he had 
attempted to assimilate the symptomatology of Holocaust survivors with 
psychoanalytical accounts of hysteria, the two had failed to coincide: 
In my follow-up observations I have struggled in vain to fit the survivors of the 
Nazi Holocaust into the 'classical' psychoanalytic concepts of psychic trauma. I 
concluded that our observations simply could not be understood in terms of the 
economic view of traumatization, nor in terms of Freud's other definition of trauma, 
namely repression. ('Psychoanalytic Views on Human Emotional Damages, 5) 
Krvstal is extreme here in his J rejection of all of 
Freud's writing on trauma. Freud 
compulsively returned to the subject of trauma throughout his career. As I shall 
demonstrate, one of the most challenging aspects of Caruth's work lies in her recognition 
of Freud's valuable insights into the belated effect of trauma on the individual, which is 
particularly evident in his late writing (see Chapter Four). However, Krystal does 
express the prevailing view of the American psychiatrists that the symptomatology of the 
Holocaust survivor did not 'fit' the 'classical' psychoanalytic concepts of hysteria. 
., 
the diagnosis was not entirely rejected: research in the 1980's was Nevertheless, 
concerned to identify the traumatic neurosis with an alternative account of the hysterical 
condition. Psychiatrists Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart radically shifted the 
focus of trauma theory from the history of Freud's founding of psychoanalysis, to the 
work of his contemporary, Pierre Janet. This change in emphasis meant that the 
diagnosis of hysteria no longer threatened to negate the devastating impact of the 
historical reality of the Holocaust on the survivor. Janet's work on hysteria emphasized 
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the lasting and belated impact of the traumatic event and recognized that a large variety 
of different experiences could overwhelm the psyche. 
In conclusion, I would like to return to Herman's formulation of the symptomatic 
history of trauma theory, which was once again revealed in the revival of interest in Janet 
in the 1980's. One legacy of Freud's founding of psychoanalysis was the eclipse of Pierre 
Janet's work, in one of the 'episodic amnesias' which have characterized the history of 
trauma studies. Janet became a mere 'historical curiosity' until he was 'reclaimed', first by 
Henri Ellenberger in 1970, and more fully by van der Kolk and van der Hart in the 
1980's. 18 The revival of his work disrupts the theoretical model of historical process in 
two respects. The remarkably 'contemporary' themes of his writing preclude the notion 
of the chronological development of ideas, while its implications place into question the 
founding of psychoanalysis as a historical point of origin for the study of trauma. It is 
with this starting point that I wish to enter the debates which focus on the relation of 
trauma and the body - the opening of my discussion thus centres on a starting point 
which is profoundly disruptive and resistant, and which is only one of many possible 
points of origin with which to begin to 'reclaim' the 'abundant and rich tradition' of 
thought regarding the impact of trauma on the individual. 
18 Ellenberger included a chapter on the work of Pierre Janet in his historical survey of psychiatry, 
which was published in 1970. Henri F. Ellenberger, 'Pierre Janet and Psychological Analysis', The 
Discoveg of the Unconscious: The Histoly and Evolution of L)ynamic PoLchiatrv (New York: Basic 
Books, 1970: repr. London: Fontana, 1994), 331-417. The collaborative articles by Bessel van der Kolk 
and Onno van der Hart on the work of Pierre Janet are numerous; the most informative are cited below. 
Bessel A. van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart, 'The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of Memory and the 
Engraving of Trauma, American Imago, 48 (1991), 425-454. Bessel A. van der Kok Paul Brown and 
Onno van der Hart, 'Pierre Janet on Post-Traumatic Stress', Journal of T natic Stress, 2 (1989): 365- 
378. Further references to these works are given after quotations in the text. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE 14YSTERICAL BODY 
A RETURN TO THE WORK OF PIERRE JANET 
RE-INSTITUTING THE EVENT: HYPNOSIS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
RE 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Thus, Janet's work can be compared to a vast city buried beneath ashes, like 
Pompeii. The fate of any buried city is uncertain. It may remain buried forever. It 
may remain concealed while being plundered by marauders. But it may also perhaps 
be unearthed some day and brought back to life. (Ellenberger, 409) 
Freud's founding of psychoanalysis in 1896 has taken on almost mythical status 
as a point of origin. Based on the narratives of Freud and his followers, psychoanalysis 
is commonly seen to originate in two monumental discoveries. In terms of therapeutic 
practice, Freud's relinquishment of hypnosis is connected with his pioneering work on 
the 'transference',, while his abandomnent of the theory of childhood seduction has 
become inextricable from his discovery of childhood sexuality. As a point of origin, 
Freud's founding of psychoanalysis thus appears to mark a revolution in thought, and it 
is commonly claimed to be the beginning of the modem era, in part because of its 
historical situation at the threshold of the twentieth century. In this chapter, I aim to 
revise the accepted history of the beginnings of psychoanalysis, and to disrupt its 
privileged status. As a starting point for the study of trauma, psychoanalysis is only one 
of many possible points of origin, and I propose to return it to its proper status as one of 
several competing claims to describe and treat the hysterical neuroses. By exploring in 
some detail the context in which psychoanalysis was founded, I am interested in 
addressing the question of why it was privileged above other,, contemporary modes of 
treatment. This enquiry into alternative views and methods of treatment is also 
disruptive of the normally unquestioned modes of behaviour in the psychoanalytic 
session. Viewed in relation to the work of his contemporaries, Freud's method of 
treatment is revealed to be an artificial construct: the psychoanalytic session can be 
rethought as a specific mode of performance which is staged between the analyst and the 
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analysand. In this chapter, I wish to examine how this psychoanalytic performance 
affects the behaviour and relationship of both therapist and client in the insular setting of 
the therapy session. In order to explore this issue, I propose to refer extensively to an 
essay by the contemporary theorist Luce Irigaray, which explores the unique staging of 
the psychoanalytic session from a disruptive and revisionary perspective. 
In the metaphor quoted above, Ellenberger describes the notion of historical 
process in relation to the science of archaeology. Even though Janet was initially more 
popular than Freud, his work was eclipsed or 'buried' by the founding of psychoanalysis 
in 1896. Ellenberger describes his own conscious effort to re-introduce Janet's ideas into 
the history of psychiatric thought in terms of an excavation or 'unearthing'; he maps the 
point at which the 'buried city' of Janet's corpus lies. Ellenberger's image is profoundly 
disruptive of notions of chronological progress. Firstly, the reference to 'Pompeii' 
compares Janet's work to an archaeological site which was remarkable for the complete 
and intact nature of its preservation. Frozen in time, historical process seemingly halted 
at Pompeii in 79 A. D., and the site is disturbingly evocative because it renders ancient 
history so seemingly immediate and contemporary. The comparison of Pompeii with 
Janet's work bears traces of Herman's 'symptomatic' history, so that although Janet wrote 
a century ago, his ideas appear remarkably contemporary once they have been 
'unearthed'. Secondly, Ellenberger's metaphor does not assume that his own writing will 
form the basis for a historical revival of Janet's work. He argues that it is for others to 
deterniine whether and to what extent the excavation of Janet's theories wifl continue. 
However, there is no guarantee of progression; Ellenberger appears to recognize the 
profoundly disruptive nature of the 'tradition' in which he writes, which is seized by 'fits 
and starts' of interest. 
In the 1980's, Ellenberger's 'excavations' formed a basis for the researches of 
Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart, who linked the contemporary work on 
trauma to Janet's ideas regarding hysteria. They claimed to have 'unearthed' Janet's 
psychotherapeutic system and to have 'brought back to life' his methods of treatment. 
However in a recent article, Ruth Leys claims that these theorists of the 1980's have 
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merely 'plundered' the work of Janet, extracting from it that which suits their purposes. I 
In her article, Leys accordingly 'unearths' that which the 'marauders' have failed to 
uncover, so that she herself can replace them as the champion of that which has been 
'concealed'. In a familiar pattern, the notion of origin becomes a site of debate and 
contestation; I will be arguing that, at least in part, this sense of conflict can be attributed 
to the contemporary debates on Talse Memory Syndrome', which provided the 
immediate context in which Leys' article was written. Her paper emphasizes the dangers 
of hypnosis, arguing that it places the status of the event radically at risk, and so she 
reiterates the claims of the 'False Memory Syndrome Foundation'. 
I wish to suggest that Leys consistently tnisreads Janet's relation to the event, or 
the incident that provoked a traumatic reaction in his patients. She contends that Janet 
deliberately altered the event in his patient's mind, thereby placing any notion of 
historical veracity at risk. In some cases, she argues, he even erased the memory of the 
event altogether through suggestion in the hypnotic state. Her misreading of the 
complexity of Janet's notion of memory appears to be compounded by her 
misunderstanding of the operation of the body in Janet's writing. She oversimplifies the 
way in which Janet understood the body's involvement in the processes of memory and 
symptom-formation, which has serious implications for her reading of his work. 
Leys begins her article at the point at which Freud broke away from mainstream, 
tum-of-the-century neurological medicine to found the science of psychoanalysis. This 
shift in Freud's work occurred in 1896 and was marked by his relinquishment of hypnosis 
as a method of treatment. Leys remarks that it is only by moving away from what she 
terms as the 'enigma' of suggestion that is involved in hypnosis, that Freud is able to 
establish psychoanalysis as a 'discipline' (Leys, 623). A clear and unambiguous 
'differentiation' (Leys' own term) emerges, which is to mark the argumentative style of 
her article throughout. Psychoanalysis as a science or objective study begins in 1896 
when Freud no longer uses hypnosis as a methodological tool. Prior to this, his work 
I Ruth Leys, 'Traumatic Cures: Shell-Shock, Janet and the Question of Memory,, Critical IpARgly, 20 
(1994), 623-662. Further references to this article are given after quotations in the text. 
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was sub . ect to the taint of 'suggestion', precisely the charge of implanting or erasing j 
memory that marks the contemporary debates regarding FMS. 
What Leys omits from her account is the historical background to Freud's 
rejection of hypnosis. It is well known that Freud was not a particularly successful 
hypnotist and frequently failed to induce in his subjects the desired state of trance. He 
was forced to devise his own method for producing the intensity of concentration on 
internal processes that was required for the therapeutic situation. This consisted of 
encouraging the patient to allow his or her ýnind to wander and at a given signal, usually 
a touch on the forehead, to verbalize whatever entered the mind first - no matter how 
inappropriate it may seem. This failure at hypnotism is usually cited as the motivating 
factor which caused Freud to cease using it in his sessions. Another, more compelling, 
reason is very revealing. In Images of Trauma, David Healy indicates the attitude to 
hypnosis that prevailed at about the time at which Freud renounced its use (Healy, 184). 
In 1892, the French media was dominated for several months by a murder trial which 
took place in Paris. A prostitute, named Gabrielle Bompard,, had been an accomplice to 
the murder of a bailiff by her boyfriend Michel Eyraud. In the lawcourt Bompard 
pleaded innocent, claiming that she had been under Eyraud's hypnotic influence when the 
crime had been committed. The trial highlighted the perils of hypnosis. It was claimed 
that not only could practitioners assault female patients (literally 'implant' in them that 
which should not be there), but also male servants could hypnotize and assault the 
housewives by whom they were employed. Such rapes would be accompanied by a 
post-hypnotic amnesia, for the hypnotist could erase all memory of the event. As in the 
contemporary debates on FMS, the entry of the question of hypnosis into the lawcourt 
places at risk the historical event. By suggestion, the hypnotist causes either a surplus or 
an absence of memory. All that this reveals is that the hypnotic process is unable to 
enter the legal discourse. The law demands an absolute form of witness, hypnosis 
reveals that this absolute form of memory is itself a fiction and so it is 'dismissed' from 
the courtroom. In the ruling of the 1892 case, the legal practice of hypnosis was 
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restricted to the medical profession, and the Catholic Church banned it altogether -a ban 
which stayed in place until 1955. 
The other significant absence from the opening of Leys' article is the major shift 
that occurred in Freud's thought in 1896 and is cited by Healy as a second reason why 
Freud was so keen to relinquish the use of hypnosis. This was, of course, the 
abandonment of the seduction theory, in favour of the Oedipal complex and childhood 
sexual drives. Healy writes as follows: 
Thus in the course of a few years hypnosis was rejected doubly, once in 1892 as 
a possible socially undermining force that might corrupt morals, and again in 1895 
when it revealed significant moral corruption by leading to the unearthing of evidence 
pointing to the widespread existence and damaging effects of incest and child abuse. 
(Healy, 185) 
In a seeming paradox, hypnosis is now itself responsible for 'the unearthing of evidence'. 
Previously it entered the lawcourt and intervened in the workings of the legal process to 
make legal evidence worthless. Now, in a process of excavation, it is turning up its own 
evidence of the frequent occurrence of the rape of children. How can hypnosis uncover 
evidence at the same time as it nullifies it? The answer lies in the complex relation of 
hypnosis to the event that is being enacted here. Hypnosis is capable of uncovering past 
events which reveal uncomfortable truths. Freud discovered this in the early 1890's 
when he 'unearthed' buried memories of incest and childhood abuse in his patients. He 
then rejected hypnosis as a methodological tool in 1896, claiming that it was subject to 
the taint of suggestion. Simultaneously he turned his back on the seduction theory and 
replaced it with the Oedipal complex. The notion of suggestion in hypnosis allows Freud 
to 'cover up' his findings again. Perhaps his patients remembered early sexual drives and 
it was somehow he himself who implanted in them the memory of an event. However he 
is not guilty of malpractice, for the processes of suggestion in hypnosis are an 'enigma!. 
Their workings are mysteriously independent of both therapist and patient. The 
important point to note here is the way in which the charge of suggestion operates to 
place at risk the historical event. Freud is able to turn his back on his early work and the 
events that it has uncovered simply by evoking the single word. The same dynamic also 
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operates in the contemporary debates regarding FMS Faced with the same charges of 
childhood sexual assault precisely a century later, there is some suggestion that the 
therapist has somehow implanted the memory of the event in the mind of his patient 
under hypnosis. Again, the effect is to obscure or place at risk the event itself An 
interesting variation on the theme is provided by the trial of Gabrielle Bompard. Here 
the event allegedly occurred only because it was suggested through hypnosis. In legal 
terms,, the event was again nuffified or said not to have occurred because the woman was 
not a participant in her own actions. She was accomplice to the act of murder but the 
intent was not her own. 
The point at which Freud followed contemporary opinion (medical and 
otherwise) and relinquished the technique of hypnosis, also marks the point at which he 
departed from the methodology of his French contemporary, Pierre Janet. Janet's 
continued use of hypnosis in treatment was directly responsible for his eclipse in the 
history of psychiatric thought. Where Freud conformed to the changes in medicine that 
were occurring at the turn of the century, Janet continued to refine and systematize the 
methods that he had always used. From the middle of the last century, medicine 
submitted to a process of increased industrialization. Drug therapies were promoted 
with the general belief that a fault in the working of the body could be mechanically 
corrected. This coincided with a general rise in the standard of health. However this 
was due not so much to the technological advancements in medicine, as to the dramatic 
changes that took place in public health, and better nutrition and housing (Healy, 232). 
In a revealing footnote, Leys compares the way in which Freud and Janet each express 
their views on hypnosis in relation to the new advances in medicine. In an 1891 article, 
entitled 'Hypnosis', Freud records: 
The chief deficiency of hypnotic therapy is that it cannot be dosed. The degree 
of hypnosis attainable does not depend on the physician's procedure but on the chance 
reaction of the patient. (Standard Edition, 1,111, quoted in Leys, 629-630) 
Here Freud criticizes hypnosis on the basis that it is unpredictable in effect. it is 
precisely for Freud an 'enigma' which is independent of both physician and patient. it 
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'does not depend on the physician's procedure' but on the Teaction of the patientf. 
However this reaction is in itself random, 'chance',, and so is outside of the patient's 
control. For Janet, however, hypnotic treatment is defended as a valid form of medicine. 
It is indeed a more valid form of medicine for him than drug therapy. Quoting from an 
article by Max Eastman, he argues that he only treats his patients with a 'helpful idea', 
whereas other physicians introduce 'capsules' into their patients, which have any number 
of harmful effects. 
It is difficult to see why it is any more a suspension of judgement to let a 
physician you have decided to trust lodge a helpful idea in your mind, than to let him 
lodge an ominous-looking capsule in your body. PUchological Healing, 1,337; 
quoted in Leys, 629) 
In contrast with Freud, Janet clearly assumes a position of responsibility for what occurs 
in the hypnotic procedure. The physician ts in a position of 'trust' and takes an active 
role in the proceedings, carrying out the action that he thinks is appropriate for the cure. 
In Leys' argument this question of the responsibility of the physician in hypnosis 
marks a turning point. She has already divided hypnosis sharply into two methods: 
eithe hypnosis heals the patient by soliciting the subject's participation, ar it encourages 
the patient to be subject to the coercion of the physician and so bypasses the 
collaboration of the self It is revealing that she contextualizes this in terms of a wider 
division within the discourse of medicine, which can be regarded according to the 
position occupied by the subject. Methods emphasizing the collaboration of the subject 
are subordinate in contemporary Western medicine to modes of treatment in which the 
subject does not participate in his cure - Leys cites drug therapy and surgery as examples 
of the latter. What Leys omits to mention is that this division in the medical discourse 
occurred at the precise historical point at which the debate on hypnosis took place. It 
provides the immediate background against which this debate was played out. 
Moreover, its emergence in history reveals that alternatives to this 'either/or' outlook do 
exist. I will be arguing that Janet's theoretical approach resisted the new advances in 
medicine that surrounded him. He operated in a framework within which both physician 
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and patient assumed an active role, and in which there was no sharp division of the body 
(as a mechanical unit) away from the other modes of functioning of the subject. 
Leys divides hypnosis into two methodologies. In the first, hypnotic treatment 
depends on the expression of the emotion that triggered the symptom. In the trance 
state, the traumatic event is reproduced or relived with all the emotional intensity of the 
original experience. For this method of treatment, the conscious participation of the 
subject is unnecessary. In the second mode of cure, the relief of symptoms is provided 
not by an affective reliving but by narrative recall. The memory of the event is 
consciously reintegrated into the patient's history. This requires that the patient have 
some degree of involvement in his own cure. The problem with this 'either/or' approach 
lies in the status of the event. In both sides of the equation, the event is placed radically 
at risk. Leys finds that when the event is relived in the present, the emotions that are 
experienced are emotions of the present. It is impossible to feel an emotion as belonging 
to the past. Emotional catharsis in the hypnotic state thus comprises an acting out in the 
present. There is no consciousness of the lived experience as past or as a component of 
the patient's individual history. Attempts to force the patient to recognize the event as 
past by introducing the past tense into dialogue, have resulted in a confusion so 
profound as to result in a loss of consciousness. What this amounts to is that the patient 
acts out the event in a profound forgetfulness of the self - the event may be reproduced 
in precise detail but it is not remembered and so it is placed at considerable risk. 
The alternative to this is to involve the patient in a process of active participation, 
in which the event is introduced into consciousness and incorporated into a narrative. In 
a narrative formulation the event is remembered as past. It coincides with the 
individual's sense of self and is able to be told and retold at will as part of a personal 
history. It forms part of the patient's autobiography. For Leys this marks the 'goal of 
therapy' (Leys, 647). If the patient is able to participate in his own history, then the 
cathartic process is complete. What Leys fails to take into account at this point in her 
argument is the status of the event in the narrative process. Janet recognized that 
narrative itself places the event at risk. He pointed out repeatedly that to narrate an 
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event was to manipulate it - to show different points of view, to shorten or lengthen the 
time sequence, to alter the order of events. In short, to narrate an event is to change it. 
This is inherent in the process of narrative which is not capable of preserving the event 
unchanged or intact. The 'either/or' process of thinking thus involves a double bind. if 
the event is reproduced exactly, then it is not remembered; if the event is remembered 
and so narrated, then it is subject to radical alteration. In either case, the event is lost. 
In her reading of Janet, Leys employs the same binary framework. She divides 
Janet's view of the memory into two distinct halves: 'traumatic memory' and 'narrative 
memory'. 'Traumatic memory' exactly repeats the past, but without it entering into 
consciousness. 'Narrative memory', on the other hand, narrates the past as past and 
integrates it into a personal history. This is familiar ground. Leys argues further that for 
Janet the aim of therapy is to convert the traumatic memory into narrative memory. The 
end result is for the patient to be able to tell what has happened to him or her. She 
quotes Janet: 'The ultimate goal ... 
is to put the story ... into words' (quoted in Leys, 648). 
However this quote does not stand alone in Leys' article. She also includes another 
quote by Janet which is very revealing: 'Janet described normal memory as "the action of 
telling a story". Traumatic memory, by contrast, is wordless and static' (Leys, 648). 
Throughout her analysis, Leys has been operating on a clear division of the body from 
the so-called 'higher functions' of mental and linguistic capacity. In her own words, she 
has been: 'Implicitly embracing the traditional distinction between the lower emotional 
appetites and the higher functions of rational control' (Leys, 626). 'Traumatic memory' is 
thus enacted through the body, which merely becomes a screen onto which symptoms 
are projected. The body is given a passive role in symptom formation. Narrative 
memory', on the other hand, is an entirely linguistic phenomenon in which bodily 
symptoms are 'converted' into verbal expression and so disappear. I would argue that 
Janet in his writing begins to dissolve the radical divide of the body and mental 
processes. Narrative memory, far from replacing the body, in fact reproduces its 
movements, so that the story that it tells is an 'action'. Similarly 'traumatic memory, ' 
although it is manifested in movements of the body that are beyond the subject's 
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conscious control, is paradoxically static', just as the body is usually stationary when a 
story is being told. I will be arguing that what is important for Janet is not the division 
of body and mind, but whether an event is integrated into a consciousness which is itself 
constructed around an image of the body. For an event to register in consciousness, 
activity is required on every level of the organism. The narrative that tells of the event is 
an 'action' in that it works to integrate present and past experiences into a coherent 
formulation. On the other hand, if an event is not integrated into consciousness, no 
amount of bodily movement will constitute an 'action' that is willed by the whole 
organism, but it is rendered 'static' by its independence from the whole. 
Leys has established a framework in which hypnotic treatment is divided sharply 
into two. One method of treatment requires the subject to be an active participant in his 
own cure, while the other bypasses the subject's involvement. In a footnote, she then 
allies Freud with the former method of treatment. For Freud the outcome of hypnosis 
'does not depend on the physician's procedure but on the chance reaction of the patient' 
(quoted in Leys, 629-630). Further, Leys implicates Janet in the latter method of 
treatment in which the 'physician's procedure' entirely determines the outcome. Janet 
used a hypnotic procedure, 'the efficacy of which did not depend on the patient's insight 
or awareness' (Leys, 629). Leys operates here in terms of the binary opposites that I 
have already demonstrated to be historical determinants, which emerged in the discourse 
of late nineteenth-century medicine. Having placed Janet in this 'either/or' framework, 
Leys now proceeds to the point of the argument. She 'unearths' that which the theorists 
of the 1980's failed to uncover in their 'plundering' attempts to revive Janet's work. 
What Leys claims to have discovered is that Janet's methods of treatment were based not 
on attempts to remember or reconstruct the event, but rather on notions of forgetting. 
Through suggestion, Janet would eliminate from his patient's mind those traumatic 
aspects of the event which were the cause of the hysterical symptom. This clearly places 
Janet as physician in a position of coercion, in which he bypasses the subject and causes 
an absence of memory. 
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The problem with this interpretation is that it does not take into account the 
nature of narrative itself Janet was introducing into the memories of his patients an 
element of flexibility. The case studies that are cited by Leys in her article are of some 
significance here. She tells the story of Marie, one of Janet's most celebrated patients. 
Janet found that in Marie the onset of menstruation was always closely followed by a 
hysterical fit, in which delirium alternated with muscular tremors, and the menstrual 
period abruptly ceased. The end of each hysterical crisis was followed by the vomiting 
of blood, ., after which 
the patient returned to full health until the onset of the next 
menstruation. Under hypnosis Janet was able to retrieve the memory of an event that 
had occurred six years earlier and since then had been known only incompletely. At the 
onset of her first menstrual period, Marie had plunged into a tub of freezing water in a 
successful attempt to stem the flow of blood. The shock had produced shivering and 
delirium for several days, after which her periods had ceased completely for an interval 
of five years. When menstruation had recommenced it was accompanied by the 
symptoms outlined above. The way in which Janet treated Marie was to alter her fixed 
and unchanging reconstruction of the event. In hypnosis he suggested to her that her 
initial period had only lasted three days and had ended naturally. As a result, subsequent 
periods lasted for three days and ended without any symptoms reappearing. The method 
of treatment involves introducing flexibility into the patient's internal account of the 
event. 
The only other example mentioned by Leys is that of Irene, Janet's most 
frequently cited case history. Since the death of her mother,, Irene had been subject to 
periods of 'acting out, ' or hysterical crises in which she exactly repeated the events of her 
mother's illness. During the intervals in which there were no symptoms, Irene possessed 
no memory of the fact that her mother had died. Again Janet's treatment aimed to 
introduce flexibility into the account - although this time he leaves no record of the way 
in which he succeeded in doing this. He comments merely: 'After much labour I was 
able to make her reconstruct the verbal memory of her mother's death' (Psychological 
He "in , 
1,680-681; quoted in Leys, 658). However, Leys indicates the way in which 
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Janet allies the mental assimilation of the event with a process which he terms as 
'liquidation' (Leys, 659). She argues that this implies a close relation in Janet's work 
between the narrativization of memory and the 'liquidation', or disappearance fi7om 
consciousness, of those aspects of the event which are traumatic. In Janet's method of 
treatment,, to tell the story is to forget the event. 
It is instructive to look at some of the case histories that Leys omits from her 
article. The two case histories that she cites are linked up for her by their emphasis on 
the elimination of the traumatic aspects of memory, or the process of forgetting. 
However in other cases Janet added elements to the traumatic memory, in order to 
transform a disturbing memory into one with pleasant associations. Janet now produces 
not an absence of memory, but rather a surplus. An example of this was Justine, a 
patient whose hysteria arose from the traumatic event of witnessing two naked corpses 
which had been victims of cholera. Following Leys' schema it would be anticipated that 
Janet would eliminate altogether the memory of the corpses through suggestion and so 
heal through the process of forgetting. This is not what happens. Instead Janet suggests 
in hypnosis that the corpses be remembered as clothed. Furthermore he identifies one of 
the corpses with a Chinese general whom the patient had admired in a procession, 
thereby introducing a pleasant association. Finally he identifies the word 'cholera' with 
the name of the general so that this no longer disturbs. A simple question arises at this 
point. If the therapeutic process is for Janet a matter of eliminating the unpleasant 
aspects of a memory, so that the patient is taught to forget the event -a process akin to 
the surgical removal of body parts, as Leys herself suggests - why then does Janet take 
such considerable pains to elaborate these fictions? A more complex process than simply 
that of forgetting suggests itself 
What Janet appears to be doing here is operating with a full consciousness of the 
nature of narrative itself, which is inherently flexible and shifting in terms of perspective 
and sequence of events. Janet is operating within these constraints. His work does not 
comprise a betrayal of the event, but an incisive recognition of the only way in which the 
event can be known. Where Leys appears to demand an absolute version of the event 
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(which is an impossibility), Janet recognizes that the event must be approximated. I 
contend that his work explores the way in which the event may be most closely 
approximated, while simultaneously recognizing that there is no regulation or law that 
can be applied to the process. Each individual event requires an equally individual 
method of approach. This perhaps explains why Janet resisted a 'grand scheme' for his 
work, such as Freud created in the discipline of psychoanalysis. 
An overall pattern is emerging in relation to Janet's work. Throughout this 
chapter Janet appears to be resisting the absolutes that arise from a methodology which 
is based on binary opposites. He resists the mind-body split that was occurring in the 
discourse of late nineteenth-century medicine. He conforms to a flexible mode of 
narrative which is more complex than the opposition 'true-false' can take into account. 
In other words he does not operate on an 'either/or' basis. I have linked this to the 
historical period in which Janet was writing, in which the technologization of medicine 
resulted in a split between a body which could be mechanically treated, and a mind that 
was increasingly the subject of the new science of psychoanalysis which was emerging 
out of neurological studies. The importance of Janet's work appears to be his resistance 
to these new developments, so that he still treated the organism as a whole. This has 
resulted in his work being almost entirely neglected in favour of Freudian analysis. 
, 
it currently marks an exciting new point of departure for contemporary However, 
theorists. 
In Images of Trauma, David Healy suggests another change that was brought 
about by the developments that were occurring in medicine in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. He writes: 
As noted, the other consequence of the demise of the humoral theories of illness 
has been the loss of a common language shared by doctor and patient. The increasing 
mechanization of medicine is seen by many as threatening the fundamental basis of 
medical therapy, which traditionally has involved in the first instance an empathic 
witnessing of the existential situation of another and a proscription to do no harm 
rather than an injunction to be an effective technician. This possibility is seriously 
compromised by the loss of a common language. One of our most urgent tasks is the 
recovery of such a language; such a recovery I believe will require some attempt to 
put in place a modem definition of what it is to be human. (Healy, 232-233) 
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It is clear that what occurred in the latter half of the last century was a split in medicine 
which consigned the 'empathic witnessing' of another's predicament to the realm of 
psychoanalysis, and caused the physician of the body to become a mere 'technician. The 
psychoanalytic cure was almost entirely devised around the 'recovery of a common 
language' between patient and therapist. Simultaneously this project effectively 
disappeared from those modes of medicine which were concerned to treat the body. 
What Healy appears to be calling for in this passage is not merely that the methods of 
psychoanalytic therapy be imported into the surgery. His proposal comprises a more 
radical demand that there be an attempt to 'heal' the rift that has occurred in medicine 
itself He anticipates the possibility that the subject may be treated once more as a whole 
organism, without the intervention of the body-mind' divide. In the words of Healy, to 
combine the discourses of psychoanalysis and mainstream medicine is necessarily 'to put 
in place a modem definition of what it is to be human' (Healy, 233). 
I am arguing that this 'modem definition' of the human is in fact a return to the 
concept of the subject which prevailed in medicine before it was radically split. Is Janet's 
idea of the subject able to aid this project? Does his treatment of the patient in the 
hypnotic state help to define the way in which he approached the role of the subject in 
therapy? This leads back to the debate on the perils of suggestion. Leys has established 
Janet as a therapist who bypasses the subject altogether and, through coercion, 
eliminates memories that are integral to the subject's sense of selfhood. This can be 
expressed in terms of the metaphor that introduced this chapter. The buried memory can 
be thought of in terms of the city buried in ashes, that is reminiscent of Pompeii. As a 
therapist, Janet is involved in a process of excavation work to 'unearth' the buried 
memory. 2 The question that is demanded by Leys' text is whether Janet is able to 
2 Freud notably also uses the imagery of archaeology, in order to articulate the nature of the buried 
memory. In his 1937 paper, 'Constructions In Analysis', he writes of the memory which the analyst 
seeks to uncover: 'the archaeological object occurs only in such rare circumstances as those of Pompeii 
or the tomb of Tutankhamun. All of the essentials are preserved; even things that seem completely 
forgotten are present somehow and somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to 
the subject. Indeed, it may, as we know, be doubted whether any Psychical structure can really be the 
victim of total destruction' (Standard Edition, XXIII, p. 260). it is notable that Freud allies the project 
of psychoanalysis only with the 'rare' archaeological finds of Pompeii and Tutankhamun, which were 
characterized not only by the extreme value and age of what was unearthed, but also by the remarkably 
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successfully complete this work, so that the memory is not only uncovered but also 
brought back to life'. She answers this question herself in no uncertain terms: Janet is a 
'marauder' who 'plunders' the mind and eliminates those parts of the memory that are 
inappropriate. Viewed in these terms, the text of Leys' article operates in a curious 
double movement. She 'unearths' evidence which proves that earlier theorists of Janet's 
work were in fact 'marauders' who eliminated from his writing that which did not accord 
with their project. But curiously that which she has 'unearthed' is nothing other than 
evidence that Janet was himself a 'marauder' of the mental processes, who eliminated 
from the memory that which did not accord with his own project of curing the symptom. 
The crucial question that arises at this point is as follows. To what extent does 
Janet engage the subject who is under hypnosis in dialogue? Are there any attempts in 
his work to establish a 'common language' with the patient whom he is treating? I wish 
to argue that this was precisely Janet's project, while he simultaneously took into 
account the full complexities of the 'language' with which he was dealing. In Leys' 
account of the method by which Janet treated Marie there is a clear reference to Janet 
engaging in dialogue with his patient, which encourages an alternative reading of the 
intact nature of the finds. In most archaeology, only fragmentary evidence is uncovered, and many of 
the 'essential' items are destroyed, it is this incomplete preservation of the past, which involves the 
archaeologist in a process of 'interpretation' of the site that he unearths. In allying psychoanalysis 
exclusively with those archaeological finds which are intact and fully preserved, Freud arguably denies 
the important r6le of interpretation in approaching the events of the past. 
Interestingly, Freuds other notable reference to archaeology reverses this association. In 
'Female Sexuality' (1931), Freud elaborates on his increasingly contentious theories regarding female 
sexual development. He rejects the Electra complex' (his former suggestion that female sexuality 
followed a parallel development to that of males) in favour of a 'pre-Oedipal' attachment to the mother, 
which he sees as decisive to female sexual orientation. However, the 'pre-Oedipal' phase is 'shadowy' 
and 'difficult to grasp% Freud has self-admittedly not 'succeeded in seeing my way through any case 
completely'. At the limits of analysis and thrown onto interpretation, Freud returns to archaeological 
metaphor: 'Our insight into this early, pre-Oedipus, phase in girls comes to us as a surprise, like the 
discovery, in another field, of the Nfinoan-Mycenean civilization behind the civilization of Greece' 
(Standard Edition XXI, 226). Freud refers here to the work of the British archaeologist Sir Arthur 
Evans (1851-1941), whose excavations of the palace of Knossos in Crete, around the turn of the century, 
provided evidence for the existence of the Nfinoan Bronze Age civilization. In this metaphor, Freud 
lexcavates' a more primitive psychic arrangement than the Oedipus complex, just as Evans uncovered 
evidence for a society prior to the civilization of ancient Greece; but there is also a suggestion that the 
#shadowy' or obscure nature of the archaeological finds reflects Freuds tentative and incomplete ideas on 
female sexuality. The startlingly contemporary appearance of the finds at Pompeii and Tutankhamun's 
tomb is replaced by a sense that the past is 'grey with age' and 'almost impossible to revivify' (S 
EdLtion, XKI, 226). By analogy, it seems that the problem of female sexuality has placed at risk the 
project of psychoanalysis itself* it represents a 'pSyChical structure' which appears to be the 'Victim' of 
almost total destruction' (Standard Edition NXIII, 260). 
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case. Quoting Janet's own words, Leys writes: 'Based on Marie's re-enactments in the 
trance state,, Janet was "able to recover the exact memory of a scene which had never 
been known except very incompletely". ' (Leys, 648) In collaboration with Marie, Janet 
establishes acommon language' through which the event can be recovered. This utilizes 
the language of enactment, which is the only medium of expression that is available to 
Marie, and combines it with Janet's language of interpretation to 'recover the... memory 
of a scene. ' Patient and therapist seemingly operate in collaboration to establish the 
traumatic event. The starting point for Janet is thus the recovery of the exact event. 
However, this does not provide a cure. Simply uncovering the past does not necessarily 
transform a neurosis. What is required is that the patient be able to tell her own story, or 
that she possess an internal narrative of the event. Hence the shift into narrative, which 
Leys argues not only falsifies the event but also bypasses the subject. A single glance at 
Justine's case history,, in which the symptom arose from witnessing victims of cholera, 
provides evidence to the contrary. In this treatment, Janet transformed the disturbing 
images into pleasant associations in full co-operation with the patient's internal imagery. 
Justine herself suggested the image of the Chinese general with which Janet then clothed 
and named the corpse, which was at the root of the disturbance. This suggests that the 
way in which Janet operated was less a form of 'coercion' than one of active co- 
operation with the subject. 
I would argue that, on the contrary, it is Freud himself who is implicated in the 
'coercion' of his patients. In the founding of psychoanalysis, Freud divorced himself 
from the practice of hypnosis and from the notions of 'coercion' that were implicit for 
him in techniques of suggestion. In place of hypnosis he installed the so-called 'talking 
cure', in which he followed threads of associations to reveal a story that made sense. He 
argued that if he had simply suggested his own preconceptions to the patient, then the C7 -- 
story would not make any sense. Any material that had been inserted by him would 
show up clearly. It appears that Freud and his patient work together to excavate the 
buried memory. However, what happened in practice was very often a different case. 
The patient would thus retrieve images and associations in the therapeutic session. 
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These would then be subject to a vetting procedure, in which Freud arbitrated as to 
which images and associations were relevant to the analytic project. In this way the 
'language' that was the product of Freudian analysis was often not 'common' to both 
therapist and patient; it was not the result of a shared attempt at communication. Rather 
it was a process in which the patient articulated a series of communications, while the 
analyst was in the elevated position to say which of these would be sufficiently privileged 
to enter the realm of discourse. 
In this introduction to Janet's work, I have thus argued that he occupies a crucial 
position in the history of medicine. He was writing at exactly the point at which the 
medical discourse divided into two sectors,. so that the treatment of the body was 
separate from the analysis of mental processes. I have indicated that Janet resisted these 
changes in contemporary medicine and continued to treat mind and body as a unit, so 
that illness was defined for him as something that affected the organism as a whole. 
What I will be concerned to explore in the remainder of the chapter is not the way in 
which Janet departs from the medical practice of his contemporaries, but rather the way 
in which he is concerned to ally himself to an alternative tradition of medicine which he 
himself 'unearthed'. In his biographical outline of Janet, Ellenberger describes the 
former's intense interest in the work of early therapeutic hypnosis. This was carried out 
in the early nineteenth century by 'magnetizers' such as Mesmer and Puysegur 
(Ellenberger, 339). Janet had an extensive and rare collection of their books and 
uncovered their almost forgotten work not only in his volumes but also in his patients, 
some of whom (for example, Leonie) had formerly consulted these therapists and 
revealed under hypnosis some of their techniques. This fits with Janet's lifelong 
commitment to the techniques of hypnotic therapy. But these thinkers also introduced 
into his work the concept of psychological energy. This combined in Janet's thinking 
with a tradition of philosophy which speculated on the role of vision and each of the 
other senses in mental life. Ellenberger mentions that Janet had read Maine de Biran 
(1766-1824), a philosopher who elaborated a construction of the mind which was based 
around the effort of the organism as a whole (Ellenberger, 402). In short, Janet inherited 
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a tradition of speculations on the nature of the body and the way in which the body and 
mind interact. He identified himself with those thinkers who contributed to early studies 
of what is now termed the body image'. Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will be 
concerned to explore the way in which Janet works within and radically extends this 
alternative tradition of medicine, in his writings and in his analytic practice. 
JANET, FREUD AND THE HYSTERICAL PARALYSIS 
Dragging feet, feet with sharp cramps, feet that swell and limp, feet that are 
suddenly too heavy to move, feet that support legs frozen in contractions, give 
Studies on Hysteria a strange rhythm and rocky gait. 3 
In the quotation above, the dance theorist Peggy Phelan suggests that as a 
symptom, the hysterical paralysis is characterized by its 'strange rhythm', so that its 
movements are not performed 'in time'. As a theorist of the hysterical neuroses, Freud 
notably moved 'in time' with the current developments in the field: his founding of 
psychoanalysis coincided with the contemporary split in medicine, so that the mind was 
treated separately from the body, and consequently psychoanalysis attained a privileged 
status in the history of psychiatric thought. Janet, like his patients, 'dragged his feet' in 
relation to current ideas and was notably 'out of step' with his contemporaries. As a 
theorist, Janet thus appears to be affected by the symptomatology of his subject(s), and 
to work in a mode which, I have argued, is characteristic of the history of trauma 
studies. In this section, I wish to focus specifically on the hysterical symptom of 
paralysis, and to compare Janet's approach to the condition with that of his 
contemporary, Sigmund Freud. It is anticipated that this close analysis will provide a 
clear insight into the differing approaches and methods of treatment of the two 
t erapists. 
It appears that both Freud and Janet developed theories on the hysterical 
paralyses at approximately the same time. In their writings on the subject each reveals a 
3 Peggy Phelan. 'Dance and the History of Hysteria', CoMPrealities: Dancing Knowledge, Culture and 
power, ed. Susan Leigh Foster (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 90-103 (p. 90). Further 
references to this article are given after quotations in the text. 
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mutual awareness of and indebtedness to the other's work. However,, both theorists 
contribute to the field in a way which is highly individual. I have chosen to examine in 
some detail one paper by each writer, which seems to me to be representative of their 
theoretical approach. I have selected by Freud 'Some Points for a Comparative Study of 
Organic and Hysterical Motor Paralyses', which was written between 1888 and 1893 and 
published in the latter year. 4 By Janet I will look at 'Paralyses - Diagnosis' which 
comprises 'Lecture VII'in The Major Symptoms of Hysteria. 5 This volume, published in 
1907, contained a series of fifteen lectures which were given by Janet at Harvard 
University in October and November 1906, and drew on his previous findings. 
In his paper, Janet outlines a diagnostic guideline to the hysterical paralyses, 
which provides a useful approach to the contributions made by each analyst. He argues 
that the 'modem' method of diagnosis is by 'intrinsic examination', in which attention is 
largely focused on the paralysis itself and its clinical characteristics. Alternatively there 
is the 'outmoded' method of 'extrinsic examination', - which takes 
into account the 
patient's psychological condition. The article provides a clear representation of Janet 
resisting contemporary movements in the medical field. Modem medicine confines its 
attention to the body itself - what has ceased to function and how it may be mechanically 
improved. Janet already introduces into the diagnostic procedure a method of treatment 
which was then outmoded, but which took into account the response of the organism as 
a whole. 
In his paper, Janet aligns Freud with the method of 'intrinsic examination' 
observing: 'An Austrian author, Professor Freud, has insisted a great deal on this point' 
(Major S3gpptoms of Hysteria, 145). Freud's article bears out this observation and does 
indeed 'insist a great deal' on the clinical aspects of the case. Freud conforms to the 
advancements in medicine by confining himself entirely to describing those phenomena 
4 Sigmund Freud, 'Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor Paralyses', 
S lard Editio , ed. and trans. 
James Strachey, (London: Hogarth Press, 1966), Vol. 1,160-172. 
Further references to this article are given after quotations in the text. 
5 Pierre Janet, 'Paralyses - Diagnosis', The Major 53TVoms of Hea ew York: Mac 1907, Ist ri . (N millan, 
repr. New York: Macmillan. 1920). pp. 138-158. Further references to this paper are given after 
quotations in the text. 
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that he is able to observe in the affected body part. He catalogues the differences in the 
mechanical operation of the limb, between the paralysis that is hysterical in ongin and 
that which derives from organic causes. The first difference that he observes is the 
severity of the paralysis which originates from a hysterical source (Standard Edition, 1, 
163-164). In an organic paralysis, efforts at movement will be clearly visible. In the 
case of a paralysed arm, for example, there will be muscular twitches throughout the 
surrounding body region. However, in hysterical paralysis the arm will be completely 
inert. There will not even be the shadow of a movement. This comparison is even more 
marked when the affected body part is a leg. In an organic paralysis of the leg, the limb 
is manipulated by a movement of the hip to enable a form of walking to take place. A 
movement of circumduction brings the leg forward to participate in the action. In the 
hysterical paralysis, however, the hip no longer makes any effort towards motility and 
the leg is characteristically dragged as an inert mass. Janet follows the Greek neologisms 
of his predecessor Charcot to describe the phenomenon. The subject affected with an 
organic paralysis has a helicopode walk, while the subject affected with a hysterical 
paralysis has a helcopode walk ajor Symptoms of Hysteria, 146). 
The second difference between the hysterical and organic paralyses that is noted 
by Freud lies in the issue of localization. In the organic case, the paralysis is not 
confined to the affected body part, but wifl also modify the behaviour of surrounding 
areas. A paralysis of the hand, for example, will affect those muscles of the forearm 
which direct the movement and co-ordination of the fingers. In the case that is hysterical 
in origin, the paralysis is more limited in affect. It remains exclusive to the particular 
body part that it afflicts. This will be sharply divided from the rest of the body in a 
curiously geometric segment. Hemiplegy (paralysis of half the body) stops just short of 
the median line that divides the body, splitting into two equal segments the forehead, 
mouth, nose, breast and abdomen. Hysterical paralysis of the hand terminates in a line at 
the wrist, forming a distinct 'bracelet'. Paralysis of the arm ends abruptly in a jacket 
sleeve; while paralyses of the foot or leg cease in a sock or stocking respectively. Freud 
finds that hysterical paralysis always affects a group of muscles en masse but never 
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moves beyond a sharply delimited area. 11is concern is to provide a diagnostic tool, by 
which the physician is able to distinguish reliably between a paralysis that is hysterical in 
origin and one that is caused by an organic lesion. 
It is Janet's work on the hysterical paralyses that contextualizes these 
observations in the framework of the body schema. In his paper, Freud clearly attributes 
to Janet the idea that the sharply terminated segments of hysterical paralysis correspond 
to popular conceptions of the body and the organs: 
I follow M. Janet in saying that what is in question in hysterical paralysis, just as 
in anaesthesia, etc., is the everyday, popular conception of the organs and of the body 
in general. That conception is not founded on a deep knowledge of neuro-anatomy 
but on our tactile and above all our visual perceptions. (Standard Edition, 1,170) 
The organic paralysis corresponds to the anatomical model of the body. Paralysis of the 
hand, which is organic in origin, will extend to those muscles in the forearm which are 
concerned with movements in the hand. However in hysterical paralysis an alternative 
model of the body emerges, which is organized according to 'our tactile and ... visual 
perceptions. ' There is an alternative body schema which is not a representation or 
mapping of the body surface. It does not represent a diagram of the anatomical body. 
Rather, it is a map built up through the motility of the lived experience of the body itself, 
the way in which it is experienced to function in everyday activities. Actual bodily 
physique plays only a small part in the construction of this body image. It would not be 
strictly accurate to limit the body-image boundary to the body wall. The wall acts as a 
primary reference point, but the body schema may well encompass, for example, clothes 
or the area within reach of the individual's musculature. The area which surrounds the 
body is invariably a zone of particular sensitiveness, which is in some way an extension 
of the body image. Every change in the posture of the body also changes this 
surrounding zone. The body image thus does not mirror exactly the body surface. 
Contemporary theorists of the body image, Seymour Fisher and Sidney Cleveland, have 
6 
suggested that this is paradoxically to remove the 'body' from the 'body image'. This is 
6 Seymour Fisher and Sidney Cleveland, E! 24 Image and PersonahiL (New York: Dover, 1968), p. 367. 
Further references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
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not true; what it does remove from the body image is the notion of the anatomical 
model. The clinical version of the body, which is represented in the anatomical diagram, 
forces it into an absolute form. In his article on the organic and hysterical paralyses, 
Freud indicates that there is only a single anatomical model, to which the organic 
paralysis conforms. In logical terms this cannot therefore also be a model by which the 
hysterical paralysis is understood. In Freud's own words: 
Since there can only be a single cerebral anatomy that is true, and since it finds 
expression in the clinical characteristics of the cerebral paralyses, it is clearly 
impossible for that anatomy to be the explanation of the distinctive features of 
hysterical paralyses. (Standard Edition, 1,167-168) 
To liberate the body image from this closed and rigid model is, in effect, to open up the 
theorization of the body to the multiplicity of lived experiences. 
Freud has already eliminated the anatomical model of the body as a mode of 
explanation for the hysterical paralyses. It is therefore to the 'body image' that Janet 
turns to furnish his explanation. The sharply-terminated segments of paralysis, which are 
characteristic of hysteria, correspond to the way in which the body parts are understood 
through their use. The hand is seen and felt to operate as a functional unit which ends at 
the wrist, even though the controlling muscles may be in the forearm. Similarly the arm 
is experienced, through use, to end at the shoulder and the foot at the ankle. This 
alternative schema of the body is understood by Janet to co-exist with the anatomical 
framework. He argues that the body image is an older conceptual organization, based 
on the way in which the use of the limbs and muscles is experienced. It is not displaced 
by the anatomical knowledge of the way in which the body operates: 
Now this popular conception of the limbs is formed by old ideas we have about 
our limbs, which we all keep in spite of our anatomic notions. So these hysteric 
anaesthesias seem to have something mental, intellectual, in them. (Major Symptoms 
of Hysteria, 158) 
Freud had contrasted the 'deep knowledge' of anatomy with the 'everyday, popular, 
conceptions of the body which are manifested in hysteria. There is an implication in his 
work that the hysterical paralysis is inherently less acceptable than the organic paralysis, 
for those who manifest the symptoms are simultaneously displaying a lack of 'knowledge' 
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or education. A slippage occurs here into the theories of degeneracy that mark early 
studies of the hysteric. In contrast, Janet insists that these 'popular conceptions' of the 
body are marked by education; they 'seem to have something mental, intellectual, in 
them'. 
This insistence on education in relation to the body as well as to the mind is 
integral to the framework of the body schema. Every action that is performed by the 
body is learnt through a series of complex manipulations of muscles and limbs. Each 
new movement that is mastered is registered in the body schema as a representation. 
The body image is thus built up through systems of movements that are grouped by 
education. Those complexes of activities that have been leamt later in life, for example 
for professional purposes, are more readily understood as a result of educative 
processes. The needlewoman's ability to sew, the ironer's knowledge of how to handle 
an iron, the functions of writing and playing the piano - these are all examples of the 
latter which are cited by Janet. However, the ensemble of the movements of the legs 
that is required to walk is also a system that needs to be learnt. Similarly the complex of 
movements involved in the manipulation of the hand result from a process of education. 
What happens in hysterical paralysis is that one of these representations is lost from the 
schema - it dissociates itself and is no longer accessible. The loss of movement in the 
hand, for example, results from the dissociation of the complex grouping of muscles and 
joints that has been learnt, and which is necessary to the sophisticated motility that the 
hand enjoys. Far from manifesting the patient's ignorance of anatomy, the hysterical 
paralysis, on the contrary, displays the highly organized processes of education that 
underlie even the simplest of activities. The body is again viewed by Janet not as distinct 
from the mind but in relation to it as part of the activity of the whole organism. The 
organization of the body has 'something mental, intellectual' about it. This body schema 
is an older conceptual framework than the model of anatomy, but is not superseded by it. 
Janet , in a 
familiar move, defiends an older and alternative mode of medical practice than 
is used by his contemporaries. 
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Janet contends that the anatomical model of the body co-exists with the body 
schema. He does not prioritize either mode of understanding the body. It was a later 
generation of theorists of the body image, who argued that the body schema was 
potentially more revealing of the workings of the body than the anatomical model. In 
the 1920's and 193 O's a group of neurologists formed what is now termed as the 'Vienna 
School' of neuroscience. Influenced by the pioneering work of such body-image 
theorists as Hughlings Jackson, Henry Head, Weir Mitchell and Pierre Janet himself, and 
combining these insights with the discipline of psychoanalysis, these men arrived at a 
much more complex notion of the body image than had hitherto been imagined. By far 
the most notable of this school of theorists was Paul Schilder, whose landmark study 
The Image and Appearance of the Human Bod was first published in 193 5.7 Even 
today it remains the most comprehensive study of the body image yet published. 
Schilder believed that the body image is capable of revealing knowledge about the body 
that the anatomical model does not show. He divided the body into a series of 
interconnective functional units,, which he termed as 'passages'. In anatomy, certain 
passages of the body function in relation to certain other passages. However the 
functional passages that anatomy outlines, are dependent to a large extent on actual 
situations in which the body is accustomed to operate. For Schilder, the body image is 
able to reveal new situations and alternative passages that are not available to the rigid 
structures of anatomy. The example that he cites is the middle line of the body, which is 
not normally considered in a functional capacity. In terms of the body image the middle 
line is essential to the development of spatial awareness, the ability to differentiate left 
from right. More than this, there is a close relation between the motility of the two sides 
of the body which is organized around the psychological median line. Schilder cites the 
example of amputation as a new situation, in which this unaccustomed 'passage' of the 
body can be seen to operate. Amputees, when ordered to move the phantom or missing 
limb, have associated movements in the healthy leg or arm. Every effort to movement 
7 Paul Schilder, The Image and AMpýarance of the Human Bp! t (London: Kegan Paul, 1935). Further 
references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
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will provoke the contralateral symmetrical associated movement (Imaize and 
Appearance, 69). For Schilder, the body image is thus prioritized over the anatomical 
model of the body, as being able to record a far greater number of situations and to 
reflect the motility and plasticity that characterizes the body. This marks a development 
in the theorization of the body image, from the early speculations of Janet. 
Another way in which the body reveals the organization of its motility around the 
psychological middle line, is in the hysterical anaesthesia. In writing of this phenomenon, 
Schilder claims Janet as his source. He observes the following distinction between the 
hysterical and the organic anaesthesia: 
In hysterical anaesthesia, the individual forgets more completely about the part of 
the body that he wants to forget, following the demand of the life situation. It is true 
that we can understand hysterical anaesthesias only if we understand the schema of 
the body. Janet has shown that patients who are anaesthetic on one side can move 
their healthy arm promptly. When they are ordered to raise the anaesthetic arm, they 
move both at once. Another patient obeys the command to raise the arm with a 
movement of the opposite side. We see again that the change in the perception of the 
body leads to actions which correspond to the changed perception. Image and 
Appearance, 74) 
As in the amputee, the desire to move the affected limb provokes an associated action in 
the symmetrically opposite region of the body. However, the passage reveals more than 
this. Schilder adopts from Janet the notion that in hysterical anaesthesia the affected 
body part is not only without sensation but is also lost from the body image. Just as the 
amputated limb is absent from the anatomy of the body, so the limb that is affected by 
hysteria is absent from the body image. The reason why the patient is unable to raise the 
affected arm is because she no longer recognizes it as her own. She 'forgets 
completely' about the afflicted body part. This returns the argument to the distinction 
between the 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' methods of diagnosis, outlined by Janet above. In 
the 'extrinsic examination' which Janet favours, the psychological attitude of the patient 
is taken into consideration. Using this method, the characteristic sign of the hysteric is 
his or her absolute indifference to the illness with which he or she is afflicted. The 
subject is not aware that there is anything wrong. What has disappeared is not the 
sensation in the limb or body part, but the capacity to realize this sensation and to 
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connect it with the personality or the organism as a whole. In the formulation 'I feel', the 
T, or the ego built up through previous body sensations and movements, is no longer 
able to connect with or integrate the new sensation that is experienced. Janet expresses 
the problem as follows: 
[Hysterical] anaesthesia is surely not ordinary absent-mindedness... There is in it 
a pathological incapacity to collect the elementary sensations in a general perception. 
In reality what has disappeared is not the elementary sensation;... it is the faculty that 
enables the subject to realize this sensation, to connect it with his personality, to be 
able to say clearly: 'It is I who feel, it is I who hear'. (Mqjor Symptoms of Hysteria, 
172) 
In effect, the afflicted body part falls out of consciousness. This accounts for the 
absolute nature of the hysterical paralysis, in which no attempt at movement is made. As 
I have observed above, the patient who suffers from a hysterical paralysis of the leg 
makes no attempt to manipulate the limb with an exaggerated movement of the hip, to 
perform the action of walking. The leg is dragged behind because it is no longer 
recognized as a part of the body. It has effectively been lost from the body schema. The 
lesion in the hysterical affliction consists in the associative inaccessibility of the body part 
to the personality as a whole. 
An important implication of this in relation to Janet was that treatment should 
centre not on the body part but on the whole person. This is clearly articulated in the 
passage quoted above, in which Janet recognizes that the 'elementary sensation' is 
unimpaired; what requires treatment is 'the faculty that enables the subject to realize this 
sensation'. In practical terms this meant that his methods of treatment differed greatly 
from those of his contemporaries. He refused to succumb to the 'either/or' impasse that 
marked the medical discourse in the late nineteenth century, which meant that the 
clinician supervised the care of the body, while the mind was relegated to the concern of 
psychiatry and the emerging science of psychoanalysis. In his method of treatment, Janet 
attempted to incorporate both body and mind. He believed that psychological forces had 
a strong physiological basis in the body. He devised what he termed as a 'psychological 
economy' ( omiques), by which he sought for possible leakages of 
psychological force. In practice, this involved eliminating those activities in the patient's 
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everyday life that were excessively energy consuming. In this, Janet demonstrated a 
clear recognition of social factors, for the two areas which he identified as particularly 
wasteful of energy were the patient's relationship with the social environment and his or 
her professional work. 
In conjunction with this, Janet was concerned to employ methods which he 
viewed as energy-increasing. The therapeutic session incorporated body concepts, body 
movements and muscle tensions. In the words of Henri Ellenberger: 'Suggestive 
treatment... is not enough. One has to... supplement the psychological treatment with 
massage' (Ellenberger, 372). Janet believed that both electricity and massage work to a 
large extent as disguised forms of psychotherapy (Ellenberger, 373). His treatment 
efforts concentrated on the organism as a whole. Electricity, hydrotherapy and massage 
provide stimulation of the body surface and so bring into focus for the patient his bodily 
liýnits and body representations. Other energy-increasing practices were encouraged in 
the patient. One of the main sources of reconstituting energy supplies is sleep and 
accordingly Janet instructed his patients in the best way of preparing for sleep. He 
taught various techniques of rest and relaxation - the distribution of pauses during the 
day of rest days during the month and of vacations during the year. The other main 7 ý, 
source of energy was nourishment and Janet emphasized the importance of a qualitative 
diet, which utilized the action of vitamins and other dietetic agents which were only just 
becoming known (Ellenberger, 3 80). This was in contrast to his American 
contemporary Weir Mitchell, renowned for his so-called 'rest-cure'. Instead of altering 
'body image' Nlitchell changed the body appearance, by combining overfeeding with 
enforced inactivity. Janet's cure was informed by the new advances in public health, 
which uncovered the need to be aware of various health issues - among them, the value 
of nutrition. Janet is here acting within the contemporary framework, using a source of 
health awareness that is supplementary to conventional medicine to inform his work. 
A direct result of Janet's treatment of the organism as a whole is the challenge 
that is implied to a purely observation-based method of diagnosis. An important shift 
occurred in the medical discourse, as a result of the historical move to isolate the body in 
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treatment. Now the clinician was concerned only with that which he could observe. The 
result was a privileging of vision, which became somehow infallible as soon as it entered 
into the clinical model of the 'observation' of the patient. I have already demonstrated 
the extent to which Freud conformed to this model. Freud's paper aims to catalogue all 
the ways in which a hysterical paralysis can be differentiated from an organic paralysis, 
by anyone who is observing either of the two cases. The problem with this procedure is 
the way in which it tends to furnish absolute theorems. The vision that is entailed in 
clinical observation is somehow no longer subject to the fallibility by which visual 
processes naturally operate. In his study of hysterical disorders, Daniel Abse indicates, 
on the contrary, that the clinician is humanly subject to observational errors and must 
engage in a variety of other diagnostic procedures, to minimize the risk both for himself 
and for the patient: 
human fallibility is especially clamant [sic] in observation. We so often see what we 
expect, not to mention what we want to see, and unfortunately this is sometimes true 
of the clinician seeking to establish a diagnosis. For the most part we reduce the 
possibility that we have subjectively distorted our observation by allowing for the 
refracting influence of our expectations, -seeking consultation, and engaging in discussion about the evidence. 8 
It should come as no surprise that Janet resisted this move to privilege sight in the 
medical discourse. In The M&r Symptoms of Hysteria, he writes against the new 
advances: 'We should... not ask the sciences of observation, which are so difficult,, to 
furnish us with absolute theorems' (M? jtor SyLnptoms of Hysteria, - 
275). It is noteworthy 
that Janet is not opposed to the 'sciences of observation' in themselves; it is only when 
vision is taken as an 'absolute' that he objects. He insists on complexity in relation to the 
visual processes; in Janet's words, it should not be forgotten that vision is 'difficult'. 
Simultaneous to the division that took place in the medical discourse,, advances in 
science conspired to confirm the privileging of the eye. Most notably, the discovery of 
the X-ray by Rontgen in 1895 meant that sight could penetrate to that which had not 
previously been visible. It must indeed have seemed that vision had somehow become 
Daniel Wilfred Abse, Hysteria and Related Mental Disorders: An Approach to Lpýy-chological 
Medicine, 2nd edn. (Bristol: IOP Publishing, 1987), p. 12 1. 
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infallible. I would like to close this section by returning to the work of Paul Schilder in 
The Imagg nnd Appearance of the Human Bpdy. Schilder cites the image of an X-ray 
picture of the lungs, which shows up a change that has occurred in the body (Image and 
Appearance, 181-182). He uses this as an example of what he terms an 'objective 
phenomenon' of a disease. The X-ray shows up to the physician an alteration in the body 
of the patient. Although the bodily change is visible to the doctor, it is not experienced 
by the patient. In this model of the doctor-patient relationship, the physician bypasses 
the subject, who is unaware of the way in which his body has altered. In contrast, 
Schilder employs the term 'symptom' to describe a change in the body which is registered 
on the body image of the patient. In other words, the 'symptom' is not only observable 
to the physician but is also experienced by the patient. Schilder cites as examples 
coughing, pain in the shoulder and fever. A more complicated example is that of a 
cancerous growth. This is an objective phenomenon while the cancerous cells are only 
observable by the clinician. However, if this is combined with fatigue, weakness and 
lack of appetite which are experienced at the level of the patient's body image, then the 
growing cancer becomes a symptom. 
The 'symptom', in Schilder's formulation, involves the personality as a whole. It 
requires that the affected body part be registered on the body image of the patient, or 
that it be available to the whole personality. Further, it allows for the curative process to 
involve both patient and physician. The possibility for dialogue is immediately opened 
up between them. I would argue that the 'symptom' provides a useful formulation, by 
which Janet's work may be understood. His project could be re-formulated as the 
transformation of the objective phenomenon' of the hysterical affliction into a 'symptom, 
which the patient is able to experience as his or her own. At the very least, it appears to 
provide a way in which the division that occurred in medicine at the close of the 
nineteenth century can be rethought. The 'symptom' of Schilder's formulation appears to 
be correspondent with the 'common language' that Healy has identified as being absent 
from contemporary clinical procedure. If this is the case, it reiterates the necessity that 
in order to re-introduce dialogue into the medical discourse, there must be a 'modem 
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definition of what it is to be human'. The physician must treat the personality as a whole, 
and not the body in fragmented parts. This section has demonstrated that Janet was able 
in his work not only to establish a dialogue with his patients, but also to treat the whole 
subject. He resisted the advance of twentieth-century medicine and successfully 
combined clinical and psychiatric procedures in the treatment of his patients. 
LUCE HUGARAY AND THE GENDERED BODY 
I wish to devote the concluding section of this chapter to examining a modem 
text, which derives not only from the analytic field, but also from the emerging discipline 
of gender theory. Luce Irigaray is both a practising analyst and one of the foremost 
proponents of contemporary French feminism. I have selected for close reading her 
essay 'Gesture in Psychoanalysis' (first delivered as a conference paper in 1985), because 
it addresses the themes which have dominated discussion throughout this chapter. 9 
Irigaray advances a profoundly disruptive reading of Freud's founding of psychoanalysis 
and she is particularly concerned to (re)locate the body in the analytic session. 
Following contemporary medical trends, Freud sought to exclude the body from 
treatment and to focus exclusively on mental processes. Irigaray's concern arises out of 
the observation that the body is present, although not acknowleged, in psychoanalysis. 
Her own experience as an analyst has been one of 'paralysis'; dictated by Freud, her 
physical position has been 'still and seated' ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 91). Irigaray 
resists this confinement: she argues that analysts should 'invent... movements' and 
suggests 'knitting or doing needlework' while listening to a patient, in order that both 
therapist and client might retain independence of movement ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 
91). Her starting point in the essay is her own reactions to the analytic setting, which 
explicitly link Freud, not Janet, to the symptomatology of his hysterical patients. While 
Janet merely 'dragged his feet' and resisted contemporary ideas and methods, Freud 
(Irigaray contends) problematically incorporated the 'paralysed' (motionless) body into 
9 Luce IrigaraY, 'Gesture in Psychoanalysis', Sexes and Genealogies, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 89-104. Further references to this essay are given after 
quotations in the text. 
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the treatment session. In this section, I will be concerned to explore Irigaray's analysis of 
the effects of this physical paralysis on both analyst and analysand. She is concerned that 
Freud not only excludes bodily expressiveness from the analytic session, but that he also 
removes an awareness of the gendered body. She argues that Freud enacts a form of 
violence on the body, which he (fan-filiarly) covers over by implicating the violence of 
suggestion in hypnotic procedure. 
Irigaray opens her essay with a 'gesture' towards contextualization. She divides 
the history of analysis into two periods. - in the days of 'Freud and the early analysts', 
there was some discussion of 'gesture' in psychoanalytic theory. In contemporary 
psychoanalysis, however, 'the issue of physical activity' is included only in exceptional 
cases ffor psychotics or children'), or outside the mainstream of classical (Freudian) 
thought ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 91). Freud's work is thus divided according to its 
inclusion of the body in its diagnoses and methods of treatment. It seems appropriate to 
Irigaray's reading to place the dividing line between the 'early analysts' and 
psychoanalysis 'today', in Freud's establishment of his own science of psychoanalysis in 
1896. This was the date at which Freud was no longer connected with the 'early 
analysts' Breuer and Janet, but radically separated himself from their systems of thought. 
It also marked the date at which Freud relinquished his former methods of treatment and 
formally dissociated himself from the use of hypnosis. 
There does, - 
however, exist in the analytic session a trace of Freud's former 
methods. It is as though the use of hypnosis is not banished but merely repressed. 
Irigaray thus describes the analytic scenario. The patient lies on the couch, motionless. 
The analyst is also still and seated. Irigaray points out that these positions were not 
arbitrary but were taken over from Freud's former practice of hypnosis. She observes: 
Let me start with two essential positions taken up on the analytic stage that 
analysis took over from hypnosis: one person (originally the woman) is lying dowIL 
jhýýýý is sitting down, and facing the back of the first person's head. 
('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 92) 
In psychoanalysis, Freud has created a gestural system which is unique. It is foreign to 
any other situation. Ifigaray explains that it is devised to create a situation in which the 
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economy of discourse and communication is interrupted. The patient is dislocated from 
his or her habits as a speaking subject. He or she is unable to produce a word or 
statement that relates to the here and now. The stage is set for remembering (Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis', 92-93). In effect, what the psychoanalytic gesture is devised to do is to 
seize from the subject the power that is associated with address. In the words of 
Irigaray: '[The patient] is deprived of the power in the present of producing rational 
speech' ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 93). The psychoanalytic gesture is thus one of 
aggression against the patient. However, Irigaray points out that this aggression is not 
as it seems. She states in no uncertain terms: 'The position is necessary' ('Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis', 93). If the patient is to be able to immerse him- or herself in the process 
of remembering, then a situation outside of normalcy must be created. The gesture of 
the psychoanalytic scenario is an effective means of achieving this. In a significant 
statement, Irigaray observes: 'if the analyst knows his or her business, the position does 
not represent the same seizure of power as in hypnosis' ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 93). 
Irigaray appears to be complicit with Freud here. Hypnosis is the true form of 
aggression against the subject. Psychoanalysis has divorced itself from the methods of 
hypnosis and so no longer represents 'the same seizure of power' as Freud practised in 
his early work. 
This passage is remarkably deceptive. In her analysis, Irigaray focuses 
exclusively on language. The aggression that psychoanalysis performs is against the 
subject's power of producing speech. It is therefore only a seeming aggression, because 
it in fact enables the patient to have access to a new level of language. What Irigaray has 
omitted from her analysis at this point is that in focusing so exclusively on language, 
psychoanalysis is comnfitting violence to the body that it thereby excludes from the 
analytic session. In the words of Irigaray: 'One part of the analytic scenario is being 
expressed by gestures, although this is often neglected in favour of what is being said 
verbally' ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 91). Irigaray is noted for her sophisticated style of 
writing, in which she consciously mimics the voice of patriarchy, in order thereby to 
undermine it. I would suggest that this is what is being enacted in this passage. Irigaray 
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n-iimics the voice of Freud, claiming that the psychoanalytic scenario only seems to enact 
yý jz a form of violence, in order thereby to reveal the underl in forms of aggression which 
are inherent in the very foundations of psychoanalysis. Irigaray points out that in the 
analytic session, neither analyst nor patient remain entirely motionless. The patient may 
twist a ring, wriggle feet or hands, or adopt a specific position. The analyst may also 
shift position in a way which affects the patient. The analyst should therefore be aware 
of his or her own movements,, and the communications that he or she is thereby sending 
out to the patient. At the same time, the physical gestures of the patient may be far from 
irrelevant to what he or she is saying. The organism as a whole makes a complete 
statement which must be taken into account. Irigaray indicates that several successful 
therapeutic outcomes have relied on her awareness of the gestures that contribute an 
unspoken communication between therapist and patient ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 91). 
This is not the whole story, however. If psychoanalysis excludes from its 
confines an awareness of the body, it also thereby excludes an awareness of the 
gendering of the subject. The patient and the analyst in the psychoanalytic scenario are 
presumed to be somehow neuter. Obviously, this is not the case. Irigaray questions 
whether the gestural system of psychoanalysis is experienced in the same way by the man 
as by the woman. Does it matter whether the analyst is of the same sex or a different sex 
to the patient? The answer, simply, is that of course it does. Irigaray outlines the 
reasons for this, stating: 
In the first place there is a very simple reason: lying down does not have the 
same sexual connotation for a man and a woman. It is relatively common for a man, 
in an erotic situation, to tell a woman to lie down, or to lay her down. This social 
habit in fact leads to a certain number of rapes of analysands by analysts. It is much 
rarer, it is in fact exceptional, for a woman to ask a man to he down, except in 
therapy. Between persons of the same sex, the connotations are much more blurred. 
('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 93-94) 
The gendering of the body is crucial in the power relations of the therapeutic session. 
For a male analyst to instruct a female patient to lie down, in the psychoanalytic 
scenario, is also to introduce an erotic scenario. It is such a fundamental seizure of 
power from the woman that it has been known to lead to rape. The point that Irigaray 
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appears to be making here is that the aggression of psychoanalysis is not against 
language, and thereby to be displaced onto hypnosis. The violence that is entailed in 
psychoanalysis is directed against the body; and is such a powerful dynamic that it may 
result in the actual situation of rape. 
Psychoanalysis is therefore constructed around the exclusion of the body. This 
means that it is able to ignore the crucial issue of the gendered body. Irigaray states of 
analysts: 'The high priests of sexuality take very little account of sex in their professional 
outlook' ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 94). There is no account taken of even the most 
basic biological facts. One defence that is raised for this is that analysis creates a return 
to 'childedness', Irigaray's own word ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 94). Of course, 
psychoanalysis is infamous for its claim that the child is neuter until it reaches the genital 
stage, and the correspondent Oedipal crisis. Irigaray disputes this claim. She turns to 
the text of the 'fort-da' game in which Freud describes his grandson Ernst playing with a 
reel at the end of a piece of string, while his mother is absent. Here Freud describes the 
gestures of a child. But the child is not neuter. The child is a boy, Ernst, and Freud 
never implies that he could be substituted by a girl ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis, 97). 
Irigaray questions what is specific about the gestures of Ernst which gender him male. 
How do his bodily gestures differ from the way in which Freud's (hypothetical) 
granddaughter would have behaved? Irigaray writes very definitely on this point: 
What I wanted to point out in relation to the story of Ernst is that neither we nor 
Freud usually interpret the fact that it is with a gesture of the hand and arm, 
accompanied by certain spoken syllables, that the little boy masters the absence of his 
mother and is thus able to enter the symbolic universe. What happens later to those 
meshed articulations of arm and sound-making apparatus? And another question: is 
Ernst walking or stationary when he performs the fort-da? Probably he is not 
walking. He is not using his legs to find his mother. Why? Why does he stay still, as 
if his legs were paralyzed? He looks for his mother with arm and mouth. Perhaps 
with ears too? ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 96-97) 
Irigaray locates the gender of the male child in his seeming paralysis. He does not walk 
to search for his mother, but remains stationary. He sits as if he is paralysed. 
What then of the girl? How would a girl have behaved if she was faced with the 
absence of her mother? For Irigaray, the female child has a specific series of gestures by 
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which she is gendered female. She dances, she skips, she spins round. In all of these 
gestures, Ifigaray is concerned with the way in which the girl produces around her an 
energetic circular movement, whether by means of a skipping rope, or by her own body. 
The girl describes a territory with her body. Simultaneously the spinning motion both 
attracts and defends. She solicits and refuses access to her territory ('Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis', 98). What is vital to Irigaray in this formulation is that the girl keeps 
her whole body in motion. While the boy gestures only with his hand and arm, keeping 
the rest of the body stationary, the girl acts as an entire organism. Irigaray writes: 
Women's pleasure does not demand that they isolate an arm or a hand in order to 
master the other; they keep all their limbs, all the body in movement, especially their 
legs. It is interesting to note that the paralysis of female hysterics described by Freud 
and Breuer affects the legs. Paralysis strikes in different ways depending upon 
whether the trauma is recent or longstanding, and, sometimes, upon whether the 
author of the trauma is a man or a woman. This is well described by Freud and 
Breuer. Nonetheless, I am not happy with the interpretation they give of hysterical 
paralysis. In my opinion, the pain comes from the loss of, or inability to achieve, 
autoeroticism, which the female body expresses differently fi7om the male. ('Gesture 
in Psychoanalysis', 100) 
Irigaray's unhappiness with Freud and Breuer's explanation of the paralyses appears to 
derive from the way in which they describe it as affecting the 'legs'. Their analysis of the 
hysterical paralysis 'isolates' a body part, which is then treated as a unit apart from the 
rest of the body. For Irigaray, the hysterical paralysis should be sited in the mark of 
difference which separates the female mode of bodily 'expression' or gesture from the 
male. The female gesture is described precisely by Irigaray: women 'keep all their limbs, 
all the body... especially their legs. The hysterical paralysis is sited for Irigaray in the 
organism as a whole. The problem with Freud's explanation is that it isolates body parts, 
treating them as separate units. Irigaray thus sites her discussion of the difference 
between the male and female 'gesture', not only in the discourse of the hysterical 
paralysis, but in the very point of difference between Freud and Janet. It appears that in 
order to describe the female gesture, Irigaray is reaching back beyond the theories of 
Freudian psychoanalysis to the work of Janet, which incorporates theories of the body 
image into the treatment of the organism as a whole. 
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The fort-da game did not only represent for Ernst the way in which he came to 
terms with the absence of the mother. It also marked his point of entry into symbolic 
language. Irigaray therefore questions how the girl, who does not play this game, would 
enter into language. The answer for Irigaray is located in a phonetic analysis of the 
language used by the male child and the female child. The male child cries out two 
words, 'fort' and 'da'. Both of these words are composed of dental sounds, which are 
stopped by the teeth. They do not get out of the mouth. The sounds vibrate in the 
mouth and reverberate in the ears. The search for the absent mother is internalized,, in an 
act of appropriation. What then of the female child? How would she call for the 
mother's return? Irigaray argues that she would say, 'maman' ('Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis', 100). In phonetic terms, she is therefore allied with labial sounds. She 
does not master the absence of the mother by a process of incorporation. The lips are 
largely closed in a hum. This closing of the lips marks a positive sign of difference 
between the male child and the female child. The woman's language is centred around 
the lips, the labials as opposed to the dentals, the threshold to the mouth. 
Irigaray turns in conclusion to her essay, to an analysis of the case of Dora. The 
neurosis of Dora stemmed from the attempts of Herr K. to kiss her. There is a form of 
aggression against the body, which is centred on the lips. In Irigaray's analysis of the 
case,, this act of violence against the bodily threshold was sufficient in itself to lead to the 
development of a neurosis. The forcing open of the woman's lips, against her will, is a 
violation of the very mark of difference by which the woman experiences her gendered 
identity. But what of Freud's analysis of the case? Does the body enter his analysis at 
this point? Irigaray points out that Freud's analyses of female neuroses often locate a 
connection between the formation of the symptom and the oral stage of development. 
Moreover, he often places a particular emphasis on the lips, as a bodily threshold. 
However, for Irigaray, Freud's analyses are 'reductive' of the woman's body ('Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis', 101). She argues that in his theories of the oral stage, Freud operates 
on a mechanism of 'displacement' ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 102). What Irigaray 
appears to be objecting to in Freud is the way in which the oral stage is centred less on 
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the mouth, than on the libido with which the mouth is invested. Although Freud initially 
appears to base his psychoanalytic theory on an awareness of the body, it soon becomes 
apparent that his interest lies in the theories of the libido which traverse the body, and 
which mark the site of his investment in the body. It appears that once again Irigaray is 
attempting to penetrate beyond Freudian thought, to a theoretical system in which the 
body forms a focus and not merely a 'substitutional mechanism' ('Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis', 102). She seems to reach back to the work of Pierre Janet, in which the 
lived experience of the body forms the central theoretical model. 
Throughout her essay, Irigaray incorporates a critique of psychoanalysis, which 
allies it to the increasing move toward technologization. In her discussion of Freud's 
assignment of a neuter gender to the child, she contends that this is a direct result of the 
embeddedness of the psychoanalytic movement in the processes of technology. 
Technology constructs itself in terms of a neutral energy, which can compete with and 
mimic the machine. For Irigaray, psychoanalysis is deeply implicated in this process: 
Perhaps it is relevant to understand this move to assign the neuter gender to 
childhood as yet one more result of the technological era we live in and that 
psychoanalysis also partakes in. If its practitioners do not take care, analysis becomes 
merely a school of technocratic orthodoxy for our unconscious. Now machines are 
intended to present themselves as more or less neuter. The truth of machines is 
supposed to be as neutral as that of currency. Our technical world claims to be 
neuter., though nature has always had a sex. ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 95) 
Irigaray appears to be introducing into her argument at this point, the familiar opposition 
of nature and culture. It should not be forgotten, however, that she is operating with the 
discipline of psychoanalysis as her field of reference. In calling for a return to 'nature', 
Irigaray is insisting on a return to a method of treatment which is based on 'the rhythms 
and regulations of the body' ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 103). This has been 'uprooted' 
in the modem age, and the organism as a whole is no longer brought into consideration. 
The body is viewed in isolated parts, and is separated from the mind in treatment. In 
Irigaray's eloquent words: 'Everything turns neurotic and violent, in need of doctors and 
medication' ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 103). What Irigaray demands is the recovery of 
a 'creative economy of the senses' ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis, 103). This is implicitly 
71 
located by her at a historical point prior to the advent of the discipline of psychoanalysis. 
I have argued repeatedly throughout this chapter, that Janet is historically situated at the 
point at which the medical discourse was divided by the advance of increasing 
technologization. Where Freud colluded with contemporary developments in his 
founding of psychoanalysis, Janet resisted the new methods and ideologies. He worked 
within the alternative tradition of the body image, to produce what could accurately be 
termed, in Irigaray's own words, a 'creative economy of the senses'. This led directly to 
his eclipse by Freudian psychoanalysis. However, it means that for modem theorists, his 
work marks an exciting point of departure. The theorists of the 1980's began the 
recovery of his work, which was anticipated by Ellenberger a decade earlier. Irigaray's 
essay arguably continues this process, repeatedly siting the process of gendering the 
body at a historical point, analogous to that which is encompassed by Janet's work. At 
the very least, Irigaray's essay seems to suggest that there may be a creative alliance 
between contemporary gender theory and the work carried out by Janet on the body 
image. Subsequent chapters will be concerned to explore the extent to which a 'creative 
economy of the senses' can be recovered, which takes into account both the findings of 
Janet in therapeutic practice, and the concerns of modem studies of the gendering of the 
body. 
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CHAPTER THREE-. THE PAINFUL BODY 
TOWARD A PBENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD 
JANET, FREUD AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS 
The reader will have learned from my account that historically psychoanalysis is 
completely independent of Janet's discoveries, just as in its content it diverges from 
them and goes far beyond them. Janet's works would never have had the implications 
which have made psychoanalysis of such importance to the mental sciences and have 
made it attract such universal interest. I always treated Janet himself with respect, 
since his discoveries coincided to a considerable extent with those of Breuer, which 
had been made earlier but were published later than his. But when in the course of 
time psychoanalysis became a subject of discussion in France, Janet behaved ill, 
showed ignorance of the facts and used ugly arguments. And finally he revealed 
himself to my eyes and destroyed the value of his own work by declaring that when 
he had spoken of 'unconscious' mental acts he had meant nothing by the phrase - it 
had been no more than a fagon de parler. I 
This thesis has thus far sought to demonstrate the profoundly disruptive nature of 
trauma in relation to temporal and spatial categories. While theorists have responded 
creatively to the problem of the belated occurrence of the traumatic event (in part, 
perhaps, because of its affinity with problems of historical and narrative method), the 
notion of space has proved considerably more resistant. In trauma theory, space is 
typically organized as a dichotomy: following Freud's abandonment of the 'seduction 
theory', the consideration of spatial factors has become inseparable, for theorists, from 
the problem of whether the traumatic event originates inside or outside the psyche. This, 
in turn,. has widened out to the contentious question of the historical reality of the 
traumatic event. This polarization of internal and external referents currently marks an 
impasse in trauma theory. 
In two recent volumes, Volatile Bodies (1994) and Space, Time and Perversion 
(1995), Elizabeth Grosz has suggested that, throughout the twentieth century, there has 
been a gradual reconfiguration in the conceptualization of space. 2 She traces the modem 
Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Stu , trans dy James Strachey, (London and New York: Norton, 
1963), p. 57. 
2 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1994). Elizabeth Grosz, Spgpz, Time and Perversion: Esýgys on the Politics of 
Bodies, (New York and London: Routledge, 1995). Further references to these texts will be given after 
quotations in the text. 
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development of the body image and locates this corpus of writing as the source of a 
radically new conception of the body's relation to space. Previously, space had been 
conceived as an external and fixed series of referents, in relation to which the body is 
passively positioned. However, body-image theorists have emphasized that the 
boundary of the body does not delineate a fixed territory, but indicates a variable margin. 
The body image is characterized by its shifting territory, which alters in relation to the 
activity of the body. The body schema is also affected by subjectivity - for example, it 
becomes expansive in relation to feelings of intimacy, but contracts when hatred, fear or 
pain are experienced. This opens up a new spatial dynamic, in which space is rendered 
flexible, allowing for the possibility that it may be altered by the subject in modes of 
performance - it changes when the body is engaged in any form of activity. It is also 
revealed as a subjective category, which is expressive of and can be influenced by 
emotional change. In this chapter, I propose to chart the development of this new 
conceptualization of spatiality in the work of three body-image theorists, Paul Schilder, 
Jacques Lacan and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. All of these thinkers derive from diverse 
theoretical backgrounds, but each seeks to create his own formulation of the body's 
relation to space. The direction of my research in this chapter is indebted to the work 
recently carried out by Grosz. It provides a theoretical basis for the last two chapters of 
my thesis, in which I propose to indicate how the reformulation of spatial categories can 
creatively intervene in contemporary trauma theory, to transform current ideas of the 
body and memory and to circumvent the recent impasse in thought. 
The inextricable relation between memory and spatial categories derives from the 
nineteenth-century writings of Janet and Freud on the nature and operations of 
consciousness and memory. Both writers mapped the relation of the conscious and the 
subconscious faculties in spatial terms, in order to provide a cartography of the psyche. 
The word 'subconscious' was originally coined by Pierre Janet as a means of 
incorporating into his work his understanding of the way in which the body image 
operated, in relation to the organism as a whole. The 'subconscious' referred to the body 
schema, or the internal map which 
is built up through continual interaction with the 
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environment and which guides the way in which future actions are carried out. The body 
schema is thus comprised of a record of past bodily postures and movements, up to the 
last action undertaken. Continual alterations in position are recorded on the body 
schema, which is constantly changing. On the basis of this history of activity, the body 
image provides the context or horizon for future actions: it functions as a standard 
against which subsequent movements and postural changes are measured. The body 0 
schema acts as a guiding influence on bodily orientation, but there is also the implication 
that it acts as a frame of reference for evaluating a wide range of experiences. The body 
image appears to be a central model by which the individual is able to measure his or her 
perceptions of the surrounding environment. There is nothing novel about the idea that 
the individual approaches the world with certain sets or expectancies. These act as 
filters allowing certain inputs to gain prominence while others are muted. What the 
body-image theorists suggest is that one of these filters derives from the configured 
impact of the general experience of the body. 
In 'The Intrusive Past', Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart describe 
Janet's view of the workings of the memory, in terms which are virtually identical to 
those which I have outlined above in relation to the body schema. They observe in 
relation to Janet: 
He viewed the memory system as the central organizing apparatus of the mind, 
which categorizes and integrates all aspects of experience and automatically integrates 
them into ever enlarging and flexible meaning schemes. ('The Intrusive Past', 426) 
The memory acts to integrate 'experience', the body's sensations and movements, into the 
'ever enlarging and flexible meaning schemes' which characterize the body image. 
11- 
Ilowever van der Kolk and van der Hart also include another aspect of the body schema 
which is vital to Janet's formulation of the 'subconscious. For Janet, the importance of 
this functional background to activity was that it operated at an 'automatic, level. Janet 
believed that under ordinary circumstances only a very small part of the interaction 
between an organism and its environment occurs within conscious awareness. Most 
expenences are automatically integrated into existing schemata. In practical terms, 
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people take appropriate action without paying much conscious attention to what is 
happening. The title of Janet's doctoral thesis, L'Automatisme psychologique (1889), 
provided the terminology by which Janet referred to this elementary activity. The term 
'psychological automatism' was considered appropriate by Janet: an 'automatism' because 
it was regular and predetermined by former actions and responses, and 'psychological' 
because it was associated with consciousness. Ellenberger has pointed out that this term 
was not coined by Janet: it had already been employed by the philosopher Despine,, 
among others, to describe acts which were the product of a living machine devoid of 
consciousness. Janet appropriated the term in his doctoral dissertation, in order to 
demonstrate that these actions formed a psychological phenomenon in their own right, 
and entailed a rudimentary consciousness (Ellenberger, 359). The movements were 
clearly determined by psychological factors and could be readily distinguished from the 
action of mechanical objects. The theoretical importance of this is twofold. Firstly, it 
reveals Janet once again resisting any attempts to 'mechanize' the body, and to divide it 
from a consciousness that it requires in order to be viewed as a part of the whole 
organism. Moreover, there is a clear representation here of Janet reaching to the 
alternative medical tradition of the body image, in order to provide a formulation in 
which the routine actions of the body are invested with a 'consciousness' or mental 
association. 
In order for a 'subconscious' to be formulated, this must be clearly defined 
against a notion of consciousness itself In The Major Symptoms of Hysteria, Janet 2-D --- 
explicitly states that the word 'consciousness' should not be used in any unclear sense, 
but must be rigorously defined: 
The word 'consciousness' which we use continually... is an extremely vague 
word... When we use it in particular to designate the knowledge the subject has of 
himself, of his sensations and acts, it means a rather complicated psychological 
operation. -- 
)f Hysteria, 303) 
The crucial term that is used by Janet here is the 'knowledge' that the subject has of 
himself and his actions. No longer are actions performed on an 'automatic' level: in 
consciousness, the powers of attention, volition and judgement are necessary so that an 
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adaptive interaction with the environment might be achieved. The most conspicuous 
characteristic of the function of consciousness is its ability to act on exterior objects and 
to change reality. In contrast, the 'subconscious' reacts to the environment in a 
predetermined ('automatic') way, which is not in any sense adaptive. Consciousness is 
concerned to deal with the social environment,. with complex professional activities, and 
with adjusting to new situations - in short, it comes into play when the action must be 
co-ordinated both with the requirements of the external environment and with the 
personality as a whole. It implies attention, which is the act of perceiving outside reality 
as well as internal thoughts and ideas. 
A contemporary and close acquaintance of Janet throughout his career was the 
philosopher Henri Bergson. In his writings, Bergson formulated the term 'attention to 
present life'. Ellenberger has argued that, in his notions of consciousness, Janet was 
concerned to refine and systematize Bergson's terminology (Ellenberger, 376). For 
Janet, the two functions of voluntary action and attention are combined into the synthetic 
operation of consciousness, which is termed by him 'pr6sentification'. The exact 
signification of this term is the formation in the mind of the present moment. Janet 
indicates that this mental operation is one which requires a considerable amount of 
energy on the part of the subject, for the natural tendency of the mind is to roam through 
the past and future. A certain effort is necessary to fix attention in the present, and still 
more to concentrate it on present action. The mind naturally prefers what Janet has 
termed 'disinterested activity', the habitual and automatic actions which characterize the 
'subconscious'. The mind thus appears in Janet's formulation to operate its own 
economy of energy-consumption, tending naturally towards those activities which 
consume the least energy supplies. 
It was this interest in the economy of energy that caused Janet to add another 
element to his system, which complicated the binary opposition fconscious/subconscious'. 
In a typical move, Janet resists the simple polarization of the conflict. With the 
introduction of the concept 'field of consciousness', Janet added another dimension to his 
thought. 'Consciousness' is concerned to process the relatively small number of 
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elementary sensations which require the attention or judgement of the individual - 
Complex professional skills, novel situations. The 'field of consciousness' is a measure of 
how many of these sensations can be processed in the conscious mind at any one time. 
In The Major Symptoms of Hysteri , Janet explains in some detail what ensues 
if the 
'field of consciousness' becomes restricted, so that only a very small number of 
sensations may be simultaneously processed. In a state of concentration, Janet proposes 
that the individual will be unable to process more than three sensations at the same time. 
In the case of dictation, for example, the subject will write, having the apprehension of 
the sound of the voice, of the vision of the letters and of the muscular movements. All 
other elementary sensations and movements will be neglected or forgotten. Janet 
indicates that this is a normal condition and is related to the efforts on the part of the 
organism to economize on energy consumption. However the 'field of consciousness' 
may become still more contracted. In this instance, only two elementary sensations may 
be perceived at once. What happens to the individual for whom this is the case? Of 
necessity, he reserves the small share of perception that remains, for the sensations which 
seem to him the most important - the sensations of sight and hearing. He therefore 
neglects to perceive the tactile sensations, thinking that he can do without them. At the 
outset, perhaps, he will still turn to them and take them into his field of personal 
perception; but a habit of neglect is gradually formed. Here the production of the 
hysterical symptom is described. The too-long neglected sensations escape the personal 
perception; the individual has become anaesthetic. If the muscular sensations are 
substituted for the tactile, then the individual has developed a hysterical paralysis (-MAjor 
SyMptoms Lf H sterig, 3 08-3 10). In order to outline the development of the hysterical Y 
symptom, Janet thus introduces into his work the idea of a 'psychological tension'. In 
1903, he argued that there were two factors in consciousness which governed the onset 
of hysteria: in the first instance, there was the complex and fragile activity of 
consciousness itself, the concentrating and unifying of psychological phenomena in a 
new mental synthesis. In the second 
instance there was the 'field of consciousness', or 
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the number of psychological phenomena that were able to be integrated in this way 
(Ellenberger, 377). 
The introduction of the 'field of consciousness' into his work allowed Janet to 
focus on the ro^ le of the event in the production of the hysterical symptom. The 'field of 
consciousness' was a measure of the variability of the number of elementary sensations 
which could be processed in the consciousness at any one time. How did Janet account 
for the existence of this variable? Janet's understanding of differing energy levels 
enabled him to perceive that at different times an individual may have a more restricted 
or an enlarged 'field of consciousness'. If an individual was tired or intoxicated or in a 
high state of emotion, there would be an associated restriction in the field of 
consciousness. This approach allowed Janet to understand the importance of the event 
in the production of hysteria, for a sudden restriction in the field of consciousness could 
invariably be traced back to a specific incident of high emotion (for example, the onset of 
menstruation for Marie) or of sustained weariness (for example, Irene's nursing of her 
mother over a prolonged period of time). The novelty or speed of the event combined 
with the emotional state of the subject - ill, intoxicated, tired, depressed, or afraid - to 
produce the pathology. 
The phrase 'field of consciousness' was inspired by the analogous phrase 'visual 
field'. Janet therefore uses the imagery of sight in order to explain his understanding of 
the workings of the body. In the 'visual field', the central part serves focused conscious 
perception, while the periphery registers vague stimuli. While these vague stimuli are 
not consciously perceived by the individual, he or she responds to them 'automatically'. 
For example, the head or trunk will involuntarily move away from a sudden peripheral 
movement. Janet applied the image to the workings of the mind, to introduce the idea of 
a variability in the extent of consciousness. The 'central' part of consciousness is 
concerned with 'focused' activities, which are subject to the individual's volition and will. 
The periphery of consciousness, on the other hand, registers stimuli which do not fully 
enter the personal perception and which are responded to on an 'automatic' level. This 
model of the 'field of consciousness' 
is significant in Janet's work because of the spatial 
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dynamic of consciousness that it implies The 'subconscious' is located at the periphery 
of the conscious mind. It is thus not radically divided from it. Nor does this propose a 
layered model of consciousness, ., 
in which the 'subconscious' is somehow placed below 
the conscious mind, in an image of depth. What Janet seems to advance is a model in 
which the 'subconscious' is a part of, but peripheral to, the conscious. 
Janet was opposed to views of the subconscious which placed it radically beyond 
the conscious mind. He regarded such views, which prevailed among his 
contemporaries, as prescientific. It is of considerable irony, then, that Freud, in 
establishing the new 'science' of psychoanalysis, adhered to precisely such a notion of the 
'subconscious' faculty. Freud argued for a subconscious that was a distinctly different 
layer to the rest of consciousness - something subterranean rather than just split off from 
awareness. Moreover, this notion of the subconscious entered his work in 1896, at 
precisely the point at which Freud sought to establish his own discipline of 
psychoanalytic therapy. Prior to this, Freud had adhered to Janet's formulation of the 
subconscious as split off from the consciousness, but still constituting a part of it. In 
Studies on Hysteri (1895), which he wrote in collaboration with Breuer, he observed: 
We have become convinced that the splitting of consciousness which is so 
striking in the well known classical cases under the form of 'double conscience' is 
present to a rudimentya degree in eveU hysteria, and that a tendengy to such a 
dissociation, and with it the emergence of abnormal states of consciousness... is the 
basic phenomenon of this neurosis... 
These hypnoid states share with one another and with hypnosis... one common 
feature: the ideas which emerge in them are very intense but are cut off from the 
associative communication with the rest of the content of consciousness. 3 
Here there is no radical divide between conscious and subconscious states: the idea 
which has become subconscious has merely been cut off from the 'rest' of consciousness, 
implying that it is still considered to be a part of that consciousness. It was after 1895 
that Freud began to revise the concepts of Janet and to postulate an 'unconscious' that 
was entirely separate from the conscious mind. 
3 Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, trans. James Strachey, ed. Angela Richards, 
Penguin Freud Library 3, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), pp. 62-63. Further references to this book 
will be given after quotations 
in the text. 
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What constituted for Freud a notion of consciousness? In order to describe the 
workings of the conscious, Freud employed the term 'ego'. In the psychoanalytic field, 
this signified the conscious mind, which was based on the perception of the environment 
and which modified the antisocial instincts of the id. Freud devoted the book The Ejao 
and ! he Id 0 923) to explaining the concept of the ego that he had developed, which was 
central to his theoretical framework. The importance of the ego for Freud is the way in 
which it continually alters and changes as the individual develops. It is not a static 
phenomenon. Modem body-image theorists Seymour Fisher and Sidney Cleveland,, in 
discussing Freud's concept of the ego, indicate the way in which he deliberately included 
ideas of the body image. They observe: 
In his writings, Freud placed great emphasis on body image... Body image was 
for him another means of describing how the initially undifferentiated organism 
develops an organizational structure. He saw the body image as fundamental to the 
development of an ego. In his book, The Ego and the Id he states... : 'The ego is first 
and foremost a body ego; it is not merely a surface entity but is itself the projection of 
a surface'. (Fisher & Cleveland, 42) 
Freud conceives of the ego as bringing unity to the vast and overwhelming diversity of 
perceptions which initially overwhelm the child. All that exists for the neonate is an 
ever-changing flux of experiences, which are registered in the id. What the ego provides 
is an 'organizational structure', by which patterns, groupings, identities and objects may 
be gradually perceived. This is a process which occurs over a considerable period of 
time: the ego is only gradually distinguished from the id through the impact of perceptual 
stimuli on the surface of the organism. Freud explains that the ego can be viewed as a 
form of 'psychical callous', which derives from the use of the body, and particularly its 
surface, as a means of processing the sensory information provided by perception. The 
ego is thus a projection or map of the surface of the body: in Freud's terms, it is a 'skin 
ego'. The ego is a consequence of this perceptual surface, and it is produced and grows 
only relative to this surface. It is clear from this that in Freud's thinking the body image 
is basic to his development of the ego structure, and provides a framework around which 
his theories are elaborated. The ego seems firmly structured around the perception of 
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the environment, developing in relation to the contact with, and comprehension of, that 
which surrounds the organism. 
There is,, however, another aspect to Freud's understanding of the ego, which 
somewhat complicates the issue. The body image is thus built up during infancy by the 
interaction of a number of different factors. Visual impressions construct a picture of the 
body in its relation to the environment; painful stimuli are located on areas of the body 
surface; play brings kinaesthetic and postural control; while libidinous factors contribute 
to intensify interest in a specific body area. The problem with Freudian psychology is 
that it reduces its understanding of the body image to the last-named factor- it is almost 
exclusively concerned with the way in which the ego is built up in relation to the libido. 
Freud's theory of the libido is stated almost entirely in terms of body zones and areas of 
bodily sensitivity. The body image, for Freud, is built up gradually, according to the 
stages of libidinal investment that the child undergoes. As the child develops, he or she 
will experience a natural succession of libidinal intensities concentrated on different body 
areas. Each successive stage adds to and redefines the preceding stages, and thus 
participates in the production and differentiation of the body image. 
Within Freud's system of thought, the body image is demarcated relative to three 
main body areas, which are, over a period of time, successively of unusual sensitivity. 
The adult body image is considered to be a final product of the individual's successes and 
failures in coping with the changing demands of each new area of libidinal dominance. 
The three body areas by which Freud maps out his cartography of bodily development 
are, of course, the oral, the anal and the genital. From the time of the oral stage, the 
mouth and digestive tract remain libidinally invested, and even when the anal stage takes 
over the intensity of the oral, the mouth retains its significance - although it no longer 
dominates the child's sensitivity. Equally when the genital stage is reached, the mouth 
and anus remain important to the child. The problem with this model is inherent in 
Freud's own terminology. Freud states that libido is at first given to the body as a whole. 
He refers to this as the stage of narcissism, and it can be supposed that the neonate has 
only narcissistic libido. The infant is only interested in himself and not in the outside 
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world. There follows the sequence of stages in which the libido is concentrated in a 
specific bodily zone. Freud terms this as the auto-erotic stage. First there is the auto- 
erotic oral libido. The child enjoys any stimulation which derives from the mouth. The 
organism at this stage attempts to incorporate the outside world in itself The 
environment is judged only from the point of view of whether it can give oral satisfaction 
or not. The problem with the Freudian framework thus lies in its sheer narcissism. The 
construction of the ego is conceived of as almost entirely independent of the surrounding 
environment. The sequence of libidinal stages succeed each other as a matter of course. 
They develop independently of the events that happen to the child, or the enviromnent by 
which he or she is surrounded. These external considerations are secondary issues for 
Freud: individual development is measured by the success with which the subject 
manages to incorporate life events into the libidinal phase, which is prevalent at that 
particular time. The adult body image, viewed as the cumulative effect of the three 
stages of libidinal development, is conceived of as a static, accomplished structure. This 
is contrary to all other theorists of the body image, for whom the schema is not an 
accomplishment to be mastered, but a continual process of production to be engaged in. 
If the consciousness in Freud's theoretical framework is accounted for by the 
structures of the ego, what then of the subconscious? After 1896, this became for Freud 
the repository of innate sexual impulses which have been repressed because of their 
incompatibility with a normal, adult psychosexual organization. Freud's notions of the 
subconscious expand on his understanding of the ego. In the infant stage of narcissism, 
everything can give sexual pleasure - the mouth, the anus, the entire skin. This 
undifferentiated sexuality is progressively given up as the child matures towards a genital 
sexuality. However, under the pressure of incorporating random, external pressures 
with the particular libidinal stage which is being experienced, the child may fixate at an 
earlier stage than the genital. Alternatively, genital sexuality may be reached, but there 
may remain an element of an earlier stage which has not been satisfactorily dealt with. 
These remnants of earlier libidinal stages represent, from the point of view of adult 
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sexuality, types of perversions. The mechanism of repression therefore comes into play, 
and these unassimilated scraps of libido are consigned to the subconscious. 
Such a theory of the subconscious was very different to Freud's early views, 
which he shared with Janet. The subconscious is no longer the repository of dissociated 
memories but of repressed libidinous instincts. This difference in approach is significant 
in a number of ways. Firstly, the difference in mechanism entirely disregards Janet's 
concern with the economy of energy-consumption. In dissociation, as I have pointed 
out, the 'field of consciousness' narrows so that only a very limited number of sensory 
inputs may be processed at any one time. As a consequence the individual efiminates 
('dissociates') from the conscious those sensory functions which are considered to be 
unimportant. These functions are not lost- no actual impairment has taken place. 
Rather, Janet found, they reside in the subconscious, which acts as a regulatory device, 
by which the organism is able to manage its own energy consumption. In repression, by 
contrast, those remnants of libido which have not been fully assimilated in the auto-erotic 
stage, become unacceptable to the mature ego. They are therefore consigned, via the 
mechanism of repression, to the subconscious. In Freud's later system, the subconscious, 
rather than acting to regulate energy-consumption, itself becomes a source by which 
energy is consumed. A considerable effort is required to contain these libidinal instincts 
vvithin the confines of the subconscious. Energy is continually expended in banishing the 
remnants of the libido from the conscious mind. The most striking difference, however, 
lies in the contents of the 'subconscious'. In dissociation, the subconscious is a 
repository for sensory inputs, which can no longer be processed because the 'field of 
consciousness' is too narrow. The subconscious holds elements which derive from an 
external source. In repression, however, it is libidinal instincts which are consigned to 
the subconscious. These not only derive from an internal source, but also mark a return 
to the body as a mere compound of mechanical processes. The oral, anal and genital 
drives, and the subsquent repression of unassimilated material, follow on from one 
another with all the certainty and rigidity of a mechanized device. 
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The change in Freud's notion of the subconscious was part of a wider change in 
his work as a whole. This was marked by his theories of childhood sexuality - the 
development of a genital sexuality through the narcissistic, oral, and anal phases. This 
progression in Freud's work served to obscure the evidence of child abuse that he had 
uncovered in his hypnotic therapy of the early 1890's. No longer was hysteria caused by 
dissociation, which resulted from the narrowing of the 'field of consciousness', due to the 
excessive fear or bewilderment inherent in a specific event. Hysterical symptomatology 
was now the result of the child's own libidinous drives and instincts. This successfully 
removed Freud's theories from any relation to the external event. It also allows Freud a 
defence against those who may accuse him of blaming the child in a case of sexual abuse 
-a popular feminist strategy in relation to Freudian psychology. Due to the very 
mechanization of the body that Freud propounds, the instincts develop independently of 
the child. In Freudian terms,, the child victim of sexual abuse would seemingly be as 
much a victim of his or her own biological processes as of the act of rape that has been 
perpetrated. 
The development of Freud's ideas away from his early alignment with the work 
of Janet thus follows a specific agenda. Like his rejection of hypnosis, it serves to 
divorce the new discipline of psychoanalysis from Freud's early findings of the sexual 
abuse of children. In so doing, it also obscures in psychology the notion of the event. 
Subsequently, Freudian thought has dominated the scene of psychiatry. It has only been 
since the 1980's that there has been a serious attempt to revive Janet's ideas as an 
alternative to the Freudian model. It has been suggested by a number of theorists that a 
psychology based on a radically separate unconscious, should be replaced by a 
psychology in which the subconscious is considered as an integral part of consciousness 
itself - only then can the external event be retrieved as a proper mode of study within the 
psychotherapeutic framework. 
PAUL SCHILDER AND THE PROBLEM OF HYSTERIA 
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Schilder's early career developed in Vienna and was inevitably marked by the 
influence of Freud and the psychoanalytic circles which flourished around him. As early 
as 1908 (at the age of twenty-two) Schilder was attending lectures by Freud, and from 
1919 he was a member of the Psychoanalytic Society in Vienna. However, despite his 
involvement in psychoanalytic circles, Schilder did not commit himself to Freudian 
principles and he remained unanalysed. In a memoir of Schilder, his widow and former 
colleague, Lauretta Bender, clearly recalls the complexity of his personal and 
professional relations with Freud. She unequivocally observes: 'Paul Schilder was a 
4 psychoanalyst, he considered himself one'. However, his relations with Freud were not 
straightforward and were marked by 'difference' and a difficulty in communication. 
Bender continues her memoir- 
He talked about Freud, and felt there were some differences between them. In 
the end he tried to reconcile some of them with Freud. Paul had me type a letter to 
him in English. Freud objected to this, maintaining that Schilder should have 
handwritten the message in German. (Bender, 34) 
In 1935, Schilder published The Image and A ppearance of the Human Bod . 
in which he 
outlined his understanding of the way in which the body image operated. In a lesser- 
known article, 'The Concept of Hysteria' (193 9), Schilder related his theories of the body 
image to the problem of hysteria. 5 The question which I wish to examine in this section 
is the extent to which Schilder incorporated Freud's highly specialized understanding of 
the body image and the hysterical neuroses into his own work. I will be arguing that 
Schilder's writing bears out the observations of Lauretta Bender, quoted above: he is 
indebted to Freud for many of his ideas regarding the body image, but there are also 
irreconcilable 'differences' between them, which is arguably where the main interest of 
Schilder's work arises. 
4 The information in this paragraph is obtained from the following two articles. Paul Schilder, 'Vita of 
Paul Schilder, Paul Schilder: Nfind EVIore , eds. Donald A. Shaskan and W. L. Roller, (New York: 
Human Sciences Press, 1985). 265-270. Laurctta Bender, 'Reflections on Paul Schilder', Paul Schilder: 
Nfind EVIorer. eds. Donald A- Shaskan and W. L. Roller, (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1985), 
31-35 (p. 33). Further references to these articles are given after quotations in the text. 
5 Paul Schilder, 'The Concept of Hysteria', American Journal of 1! ýychigpy, 95 (1939), 1389-1413. 
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Schilder opens his article, 'The Concept of Hysteria', by providing a historical 
context for the debates which have occurred on the subject of hysteria. He introduces 
his paper with the fbHowing words: 
The modem development of medical psychology and psychotherapy started with 
studies in hysteria. Bernheim, Charcot, Janet, Breuer and Freud derived many of their 
conclusions from the study of cases of hysteria. Towards the beginning of this 
century the interest in other forms of neurotic disturbances increased, whereas the 
interest in the psychology of hysteria decreased. Freud's fundamental paper 
'BruchsWck einer Hysterie-Analyse' appeared in 1905 and finished that epoch. 
('Concept of Hysteria', 13 89) 
Schilder clearly contextualizes the study of hysteria within the changes in medicine that 
were occurring in the late nineteenth century. In his words, the study of hysterical 
phenomena coincided with 'the modem development of medical psychology and 
psychotherapy'. He locates the early research carried out by Freud and Breuer into the 
hysterical symptom, alongside the work of Janet and his predecessors at the Salp&riere, 
Charcot and Bernheim. This marks a distinct recognition of Freud's early alignment of 
his work with Janet's theories. However, 'towards the beginning of this century', a shift 
is perceived to have occurred. Gradually 'other forms of neurotic disturbance' assume a 
central position, although Schilder does not specify the exact nature of these complaints. 
What is specified is a date, 1905, which marks the end of the 'epoch' in which hysteria 
has been an object of serious study. Moreover, from Schilder's phrasing it seems to be 
the case that it was Freud himself who actively 'finished that epoch'. What Schilder, 
knowingly or unknowingly, perfonns in this passage is a placing of Freud at the onset of 
the 'modem'. It can surely be no mere slippage of meaning that Schilder locates the 
origins of the 'modem development of medical psychology', with 'studies in hysteria'; 
almost exactly the title of Breuer and Freud's collaborative study of hysteria, published in 
1895. 
Two dates or points of origin are thus remembered in the passage, one implicitly 
and one explicitly. Both dates, at an interval of ten years apart, are said to mark the 
beginning of the era of modem medicine. In 1905, Freud wrote his last article on the 
subject of hysteria. However, Schilder does not mention that 1905 also marked the 
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publication of Three Essays on the Theory of SexualitLy This was Freud's first attempt 
to trace the course of the development of the sexual instinct in human beings, from 
infancy to maturity. Perhaps the onset of the 'modem' is characterized not so much by 
the last essay written by Freud on the subject of the hysteric, but by his first systematic 
study of infantile sexuality. The 'other forms of neurotic disturbances', which 
increasingly came to light in the years from the turn of the century to 1905, would 
accordingly be those which were increasingly highlighted by Freud in this period; namely 
the neuroses caused by the repression of the libidinal instincts, which remained at the end 
of the auto-erotic stage. But what of 1895? This is the conventional date cited for 
Freud's break with contemporary medical practice, and the establishing of his own 
'science' of psychoanalysis. Why, then, does Schilder repress this date in his text, 
mentioning it only by an allusive slippage of reference to the title of Freud's publication 
of that year? Why is this date replaced with that of 1905? 1 would argue that Schilder is 
operating according to his own agenda here. He is writing a history of modem medicine 
from the perspective of a body-image theorist. The origin of the 'modem' accordingly 
lies for him in Freud's outline of the way in which the body image is gradually built up 
through childhood, by libidinal investments in specific body parts. This is of more 
import to Schilder as a point of origin than 1896, which is conventionally seen as the 
most significant date in Freud's thought because it marked the founding of 
psychoanalysis. 
It is indeed the case that Schilder highlights in his theories Freud's repression- 
based concept of the neuroses. He incorporates his understanding of Freudian 
psychology wholesale into his work on the body image. One of the major problems for 
modem theorists of the body is Schilder's unquestioning acceptance of Freudian notions 
of gender difference and the development of sexuality. This is incompatible with the 
work that has recently been carried out in the field of gender studies. Schilder's article 
'The Concept of Hysteria' readily provides examples of his incorporation of Freudian 
models. He writes that the best illustration of the 'deeper mechanisms of hysteria' lies in 
Freud's analysis of the case of Dora ('Concept of Hysteria', 1393). Already, the body on 
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which hysteria is operating is seen to be constructed of a series of 'mechanisms', which 
are devoid of consciousness. The terms in which Schilder describes the development of 
the hysterical symptom are derived from Freud's account of the auto-erotic stage. He 
observes as follows. 
Freud's classical analysis of Dora still gives the best insight into the deeper 
mechanisms of hysteria. Here is found deep attachment to the parent of the other sex. 
The attachment was principally a genital one, although pre-genital elements were 
present. The affection for the father was partially expressed in urinary symptoms 
(ýgnuresis). The main symptom was coughing. It was based on oral tendencies 
(penilingus). ('Concept of Hysteria', 1393) 
Hysteria is viewed,, in alignment with Freud, as being caused by the repression from 
consciousness of unacceptable, 'pre-genital' sexual attachments. Involuntary urination 
represents a fixation at the anal stage; while coughing is symptomatic of an oral 
attachment. These 'pre-genital elements' are repressed when they are viewed as 
unacceptable perversions; namely at the point at which adult, genital sexuality is reached. 
This accounts for Schilder's assertion at a later stage in the essay, that the hysterical 
symptom is only possible when the individual has reached the level of the Oedipal 
complex; or full genital sexuality ('Concept of Hysteria', 1405). The problem with this 
account of hysteria is precisely that it is too 'mechanical': the body is subject to a series 
of inexorable processes, which are liable to malfunction. The task of the analyst is to 
determine at what stage the mechanism failed to operate appropriately, and to attempt to 
restore functioning at this point. The analyst is seemingly no longer concerned to heal 
the human subject; he has become the technician of a complex but infinitely knowable 
machine. 
Schilder thus uncritically incorporates into his work on the body image, the 
Freudian model of libidinally invested body parts. In The Image and Appearance of the 
Human Bod , 
he writes that psychogenic pain is: 'beyond all else... the expression of the 
libidinous tendencies. Whatever goes on in the body has its specific psychological 
meaning and importance' (Image and Appearance, 158). There is, however, another 
aspect to Schilder's understanding of the body image, which introduces a new element to 
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the formation of the hysterical symptom This alternative approach is evidenced in 
Schilder's continuation of his analysis of the case of Dora. After he has outlined the case 
in classical Freudian terms, Schilder notes the following: 
The girl was deeply engrossed in admiration of the body of the father's 
sweetheart. Positive transference was easily obtained. However, the positive 
transference was soon followed by a negative one which led to the interruption of the 
treatment. Dora's coughing was based on a real organic ailment, a slight catarrh. The 
sick organ became the nucleus of conversion (organic compliance). ('Concept of 
Hysteria', 1393-1394) 
This passage is (unintentionally) revealing of the linfitations of the Freudian 
method. The hysterical symptomatology of Dora mainly comprised a persistent cough. 
in Schilder's first analysis, quoted above, this was representative of an oral fixation, 
libido remained which had not been properly assimilated at the oral stage of 
development. What was going on in the body had its 'specific psychological meaning 
and importance'; hysteria was 'beyond all else an expression of the libidinal tendencies'. 
The problem with this approach is that it operates on the rigid division of mind from 
body. The hysterical ailment is confined to the 'psychological'; it is an illness of the mind. 
In Dora's case, however, the coughing was 'based on a real organic ailment'. The body 
insists on its own entry into the analysis. Schilder clearly reveals that in Freud's analytic 
system, the body cannot be treated in conjunction with the mind. He notes that the 
organic complaint led to 'the interruption of the treatment'. Dora is presumably referred 
to a physician, who treats the cough as a bodily affliction. When he is satisfied that his 
patient has been cured, she is referred back to the analyst. This provides a clear 
illustration of the division of mind and body into separate units of treatment, that split 
the medical discourse of the late nineteenth century. 
It is without doubt that Schilder resisted this division in the medical sciences. He 
believed that both body and mind should enter treatment, which would accordingly focus 
on the organism as a whole. This view is explicitly stated in his works of 1935 and 
1939. In The he CaUs for a revision in 
medicine, so that both mental and physical factors may be considered in treatment. He 
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argues: 'It is one of the important tasks of general medicine to describe the way in which 
an Organ is attacked from both the psychic side and the organic side' (Image and 
Appearance, 145). So fundamental is the point to Schilder that it recurs as the close to 
his 1939 article, 'The Concept of Hysteria. Here he writes of hysteria as a forum in 
which medical treatment can be changed, observing: 
Hysteria is a form of human suffering which affects the psychophysiological 
person. It is only when we understand the seriousness of the problem that we can 
help the hysterical patient to a fuller social adaptation for which he struggles. 
Hysterical symptoms, organ neuroses and organic disease are forms of human 
suffering deeply related to each other. ('Concept of Hysteria', 1408) 
The nucleus around which Schilder explores the 'psychophysiological' aspect of hysteria 
is that of 'conversion. 'Conversion' refers to the mechanism by which psychological 
changes can effect alteration on the organic level, and vice versa. Schilder points out 
that in psychoanalytical literature, the term acts as a source of confusion Image and 
Appearance, 180). This is because psychoanalysis historically stakes its existence on a 
rigid division of rnind and body. It could be argued that conversion places at risk the 
psychoanalytic enterprise. To return briefly to the case of Dora, it was, in Schilder's own 
terms, 'conversion' which 'led to the interruption of the treatment' of analysis. 
If psychoanalysis is unable to incorporate the mechanism of conversion, Schilder 
turns instead to theories of the body image. He writes: 'We can understand conversion 
only as something which is happening in the postural model of the body' Image and 
Appearance, 178). 1 have argued in the preceding sections that the body i-mage is 
concerned with the organism as a whole. Accordingly, Schilder contends that as a body- 
image theorist, he does not believe in an 'absolute contrast' between psychology and 
physiology. In terms remarkably similar to Janet's formulation of the relation between 
conscious and subconscious, Schilder divides the organism into central and peripheral 
functions. Central functions are those acts which derive from the consciousness, and 
which are concerned with the individual's personality and motivation. Peripheral 
functions are those which require no attention from the individual, but operate 
automatically; for example, the heart or the digestion. Conversion acts in Schilder's text 
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to describe the relation between centre and periphery. In a schematic way, he divides 
illness into the organic and that which derives from a psychological source. However, he 
is at pains to point out that this is not a division so much as a relation. Both forms of 
illness are thus related to the same process; the difference between them is merely the 
direction in which this process moves. In the organic illness, the periphery is affected 
first, and the affection moves from the periphery to the centre; in psychogenic cases, the 
change travels from the centre to the periphery. The difference between the organic and 
the psychological is reduced to a difference in flow, so that the organic ailment moves 
centripetally around the organism, while the psychogenic disturbance travels 
centrifugally. Schilder's understanding moves away from the psychoanalytic model to 
incorporate theories of the body image. Like Janet, Schilder's concept of the neuroses 
belongs neither to the purely organicist nor to the purely psychogenic theories; he 
combines the two, in resistance to the prevailing modes of contemporary medicine. 
The importance of the conversion mechanism in Schilder's work was that it 
allowed him to introduce into his theories of hysteria his conception of the event. No 
longer was the hysterical symptom confined to the internally regulated structures of the 
libido. The event which is highlighted by Schilder in his understanding of the neuroses is 
that of an incidence of illness, usually experienced in childhood. So fundamental is this 
event to his conception of the hysterical symptom, that he questions whether it is not 
indispensable in the formation of the hysterical constitution (Image and Appearance, 
185). The mechanism of conversion provides Schilder with a framework in which 
psychological factors may result in organic symptoms, for there is a flow of connection 
between the two. What it does not explain is why a particular organ is chosen as the 
nucleus for this conversion, in preference to other sites. Schilder uses the imagery of a 
stream to explain the phenomenon. The flow of impulses around the organism, which 
Schilder has posited as the site of connection between the centre and the periphery, is the 
flow of a stream. At certain points the bed of the stream widens, and this marks the 
locus of an organ which especially attracts the stream of impulses. In Schilder's terms 
this is the site Of a 'predisposed' organ (Image and Appearance, 179). The organ that is 
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'predisposed' will provide sensations different from and more numerous than those of the 
average body part. This physiological difference will be reflected in the postural model 
of the body, and this point will accordingly attract and reflect conversion. But what is 
the cause of this 'predisposition'? Schilder writes clearly that it is created by temporary 
or lasting organic disease, in childhood or even later (Image and Appearance, 180). This 
illness is not necessarily experienced by the individual; it is sufficient to have been in 
close proximity to a sick person, for a somatic change to take place. 
The conversion is either based on an actual scene experienced in childhood..., on 
a disease observed in another, or a previous organic disease. There is always a real 
event at the basis of conversion. In this event the body image, one's own somatic 
experience or one of others always play the most important part. ('Concept of 
Hysteria', 1399) 
The case of Dora provides an illustrative example. Dora was suffering from a 'slight 
catarrh'. This provided the 'sick organ', which attracted the stream of impulses. There is 
no doubt for Schilder that in this case the 'organic ailment' provided the 'nucleus of 
conversion', by which the hysterical symptom was formed. 
Schilder thus posits the incidence of childhood illness at the basis of his 
conception of hysteria. This is the 'real event' in which the hysterical symptom 
originates. Hysterical symptomatology always affects a specific bodily area. For 
Schilder, the body part which is prioritized is the result of a disease, which provokes a 
particular action or attitude towards the area of the body which is afflicted. In terms of 
the body image, the representation of the affected organ on the body schema will be 
emphasized. This is particularly true if the illness occurs in early childhood, when the 
body schema is in an exaggerated process of development. In The Image and 
Appearance of the Human Body, Schilder provides two examples of his understanding of 
the way in which illness can alter the body schema. In the first example, the illness cited 
is one in which an internal organ of the body is felt to be particularly painful. In this 
instance, the individual is induced to touch, rub or massage the painful area. The hand 
returns again and again to the aching organ, even though this may effectively increase 
the pain sensation that is experienced (Image and Appearance, 157). Schilder explains 
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that the painful organ has become a centre of experimentation with the body. By a 
process of touch, the individual is able to build up what Schilder terms as a 'key 
representation' of an organ, which is not normally available for representation on the 
body schema (Image and Appearanc , 184). 
Organic illness facilitates the 
experimentation with organs which are otherwise beyond the reach of the subject. 
Organ neuroses, such as hysteria, are in turn prepared by such experimentations, in 
conjunction with a subsequent motivating factor. 
This is not to suggest, however, that these experiments with body parts are not a 
healthy part of the development of the individual. Schilder observes of such 
experimentation with the body: 'It takes a part usually taken by the erogenic zones' 
(Image and AVpearance, 126). Schilder is indicating here that pain provides an 
alternative mode to the libido, by which body parts may be recognized and differentiated 
from each other. This conflicts with Freudian psychoanalysis, which exclusively 
highlights the libidinal investment of body parts as a means of bodily experimentation 
and recognition. Schilder points out that in early infancy, there is a remarkably 
incomplete reaction to pain. In the earliest months, a bleeding wound provokes no pain 
reaction. Even at ten months, a child will bang its head against a wall as if it were a 
foreign object (Image and Appearance, 194-195). It seems that in order to be fully 
perceived, pain must be brought into connection with the organization of the body 
image. Schilder's subsequent citation of the condition of 'asymbolia for pain' supports 
this thesis (Image and Appearance, 101-103). In this condition, some pain is felt 
although it is not connected with the image of the body. It is dissociated from the body 
schema and so from the personality. Patients with this condition often offer themselves 
to the pain stimulus, and even inflict pain on themselves. It seems that they are not only 
curious about the sensation which they cannot completely perceive, but they are also 
diriven by an intense need to localize this pain on the body schema. 
This is analogous to the developing child. It seems that the infant similarly 
requires that the incompletely perceived sensation be localized on the body image, and 
so fully experienced in relation to the personality. The child offers itself to the pain 
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stimulus, inflicting on itself a considerable amount of violence. Schilder notes that in the 
., 
the child bangs its own head with considerable force. On the four- forty-first week, 
hundred-and-ninth day, it bites its fingers, arms and toes, until it screams with the pain 
that is induced. The experimentation with pain sensations thus forms a vital part of the 
way in which the body image is constructed. Pain functions as an alternative stimulus to 
the libido, in focusing attention on a specific bodily part or zone. 
The second instance that is cited by Schilder of the way in which illness can alter 
the body schema, concerns the irritation of the body surface. He writes of the way in 
which skin diseases, experienced early in fife, can cause a premature development of the 
body image (Image and Appearance, 133). Itching causes the skin to be irritated and 
hence to become an irritating organ. It induces the individual to scratch, leading the 
hand to the whole surface of the body. When the subject scratches, he will invoke pain 
in himself The whole surface of the body will be afflicted with sensations of a more or 
less painful type. These continuous sensations and touches lead to the development of 
an awareness of the body surface and its parts. The searching movements of the hands 
explore the body surface, before the child is libidinally drawn to the separate areas. 
Excessive skin irritation at an early age is therefore of importance in the construction of 
a premature conceptualization of the body image. 
It is worth examining in some detail Schilder's description of the way in which 
the skin acts in an irritative disease, to induce the individual to scratch. He points out 
that the skin draws the hand especially to the genital region, which is particularly 
sensitive. He argues: 'The itching will lead the hand to the whole body and especially to 
the genital region, which is especially apt to provoke itching sensations' (Image and 
Appearance, 133). There seems to be some anxiety here that pain may induce the genital 
phase, before the libidinal investment of the body area has taken place. This would 
explain the curious passage, in which Schilder explicitly incorporates the itching of the 
skin into the mechanism of the genital libido: 
the sex organs... are... a continual source of sensations and stimulations... 
Whenever there is an inner tension in the organ, the organ will ask for a contact either 
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with the hand of the person or with the outside world... it is true that what has been 
said about the genitals is in some ways true for the whole surface of the body. The 
skin is easily irritated... Continuous sensations are present... which, in view of what 
we have already said, must themselves enrich the image of the body. (Image and 
Avpearance, 125) 
The 'continuous sensations', or the itching of the body surface, is aligned with the genital 
libido, which is a 'continual source of sensations and stimulations'. Both act to induce 
contact, either with the hand of the individual or with an external stimulus. It is through 
this contact that the body part comes to be known, and so registered on 'the image of the 
body'. By aligning the two, Schilder is able to suggest that the pain which derives from 
scratching the skin, and which acts as a nucleus for the development of the body image, 
is not an alternative source of bodily investment to the libido, but is rather an integral 
part of the libido itself 
The strategy which is outlined above does not derive from Schilder, but is found 
in the work of Freud himself In the essay 'On Narcissism! (1914), Freud writes on the 
subject of illness. 6 The article is notable for the way in which it incorporates pain into 
the libidinal structures. In illness, Freud argues, there are distressing and painful bodily 
sensations. These absorb the interest and attention of the sick person, who concentrates 
on the organ which is the source of his suffering. This, however, implies that pain is an 
alternative source of bodily awareness to the libido. Freud therefore stresses the point 
that it is not merely his interest that the patient bestows on the painful organ, but his 
'libidinal interest' ('On Narcissism', 75). The libido is drawn to the painful body part, 
which is treated as an area of investment. The high distribution of libido in the painful 
area causes a change in the erotogenicity of the organ. The area becomes an 'erotogenic 
zone', and acts as a 'substitute' for the libidinal structures ('On Narcissism', 77). Freud 
has neatly incorporated the impact of pain on the body schema, into his highly 
specialized understanding of the mechanisms of the libido. Pain attracts the libido to a 
specific body part which would not otherwise be fibidinally invested. In other words, 
pain does not register in Freud's work as an alternative mode of bodily exploration to the 
6 Sigmund Freud, 'On Narcissism', On MetaMchology: The Theo! y of PachgqLWysis, trans. James 
Strachey, ed, Angela Richards, Penguin Freud Library, 11, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991). 59-94. 
Further references to this paper will be given after quotations in the text. 
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libido, but is instead integral to it. The concept of pain merely allows Freud to map 
another site onto his cartography of bodily development. 
In a passage that is astonishingly similar to Schilder's (quoted above), Freud 
explicitly incorporates the painful sensations of the body into the genital libido. The 
genitalia are described as the 'prototype' of all the organs. Because of their potential to 
attract the libido through pain, the organs of the body act 'analogously' to the genitalia, 
which naturally attract the libido. The passage is exclusionary in two senses. Firstly, 
pain is excluded as an alternative source of bodily investment to the libido. Secondly, 
the genitalia are implicitly male and so Freud effectively excludes the female body from 
his discussion. The passage is worth quoting in full: 
Now the familiar prototype of an organ that is painfully tender, that is in some 
way changed and that is not yet diseased in the ordinary sense, is the genital organ in 
its states of excitation. In that condition it becomes congested with blood, swollen 
and hurnected, and is the seat of a multiplicity of sensations. Let us now, taking any 
part of the body, describe its activity of sending sexually exciting stimuli to the mind 
as its 'erotogenicity', and let us further reflect that the considerations on which our 
theory of sexuality was based have long accustomed us to the notion that certain 
other parts of the body - the 'erotogenic' zones - may act as substitutes for the genitals 
and behave analogously to them. We have then only one more step to take. We can 
decide to regard erotogenicity as a general characteristic of all organs and may then 
speak of an increase or decrease of it in a particular part of the body. ('On 
Narcissism, 77) 
The crux around which the passage revolves is the 'theory of sexuality' which is based on 
the 'erotogenic zones'. This refers back to the Three Essays on the TheoU of Sexuality, 
which were published in 1905. It is this 'theory' which provides the structural connection 
in the passage between the 'genital organ' and 'all organs' of the body. It is able to 
provide the means by which Freud subordinates the multiplicity of the body to a single 
dimension, because it marks the historical point at which the body became for him 
exclusively a product of the libidinal drives. 
As I have pointed out above, The Three Essgys on the Histoly of Sexuality also 
marks the point at which Schilder locates the origin of the 'modem epoch' of 
psychoanalytic thought. It should come as no surprise therefore that Schilder follows 
Freud, in describing pain sensations in terms of their attraction of libido. In The Image 
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and Appearance of the Human Bod , 
Schilder states explicitly: 'The part of the body in 
which the pain is felt gets all the attention. Libido is concentrated on it (Freud) and the 
other parts of the body image lose in importance' (Image and Appearance, 104). 
However in Schilder's analysis, the two elements of pain and libido fail to be drawn 
seamlessly together. Although 'the other parts of the body image lose in importance', 
they refuse to be entirely subordinated to the libidinal structures of Freudian thought. 
Schilder notes that the painful organ which has been invested with libido does not 
thereby become a nucleus of pleasurable sensations. Libidinal investment does not here 
entail the creation of a love-object. On the contrary, the painfiýl part of the body 
becomes isolated. There is a tendency to push it out of the body image. When the 
whole body is filled with pain, there is an attempt to get rid of the whole body QmWe 
and Appearance, 104). Schilder expresses this in the specialized, Freudian terminology 
of the libido. He writes as follows: 
The individual defends himself against the libidinous overtension of the ... organ; he tries to isolate the diseased organ, to treat it like a foreign body in the body-image. 
This fight is entertained by an ego system, which is at least partially preserved and 
which has strength enough to fight against the libidinous organ. (Image and 
Appearance, 142) 
In the preceding section, it was clear that for Freud the ego was built up as a 
consequence of the successive libidinal stages. The libido was clearly implicated in the 
construction of the ego. In this passage, however, the libido is invested in a source of 
pain. It therefore becomes a negative force, which destroys the ego system. In other 
words, its function is entirely reversed. The ego, far from itself deriving from the 
'libidinous overtension' of the erotogenic zones, is now forced to fight against the 
libidinally invested organ. This radical alteration in the relation of ego and libido does 
not originate in Schilder's work, but is implicit in Freud's essay 'On Narcissism'. It seems 
that in order to provide a model in which pain is incorporated into the structures of the 
libido, theoretical changes must occur at a wider level. The ego itself can only be 
'partially preserved'. It could be argued, by implication, that psychoanalysis is invested at 
a crucial level in theories of the libido and childhood sexuality, and that therefore 
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establishing the supremacy of the libido over other modes of bodily awareness, is more 
important to Freud than preserving other elements of his system. 
It could equally be argued, however, that this passage reveals a crucial 
'difference' between Schilder and Freud. In opening up a space of conflict between the 
'ego system' and the 'diseased organ', Schilder suggests the possibility of an alternative 
dynamic. Located as a source of 'strength', the 'ego system' 'fights' the painful body part 
by 'isolating' it, or rejecting it from the body image. The dynamic which is revealed is 
one of spatial perfomativity - the 'ego system' defends its boundaries by 'pushing' the 
source of pain outside of the body schema. Although Schilder's work is heavily invested 
in Freudian thought, there is a glimpse of conflict here. Schilder fights against the 
'libidinous overtension' of body parts, in order to 'preserve' the body image, and in so 
doing hints at the emergence of a new therapeutic dynamic, which is based on a mode of 
spatial performativity. 
JACQUES LACAN'S MIRROR REFLECTIONS 
We have laid some stress on this phenomenological detail, but we are not 
unaware of the importance of Schilder's work on the function of the body-image, and 
the remarkable accounts he gives of the extent to which it determines the perception 
of space. 7 
In 1933, following the completion of his doctorate the previous year, Jacques 
Lacan published his first articles in Minotaure, a joumal of the surrealists. Out of this 
work arose his first influential academic paper, presented in 1936 at the International 
Congress of Psychoanalysis in Marienbad. Here, Lacan introduced his formulation of 
the 'mirror stage' in the child's development. This paper was never published; the version 
that was included in Ecrits dates from a later revision of the paper presented by Lacan in 
1949.8 In his paper, Lacan was concerned to locate the mirror stage at a precise 
7 Jacques Lacan, 'Some Reflections on the Ego', International Journal of PE3Lchganalysis, 34, (195 3), 11 
17, (p. 13). Further references to this article will be given after quotations in the text. 
8 Jacques Lacan. 'The Nliffor Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience'. tcrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, (London: Tavistock 1977), 1-7. Further 
references to this article are given after quotations in the text. 
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chronological period in the physical development of the child, arguing that it occurred 
when the infant was between six and eighteen months of age. He appeared to evidence 
considerable concern. for the actual structures and capabilities of the body with which he 
was dealing, and he simultaneously exhibited an informed understanding of the 
successive forms of evolution of the body image itself However, it is worth noting that 
in 1938, Lacan was accepted as a training analyst by the International Psychoanalytical 
Association, and so demonstrated his allegiance to Freudian ideas and methods. 
Although Lacan claims Schilder as a primary influence on his work (see quotation 
above), a question arises regarding the extent to which Lacan was influenced by Freud's 
highly specialized understanding of the nature and operations of the body schema. 
The importance of Lacan's concern with chronology lies in the recognition that 
the mirror stage occurs at a period of development in which the child has not yet 
developed full motor capacity. Lacking in muscular co-ordination, the infant is as yet 
unable to stand or walk without support, whether human or artificial. The mirror phase 
represents a stage at which, despite his imperfect control over his own bodily activities, 
the child is nevertheless able to imagine himself as a self-governing entity. Finding 
himself in front of a mirror, the child is fascinated by the image which is reflected. The 
mirror reflection reveals to the child that his body is an integrated whole. What he sees 
as a unified exteriority in the mirror is belied by the turbulence and chaos occasioned by 
his own sensory and motor immaturity. The infant's jubilant adoption of the mirror 
image as a reflection of his own body is consequently based less on recognition than on 
identification - the child identifies with a level of co-ordination and integration that he 
has not yet been able to achieve experientially. The child feels disunified at the same 
time as he perceives an image of (possible) unity for himself In the terminology of 
Lacan, the infknt's relation of the mirror reflection to his own body during the mirror 
phase is based on a 'misrecognition' (meconnaissance). The process is fraught with 
tensions and contradictions, since the child identifies with an image that both is and is 
not himself 
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In his account of the mirror stage, Lacan adopts from his predecessors and 
contemporaries in the fields of neuropsychology and psychiatry, the concept of the body 
image. Renaming it the 'imaginary anatomy', Lacan writes of the internalized map or 
image of the body, which the subject develops through his or her contact with others and 
the culture in which he or she lives. Drawing on the work of Janet, Lacan argues that 
the symptoms of hysteria follow closely the pattern of the body schema. Instead of 
observing the neurological connections in organic paralyses, hysterical paralyses 
reproduce various naive or everyday beliefs about the way in which the body functions. 
He writes of the hysterical symptom as follows: 
If the hysterical symptom is a symbolic way of expressing a conflict between 
different forces, what strikes us is the extraordinary effect that this 'symbolic 
expression' has when it produces a segmental anaesthesia or muscular paralysis 
unaccountable for by any known grouping of sensory nerves and muscles. To call 
these symptoms functional is but to confess our ignorance, for they follow the pattern 
of a certain imaginary Anatomy which has typical forms of its own. In other words, 
the astonishing somatic compliance which is the outward sign of this imaginary 
anatomy is only shown within certain definite limits. I would emphasize that the 
imaginary anatomy referred to here varies with the ideas (clear or confused) about 
bodily functions which are prevalent in a given culture. ('Some Reflections on the 
Ego', 13) 
Lacan here appears to accept the formulation of the body schema derived from Janet, but 
some caution is required. It is notable that Lacan refers only to the social and cultural 
influences by which the body schema is developed ('the ideas... about body functions 
which are prevalent in a given culture'). His interest in the body schema is confined to its 
socio-cultural determinants; he does not take into consideration its formation by physical 
experience and habit, the automatic actions of the body which were so important a 
determinant for Janet in the precise form taken by a hysterical symptom. 
The limitations in Lacan's treatment of the body image are extended when he 
proceeds to examine the work of his contemporary, Paul Schilder. In 'Some Reflections 
on the Ego', Lacan acknowledges his awareness of the importance of Schilder's writing 
on the body image, indicating particularly Schilder's work on the phenomenon of the 
phantom limb. The phantom limb represents the organization of the body image 
according to the tasks which the body is accustomed to perform, or its habitual 
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movements. The phantom arm thus arises from the extent to which the body is 
accustomed to rely on the hand as a tool for manipulating and exploring the objects with 
which it comes into contact. The phantom leg arises from the body's dependence on its 
function as a mode of transportation. The gradual disappearance (telescoping') of the 
phantom arm, and the merging of the phantom leg with a prosthesis, indicate the slow 
transposition of the function onto another body part. The phantom limb thus reveals the 
remarkable adaptability and flexibility of the body schema. 
Lacan's analysis of the phantom limb again ornits from the body schema all 
consideration of the habitual or automatic actions of the body. He is concerned to 
extend Schilder's definition of the phantom limb, writing as follows: 
The meaning of the phenomenon called 'phantom limb' is still far from being 
exhausted. The aspect which seems to me especially worthy of notice is that such 
experiences are essentially related to the continuation of a pain which can no longer 
be explained by local irritation; it is as if one caught a glimpse here of the existential 
relation of a man with his body-image in this relationship with such a narcissistic 
object as the lack of a limb. 
The effects of frontal leucotomy on the hitherto intractable pain of some forms of 
cancer, the strange fact of the persistence of the pain with the removal of the 
subjective element of distress in such conditions, leads us to suspect that the cerebral 
cortex functions as a mirror,, and that it is the site where the images are integrated in 
the libidinal relationship which is hinted at in the theory of narcissism. ('Some 
Reflections on the Ego', 13) 
The important point to note here is that, for Lacan, the phantom limb operates as a 
'narcissistic object'. This is an allusion to Lacan's own formulation of the 'theory of 
narcissism', modified from Freud's writings, which refers to the child's captivation by his 
own reflection at the mirror stage. Samuel Weber, in his study of Lacan, indicates that 
the importance of the myth of Narcissus in the context of Lacan's thought, is that 
Narcissus was not merely in love with himself but with an image of himself 9 The myth 
thus underlines Lacan's point that the miffor reflection is an idealized representation of 
the child, with which he identifies. The mirror phase is based on a 'misrecognition', in 
which the image both is and is not the child. What Lacan performs in the passage above 
9 Samuel Weber, Return to Freud: Jaggues Lacan's Dislocation of PachoanWysis, trans. Nfichael 
Levine, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1), p. 16. 
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is a transposition of the mirror stage onto the phenomenon of the phantom limb. The 
cerebral cortex functions as the 'mirror' in which the subject's actual body is reflected, to 
become an idealized image with which the subject can identify, and which both is and is 
not the actual body (the 'body image). In this case, the 'mirror' reflects the actual body 
(the absent limb) as if it were whole once more: thus, the phantom limb is produced. As 
in the mirror stage, the subject is captivated by this idealized image: the phantom limb 
becomes a 'narcissistic ob ect' to which the subject develops a 'libidinal' attachment. j 
The theoretical implications of this account are important. The phantom limb 
(representative of the body image as a whole) is reduced to a body part (an'object'), with 
which the subject develops a 'libidinal relationship'. This also acts on the level of the 
mirror phase. The child's idealized reflection acts as a representative of the body image, 
in which the child libidinally invests as if it were analogous to any other body part. The 
model of the body used by Lacan thus represents a return to Freud - it is divided into a 
series of individual parts which act successively as a matrix of libidinal investment. In 
the mirror phase, Lacan is effectively incorporating the body schema into Freud's model 
of the child's development. It is reduced to merely another body region; in Lacan's 
formulation, the subject's attachment to the body schema follows the oral, anal and 
genital phases, as a preliminafy to the Oedipal complex. 
Lacan's work on the body image in the 1930's thus appears to derive from his 
reading of Janet on the hysterical paralyses, combined with an understanding of the work 
of his own contemporary,, Paul Schilder. However, his formulation of the mirror phase 
does not owe as much to the field of body-image theorization as to the discipline of 
psychoanalysis. It represents a return to the body as a bit of matter, a network of 
mechanisms. A problem thus arises in Lacan's account of the phantom limb, quoted 
above. In Lacan's formulation, the 'libidinal relationship' which the subject forms is with 
a source of pain. He ignores the introduction by Schilder of a dynamic of conflict 
between the 'ego system' and the painful body part, which results in the isolation from 
the body image of the souce of 'intractable pain' (Image and A ppearance, 142). He 
returns instead to Freud's model of libidinal investment in pain, so that the individual is 
103 
left with no 'defence' with which to 'fight' against the invasion of the boundaries of the 
body in physical suffering. 
MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD 
In 1949, Lacan addressed a paper to the International Congress of 
Psychoanalysis, in which he spoke of his concept of the mirror stage. This year marked 
a turning point in his work, in which he moved away from his early fascination with the 
domination of the individual by his or her image, and engaged with the writings of the 
linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure. In the same year, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, seven years 
his junior, introduced a series of lectures on 'Consciousness and the Acquisition of 
Language', in his role as Professor of Child Psychology and Psychiatry at the Sorbonne. 
In these lectures, Merleau-Ponty cited closely Lacan's notion of 'pre-maturation' in the 
child's psychological development, an idea which was stressed particularly in Lacan's 
1936 paper on the mirror stage, which had remained unpublished. Merleau-Ponty was 
able to cite Lacan so closely because the two not only knew each other's work, but were 
also personally acquainted. Merleau-Ponty regarded Lacan as a major influence on the 
development of his system of phenomenology. In 'The Child's Relations with Others, an 
essay published posthumously in 1964, Merleau-Ponty wrote that Lacan had transformed 
the notion of the body image, and he singled out the concept of the mirror phase for 
particular praise. 10 However, Merleau-Ponty's unqualified admiration for Lacan should 
perhaps be regarded with some caution; the critic, John ONeill has suggested that there 
is an underlying 'incompatibility' between the two thinkers: 
The question we have to decide is whether the Lacanian view of the body image 
at the mirror-stage is really as compatible with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of 
the infant's corporeal schema as he himself takes it to be. II 
10 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'The Childs Relations with Others, The Pri! nM of PercMfion, and Other 
Es 
-W 
Pýychi4tjy, the PhiloDphy of Art, Histog and Politics ed. James M. Edie, 
trans. William Cobb, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern Universities Press, 1964), 96-155. 
John O'Neill, 'The Specular Body: Merleau-Ponty and Lacan on Infant Self and Other', SýMftse 66, 
(1986), 201-217 (p. 202). 
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Arguably, Merleau-Ponty's most influential work was The Phenomenology o 
Perception (1947) 
, in which 
he wrote extensively of his views regarding Freudian 
psychoanalysis. 12 His assessment of the contribution of psychoanalysis to the field of 
psychiatry is worth quoting in full: 
Here we concur with the most lasting discoveries of psychoanalysis. Whatever 
the theoretical declarations of Freud may have been, psychoanalytical research is [sic] 
in fact led to an explanation of man, not in terms of his sexual substructure, but to a 
discovery in sexuality of relations and attitudes which had previously been held to 
reside in consciousness. Thus the significance of psychoanalysis is less to make 
psychology biological than to discover a dialectical process in functions thought of as 
'purely bodily', and to reintegrate sexuality into the human being. 
... 
For Freud himself the sexual... is the general power, which the psychosomatic 
subject enjoys, of taking root in different settings, of establishing himself through 
different experiences, of gaining structures of conduct. It is what causes man to have 
a history. In so far as a man's sexual history provides a key to his life, it is because in 
his sexuality is projected his manner of being towards the world, that is, towards time 
and other men. (Phenomenology of Perception, 157-158) 
Merleau-Ponty here appears to 'concur' with Lacan in according Freudian psychoanalysis 
a privileged status. He argues that the 'lasting' contribution of psychoanalysis has been 
to dislodge the supremacy of 'consciousness'. However, where other writers have 
opposed this to the subconscious, Merleau-Ponty reads 'consciousness' as the faculty of 
the mind and opposes it to the physical sphere. For Merleau-Ponty, the achievement of 
psychoanalysis has been to redefine sexuality, so that it is no longer a mere function of 
bodily processes, but is a mode of conduct towards others, which takes place on the 
level of the organism as a whole. It is the creation of a 'psychosomatic' subject, who 
combines the levels of body and psyche, which is crucial for Merleau-Ponty. It is only 
when the organism can be viewed as a whole that there is a subject who is capable of 
being grounded in a concrete, lived reality ('taking root in different settings') and who 
can be set in a historical context ('It is what causes man to have a history'). 
Merleau-Ponty introduces a case history into his argument, in order to exemplify 
his meaning. He writes of a girl whose mother has forbidden her to see again the young 
12 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of PeI99211 Lon, 4th ecL, trans. Cohn Smith, (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967). Further references to this book will be given after quotations in the 
text. 
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man with whom she is in love. The girl gradually falls sick: she cannot sleep, she loses 
her appetite, and finally she is unable to speak. Merleau-Ponty notes in his text: 'A 
strictly Freudian interpretation of this would introduce a reference to the oral phase of 
sexual development' (phenomenology of Perception, 160). Surprisingly, however, 
Merleau-Ponty is unequivocal in his condemnation of this approach. He writes that it is 
impossible to talk of a distinctive development of sexuality, such as Freud is concerned 
to map in his chronology of childhood complexes. Sexuality cannot be confined to a 
single body part, for it is by nature pervasive. Merleau-Ponty writes evocatively: Trom 
the part of the body which it especially occupies, sexuality spreads forth like an odor or 
like a sound' (Phenomenology of Perception, 168). Sexuality cannot be confined to the 
genital organs, as Freud contests in his formulation of the genital phase, in which the 
libidinal attachment to other organs is given up or repressed. For Merleau-Ponty, this 
entails regarding the sexual apparatus as in abstract separation from the rest of the body 
- sexuality has become a removable appendage. If body parts are viewed in isolation, a 
man's hand or foot can be removed without damaging the conception of him as a whole 
person; he is simply regarded as 'handless' or 'footless'. So if the genitalia are removed, 
he is still regarded as an entire individual, but is seen to be 'sexless'. 
For Merleau-Ponty, this is a false conception of the human, who is composed not 
of the sum of his bodily parts, but of the functions that he is able to perform. As a 
phenomenologist, his interest lies in the 'intentionalism' of the subject, the drive toward 
objects and other bodies. Man is thus distinguished from other animals by his tool- 
making capacity, which is a function of the hands. However, if the hands are lost, the 
organism adapts, so that an alternative body part assumes their task. Even if the hands 
are lost, the function which they perform is transposed, and so the individual cannot be 
said to be truly 'handless'. The clearest operation of this principle lies in the phenomenon 
of the phantom limb, which represents for Merleau-Ponty, not a source of narcissistic 
libidinal investment, but the organization of the body image according to the tasks which 
the body is accustomed to perform. The gradual disappearance of the phantom limb, as 
its function is transposed onto another body part, demonstrates the true impact of 
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Merleau-Ponty's statement that on the level of the body schema, a man can never be 
regarded as 'handless' or 'footless', for the function that these body parts perform does 
not disappear, even if the extremity itself is lost. 
The same is true of the sexual function, which exists in the human as an 
'atmosphere' (Phenomenology of Percepfion, 169). It underfies the activities of the 
whole organism and motivates both consciousness and bodily activity. The removal of 
the genitalia does not take away from the individual those modes of conduct towards 
others in which sexuality can be said to inhere; Merleau-Ponty does not 'concur' with 
Freud's separation of sexual existence fi7om other modes of relating to the world. 
Returning to the case of the young girl separated from her lover, Merleau-Ponty 
indicates that her loss of voice cannot simply be reduced to a form of 'sexuality' which is 
confined to the oral region, but is an expression of a whole sequence of conflicts, sexual 
and otherwise, on the level of the organism as a whole. Loss of speech, in this instance, 
constitutes a refusal of co-existence with others. The emotion elects to find its 
expression in loss of speech because of all bodily functions, it is the most intimately 
connected with communal existence. Not only is her mouth incapable of ejecting 
language, it is also unable to incorporate food. Her inability to swallow arises from the 
fact that swallowing implies the ability to incorporate events and assimilate them. The 
patient is expressing at a literal level her inability to 'swallow' the events which have been 
imposed on her. The loss of voice is no accident; the body area acts as a matrix for the 
emotions which cannot otherwise be expressed. The organism acts as a whole to 
express the suffering which it undergoes, and which is neither purely physical nor purely 
psychological. 
Merleau-Ponty therefore 'concurs' in his writing, not with Lacan's view of the 
body image, which is in turn derived from Freud's highly specialized understanding of its 
operations, but with Schilder. However, he exceeds Schilder in his explicit rejection of 
the libidinal drives as central to the development of the individual. This version of 
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Freudian psychoanalysis is termed by Merleau-Ponty as 'superficial'. " It is centred on an 
understanding of the body in isolation from the organism as a whole. Merleau-Ponty 
juxtaposes this 'philosophy of the body' to what he terms the 'philosophy of the flesh'. 
'Flesh' was to become a key term in Merleau-Ponty's later work and arose from his 
understanding that there was an absence in theory for a term which encompassed the 
animate body, that is, a body which is viewed as inseparable from an enlivening 
consciousness (animus). In a late work, Sims, Merleau-Ponty provides a history of how 
he sees the transformation from a'philosophy of the body'to a'philosophy of the flesh'to 
have been effected. 14 He argues that at the close of the nineteenth century, many 
thinkers viewed the body merely as a network of mechanisms. It was this nineteenth- 
century view which Freud inherited in his founding of psychoanalysis. Merleau-Ponty 
remarks: Did not psychoanalysis take up the tradition of mechanistic philosophies of the 
body - and is it not stiff frequently understood in the same way todayT (Signs, 227) By 
reducing the most elaborate and complex behaviour of individuals to a system of 
explanation based on instincts, particularly sexual instincts, Freud is restricting interest in 
the human subject to a mechanistic working of the body. However, Merleau-Ponty 
contends that there has been a revolution in thought throughout the twentieth century. 
The modem evolution of thought has led to a rejection of dualism and the victory over 
the opposition between body and mind is seen by Merleau-Ponty to be one of the most 
striking features of philosophic thought in the twentieth century. Modem theory has 
eliminated the dividing line between 'mind' and 'body' and sees human life as both mental 
and corporeal. 
This notion of a 'philosophy of the flesh' informs Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenological project, which is primarily concerned to elucidate a theoretical model 
of the body as it is lived and experienced by the individual, and as it in turn shapes the 
individual's experience of the surrounding environment. He borrows from the body- 
13 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'Worldng Notes', The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis, 
(Evanston. Illinois: Northwestern Universities Press, 1968), 269. 
14 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Siggs, trans. R. C. McCleary, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern Universities 
press. 1964). Further references to this book will be given after quotations in the text. 
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image theorists the notion that the body may be organized around a fictional or 
phantasmatic construction, outside of or beyond its neurological structures. This notion 
affords Merleau-Ponty a model of the body, which is conceived according to the tasks 
which it is accustomed to perform, rather than as the sum of its parts. The body that 
results is highly adaptive and considerably more flexible than a strictly anatomical model 
would allow. 
Contemporary critics, most notably Alphonso Lingis, have taken issue with 
Merleau-Ponty's organization of the body in relation to its habitual actions. In Foreig 
Bodies (1994), Lingis renames the phenomenological body as the 'competent body', and 
argues that Merleau-Ponty's analysis is inadequate because it fails to account for those 
situations in which the body is incompetent, or unable to perform tasks. 15 The instance 
of this which is cited by Lingis is physical pleasure - in experiencing pleasure, the body 
deliberately renounces its competence. I would argue that there are dangers inherent in 
Lingis' project of stripping the body of its competence. In contrast to Lingis, I propose 
to centre discussion on the phenomenon of physical pain, which snatches competence 
away from the body, and is almost entirely beyond the individual's control. Extensive 
reference will be made to Elaine Scarry's seminal work, The Body In Pain (1985). 
In Foreign Bodies, Lingis outlines his definition of Merleau-Ponty's work (Lingis, 
13-20ý1 47-48). He points out that for Merleau-Ponty, the world is perceived as a series 
of objectives. The world is a practicable field, which must be negotiated in order for 
goals to be attained. When an object is seen in space, Lingis claims, the 
phenomenological body apprehends it as an exterior objective, and so activates its own 
immanent knowledge of how to approach it. The phenomenological body does not tend 
towards a state of rest, but maintains a state of permanent tension, in which it is 
positioned (postured) in readiness for its typical tasks in each specific type of 
enviromnent. It carries within itself a knowledge of how to position or centre itself, in 
order to take hold of things. When an objective is perceived, the body activates its own 
15 Alphonso Lingis, 'The Competent Body', Foreign Bodies, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 
3-28. Further references to this chapter will be given after quotations in the text. 
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force by converging its sensory surfaces and integrating its powers and parts. This 
ability of the body to orient itself is reliant on the postural schema. This operates 
identically in body-image theory and in phenomenology - it is not a momentary intention 
but a dynamic diagram, built up through former movements and actions, which maintains 
and varies itself It is not elaborated at a central point of synthesis or will, but each 
energized part regulates and determines the force and orientation of the other parts. A 
new gesture or movement does not arise as a spontaneous invention, but is a realization 
of one of the variants contained in the diagrams of organization that the body has 
contracted. If the phenomenological body is thus a competent body, it is the postural 
schema or body image which provides a locus for this competence. For Lingis, the task 
of phenomenology itself is twofold. Firstly, it must devise a language in order to 
describe the world as a practicable field - all the paths, horizons, obstacles and objectives 
that the body must perceive and undergo. Secondly, it must be able to describe the 
postural schema as it is experienced by the individual - the actions, gestures and 
operations which constitute practical competence. 
The model of the phenomenological body that Lingis identifies is thus one which 
works itself into the world. It identifies its own existence with its ability to carry out 
tasks, or its competence. I am not disputing here that Lingis has correctly identified the 
major theme of Merleau-Ponty's work; Merleau-Ponty structures the body around the 
habitual tasks which it is accustomed to perform and so writes himself into the tradition 
of body-image theory. However, Lingis omits from his analysis Merleau-Ponty's account 
of 'passive intentionality'. This notion derives from Merleau-Ponty's recognition that the 
body does not, in fact, exist in a state of permanent tension. The assumption of an 
unrestricted availability of the body for action clearly does not match the biological facts. 
He therefore introduces the idea of 'passive intentionality' as a means of describing those 
situations in which the body is set free and not controlled. 16 However, as the phrase 
suggests, Merleau-Ponty does not believe that the body ever entirely relinquishes its 
16 The following discussion is based on Hans Jonas, 'The Intersubjective Constitution of the Body 
Image', H in Studies, 6 (1983), 197-204. 
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capacity for 'intentional' acts: it is never truly incompetent. I wish to elaborate this claim., 
and suggest an alternative reading of the 'competent body', by examining the most 
famous instance of this structure - Merleau-Ponty's extended description of falling 
asleep. 
The first point that I wish to note is that Merleau-Ponty's description of falling 
asleep differs markedly from that of Schilder, who suggests that in the process of falling 
asleep the body image undergoes a process of fragmentation. Once in sleep, the body 
schema is almost entirely relinquished: 
Federn has carefully described the changes in the body-image which occur when 
we gradually fall asleep. It often completely loses its third dimension. It is distorted 
in all directions. The distance of symmetrical parts can appear much larger than the 
length of the body. The dimensions in space lose their proportions. When two or 
three parts of the body are experienced correctly, the remaining part becomes a vague 
mass,, enlarged or diminished. Sometimes the body-image reaches only to the trunk 
or the knees. But parts of the middle of the body can also disappear. The borderline 
of the body in one direction may become bluffed and it seems to be moving on this 
side. The body image of the face and of the head is generally free. The parts of the 
body which touch the support are also stabilized. But even the shape of the head can 
be changed. Image and Appearance, 115-116) 
It is clear that for Schilder the process of falling asleep entails a disintegration of the 
body image, which is subjectively experienced as the loss of body parts, or their 
distortion in terms of length, dimension or proportion. 
Merleau-Ponty describes the process of falling asleep in The Phenomenology o 
Perception. Initially, this appears to accord with Schilder's treatment; Merleau-Ponty 
describes the gradual relaxation of the posture of the body and its accompanying loss of 
competence: 
... I 
lie down in bed, on my left side, with my knees drawn up; I close my eyes and 
breathe slowly, putting my plans out of my mind. But the power of my will or 
consciousness stops there. As the faithful, in the Dionysian mysteries, invoke the god 
by miming scenes from his life, I call up the visitation of sleep by imitating the 
breathing and posture of the sleeper. The god is actually there when the faithful can 
no longer distinguish themselves from the part they are playing, when their body and 
consciousness cease to bring in, as an obstacle, their particular opacity, and when they 
are totally fused in the myth. There is a moment when sleep 'comes', settling on this 
imitation of itself which I have been offering to it, and I succeed in becoming what I 
was trying to be: an unseeing and almost unthinking mass, riveted to a point in space 
III 
and in the world henceforth only through the anonymous alertness of the senses. 
(Phenomenology of Perception, 163-164) 
A closer reading suggests that for Merleau-Ponty, the process of falling asleep is merely 
another level of the body's competence. The postural schema assumes the position of 
one who is asleep - lying down, on the left side with the feet drawn up, in a 'foetal' 
position. The body imitates sleep, and the speed with which sleep 'comes' appears to be 
a measure of the body's success at its task of mimicry (I succeed in becoming what I was 
trying to be'). The postural schema is not relinquished, as in Schilder's analysis, but 
rather becomes a focus for imitation. However, this reading derives its critical terms 
from Lingis' critique of the 'competent body'. In its place, I would like to suggest an 
alternative reading based on the notion of performativity. What Merleau-Ponty's analysis 
suggests is that beyond the 'power of my will or consciousness', there exists a bodily 
mode of performativity, which is capable in this instance of 'imitation' and 'miming'. 
The second point which arises out of Merleau-Ponty's description of falling 
asleep is its reliance on the model of 'conversion'. The individual imitates the posture 
and breathing of one who is asleep and, by a process of conversion, becomes the sleeper 
whom he or she is miming. This registers in Merleau-Ponty's text in his comparison of 
the sleeper to the hysterical patient, separated from her lover, whose loss of voice and 
appetite was analysed earlier in this section. Merleau-Ponty observes that sleep and 
hysterical illness are alike, for they are both reliant on bodily transfonnation - mimicry of 
sleep is transfonned into real sleep, just as the patient's refusal to accept ('swalloW) what 
has happened to her is converted into the symptomatology of an inability to eat. What is 
crucial for Merleau-Ponty in the model of hysteria that he has invoked is the role of 
consciousness. Working in the dissociative tradition of Janet, he writes that the girl's 
inability to speak has not been repressed into a radically separate unconscious, but 
remains in a subconscious which is at the margins or periphery of consciousness. Illness 
thus does not constitute a breach in consciousness: what is split off from the conscious 
mind is only at a partial remove. Merleau-Ponty transfers this theoretical model onto the 
phenomenon of sleep. The sleeper is never entirely asleep, but retains at every moment 
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the power to withdraw from sleep and enter into active negotiation with the world once 
more. In sleep the body schema does not disintegrate, as it does in Schilder's work. 
There is, rather, an 'anonymous alertness of the senses, which continually monitor the 
surrounding environment: 
It is true that this last link makes waking up a possibility: through these half-open 
doors things will return or the sleeper will come back into the world... In this sense a 
sleeper is never completely isolated within himself, never totally a sleeper, and the 
patient is never totally cut off from the intersubjective world, never totally ill... We 
remain free in relation to sleep or sickness to the exact extent to which we remain 
always involved in the waking and healthy state, our freedom rests on our being in a 
situation, and is itself a situation. (Phenomenology of Perception, 164) 
His phenomenological method means that Merleau-Ponty always situates his subject in 
an 'intersubjective world'; even in states of illness or sleep, when consciousness is 
affected, 'half-open doors' remain to connect the subject to 'the world' of objects and 
other beings. Although intentionality is weakened in these states, it is nevertheless still 
present; the subject is not 'cut off from the world, but can still reach out towards it in 
modes of bodily performance. 
Merleau-Ponty's conception of 'half-open doors' which always connect the 
subject to the world of objects and other bodies, seems to me to be crucial when the 
problem of pain is introduced into the phenomenological method. It opens up a 
conceptual space, and allows for the elaboration of a new therapeutic dynatnic. Scarry's 
volume, The Body In Pain, is informed by work which has been carried out on the body 
image, and emphasizes the ethical importance of the phenomenological body. The book 
opens by indicating the profound inexpressibility of pain - physical pain, in particular, has 
no voice and is entirely incommunicable to others. Scarry is unequivocal as to why this 
should be the case: it is because pain alone, of all the psychic, somatic and perceptual 
states, has no object in the external world. It is this objectlessness, this complete lack of 
referential content, that prevents it from being rendered accessible in language: 
If one were to move through all the emotional, perceptual, and somatic states 
that take an object - hatred for, seeing of, being hungry for - the list would become a 
very long one and, although it would alternate between states we are thankful for and 
those we dislike, it would be throughout its entirety a consistent affirmation of the 
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human being's capacity to move out beyond the boundaries of his or her own body 
into the external,. sharable world. This list and its implicit affirmation would, 
however, be suddenly interrupted when, moving through the human interior, one at 
last reached physical pain, for physical pain - unlike any other state of consciousness - 
has no referential content. It is not of or for anything. It is precisely because it takes 
no object that it, more than any other phenomenon, resists objectification in language. 
(Scarry, 5) 
It is also because it has no object that pain poses a problem for the phenomenological 
method. The phenomenological body is fundamentally based on its movement out 
beyond its own boundaries into the external, sharable world. Its momentum is towards 
objects which it grasps and manipulates. Scarry appears to introduce a theoretical model 
which renders the phenomenological body a redundant form. 
Scarry is not content, however, to accept the theory of pain which she has 
outlined. She argues, on the contrary, that the task of objectifying pain is one which is 
crucial to therapeutic strategy (Scarry, 6). It is a project which is laden with practical 
and ethical significance, for it is only when physical pain is transformed into an 
objectified state that it will be accessible to language. Avenues will thereby be made 
available by which this most radically private of experiences may enter into public 
discourse. Those who are free of pain will no longer be able to bypass the bodily event, 
or the person who is in pain. The main area in which the authors of this language of pain 
have been active is in the medical context. Scarry observes that the era in which 
physicians do not trust the human voice is now thankfully over. The present era of 
medicine is largely based on a profound respect for the human voice, and focuses 
increasing attention on the nature and treatment of pain. She thus concurs with the 
analysis of medicine which I have been propounding: the twentieth century has witnessed 
an increase in the treatment of the organism as a whole, rather than merely of those 
symptoms that are evident in the clinical observation. 
The example which Sc&rry cites as evidence of this new language of pain is the 
'McGill Pain Questionnaire' (1975), devised by Ronald Melzack and his colleague W. S. 
Torgerson. Scany emphasizes that Melzack and Torgerson have not devised a new 
vocabulary in order to articulate the experience of pain, but have gathered the apparently 
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random words by which patients describe their experiences and arranged them into 
coherent groups. By listening to the human voice, they have uncovered a structure 
residing in the already-existing vocabulary, which originates with the patients 
themselves. The diagnostic questionnaire relies on strategies of objectification, in order 
to produce an accurate description of the pain experienced. Many of the adjectives used 
by patients were found to imply the action of an external agent on the body, which 
allowed the patient to articulate his or her experience of pain by externalizing it in a 
foreign object. For example, words such as'burning', 'stabbing', 'drilling' are contained in 
the questionnaire. The patient is asked to characterize the pain as if it derived from a 
source outside of the body, and identify the agent that they imagine to be responsible for 
the hurt. In naming the pain as 'drilling', the patient is in effect saying: 'It feels as though 
a drill... '. Similarly if the pain is identified as 'stabbing', then the patient subjectively 
experiences the pain as a knife entering the body in repeated motion. Scarry clarifies: 
Because the existing vocabulary for pain contains only a small handful of 
adjectives, one passes through direct descriptions very quickly and ... almost immediately encounters an 'as if structure: it feels as if..; it is as though ... On the 
other side of the ellipse there reappear again and again... two and only two metaphors 
whose inner workings are very problematic. The first specifies an external agent of 
the pain, a weapon that is pictured as producing the pain; and the second specifies 
bodily damage that is pictured as accompanying the pain. Thus a person may say, 'It 
feels as though a hammer is coming down on my spine' even when there is no 
hammer; or 'It feels as if my arm is broken at each joint and the jagged ends are 
sticking through the skin' even when the bones of the arm are intact and the surface of 
the skin is unbroken. Physical pain is not identical with (and often exists without) 
either agency or damage, but these things are referential; consequently we often call 
on them to convey the experience of the pain itself (Scarry, 15) 
Clearly this form of diagnosis (which also acts as a means by which patients are able to 
articulate their experience) relies on the 'half-open doors' of Merleau-Ponty's description. 
Patients who are overwhelmed by pain are encouraged to connect to the 'world' of 
objects, which simultaneously act as a form of communication, or contact with other 
subjects. 
Modem forms of pain therapy have extended this diagnostic criteria. The object 
or weapon that the patient conceptualizes as an analogy for his or her internal experience 
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of pain thus becomes a focus in therapy, and is resisted or pushed out of the body to the 
external world where it properly belongs. In this therapeutic mode, pain is contested by 
a process of reversal: the objects (representative of the patient's world) that he or she is 
deprived of by pain, are reclaimed in a radical reassertion of the body's competence. The 
imaginary object which the patient identifies with his or her pain is transformed from a 
weapon, by which the patient is being attacked, to a tool with which the pain is able to 
be manipulated and even rejected altogether. No clearer example could be provided of 
the inclusion of the whole patient into medical treatment; psychological attitudes are 
revised in the hope that they will activate the body toward health. The crucial point, 
however, is that this therapeutic dynamic is constructed around the phenomenological 
method; it emphasizes that the patient is not 'cut off from the world by pain, but is 
crucially able to connect to a world of objects. In therapy this connection is utilized, so 
that the (initially hostile and invasive) imaginary object is transformed to a tool, which 
can be manipulated by the patient and pushed outside the boundary of the body image in 
a mode of bodily performativity. 
There are thus important theoretical and practical implications of a 
psychotherapy which is based on the phenomenological method. The'outer directedness' 
of the phenomenological subject, who is driven or impelled towards objects and other 
bodies, allows an outlet for pain, which can thereby be conceptualized and transformed. 
In psychoanalysis, which focuses on the inner mechanisms of the libido, no such outlet 
exists; pain is merely incorporated into the libidinal development of the individual. 
Therefore pain threatens to entirely overwhelm the subject of psychoanalysis; in its 
passage, the ego is only 'partially... preserved'. The figure of Paul Schilder stands as the 
pivot between psychoanalysis and the phenomenological method. His own work largely 
retains the libidinal structures which dominate Freudian psychoanalysis, but he hints at 
the emergence of a new dynamic, which was subsequently to become a major influence 
on the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought. 
I wish to conclude this chapter, which has considered the relation of the body 
and spatiality, by introducing the notion of geographical space. Schilder was born, 
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raised and educated in the city of Vienna, but in 1928 he departed for America because 
of the increasing persecution of the Jews. This geographical move was also a liberation 
from the restrictive atmosphere of Freudian psychoanalysis. In April 1930, Schilder 
started work at the Bellevue Hospital in New York, where he headed a team of dynamic 
young medical staff and researchers. His colleagues recognized the potential of 
Schilder's work and incorporated his theories of the body image into their own research 
interests and therapeutic methods. The next chapter will survey one of the most dynamic 
results of this experimentation, which is used widely today to treat the pervasive 
psychological and physical pain of PTSD. I refer to the pioneering work of Schilder's 
colleague, Francizka Boas, in the development of what is now referred to as Dance 
Movement Therapy (DMT). This therapeutic mode builds on and consolidates the 
performative space, which was tentatively explored in Schilder's writing. 
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PART TWO 
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PREFACE 
My thesis has thus far sought to trace the development of a conceptualization of 
the body which is based on the body image. I have argued that the notion of the body 
image evolved from the early theorizations by Janet in the late nineteenth century, 
through Schilder, Lacan and Merleau-Ponty to its current role in Dance Movement 
Therapy. However, the tradition of thought concerning the body image has always been 
overshadowed by the Freudian method of psychoanalysis, which is rooted in a highly 
specialized notion of the body image and based in the libidinal drives. By unearthing the 
work of Janet, Schilder and Merleau-Ponty, I have demonstrated that Freudian 
psychoanalysis is only one method of approach to the theorization of trauma and the 
body and I have thereby sought to disrupt its privileged status. 
In the chapters which follow, I am interested in investigating the ways in which 
the concept of the body image can intervene in contemporary thought and creatively 
challenge our theoretical and therapeutic modes of approach to the body. Due to the 
highly exploratory nature of the work produced in this section, the connections and 
parallels made are necessarily more tenuous and experimental than in previous chapters. 
I feel that this is justified by my project of exploring new ways of thinking through the 
methods of, and connections between, the emergent disciplines of trauma studies and 
gender theory, in tenns of a dynamic and performative body. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE DANCING BODY 
CHOREOGRAPFUNG A PSYCHOTBERAPEUTIC INTERVENTION 
POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
To listen to the crisis of a trauma, that is, is not only to listen for the event, but to 
hear in the testimony the survivor's departure from it: the challenge of the therapeutic 
listener, in other words, is how to listen to departur . (Caruth, 'Introduction', 10) 
Cathy Caruth, in her sensitively written study of trauma and its aftereffects, 
entitled 'Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History', I examines 
Freud's late text Moses and Monotheisa (1939). In his fictional history of the Jewish 
people and religion, Caruth argues movingly and persuasively that Freud writes of the 
possibility of history that arises in the wake of trauma. The traumatic event is that which 
overwhelms by its sudden or catastrophic nature and is precisely that which cannot be 
assimilated by the understanding. It is only in the delayed, uncontrolled and repetitive 
occurrence of hallucinations and other intrusive phenomena that the event is experienced 
and assimilated by the individual. The possibility of history and of the event is thus 
problematized: it can no longer be straightforwardly mapped onto a simple model of 
experience and reference. However, this is not to say that history is thus eliminated, but 
that it is resituated in our understanding. Immediate understanding of an event is 
replaced by a temporal delay, which is precisely where the new mode of history arises. 
Caruth examines the way in which Freud's text itself exemplifies this new model of 
historical reality, by its fictionalization of the Jewish past. This has led to the work being 
regarded with deep distrust by critics, who have raised questions about its historical and 
political status. But it is arguably the notion of history that Freud offers in this text 
which challenges the reader to rethink his or her own assumptions about the historical 
process, in this era of catastrophe. 
It is perhaps with some sense of surprise that Freud is located as the author of a 
text which radically challenges notions of history, narrative and the event. It has been 
Cathy Caruth, 'Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History', Yale French Studies 79, 
(199 1), 181-192. Further references to this article are given after quotations in the text. 
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clearly demonstrated that with the founding of psychoanalysis in 1896, Freud's desire for 
a scientific basis to his work led him to reject many of the most exciting and challenging 
discoveries of his early career. History, at first of the individual but later of the entire 
race, was organized around the straightforward model of the Oedipal complex; shared 
narrative gradually faded into monologue; and the event of childhood sexual abuse which 
Freud uncovered was once more concealed. Arguably, the reason that this late writing 
returns to the concerns of Freud's earliest work, is because it is a text which not only 
confronts issues of trauma and history in a radical and dynamic form, but also itself 
arises out of and inscribes the trauma of a particular historical event, which was to have 
a devastating impact on Freud himself and on Europe as a whole. 
Caruth's essay provides a brilliant and comprehensive analysis of the ways in 
which Freud's text examines the Jewish past and history, and the implications that this 
treatment carries for modem theorists. I therefore wish to avoid repeating the same 
arguments, and I will focus instead on the historical situation in which 'Moses and Q-7 -- 
Monotheism' was written, which intrudes into the writing in the third section of the text. 
The third and final section of the writing, 'Moses, Ilis People and Monotheist Religion', 
is thus prefaced by not one but two explanatory notes, and the text is interrupted 
midway by a further 'Summary and Recapitulation'. 2 Of the two explanatory notes, the 
first is dated 'before March 1938%. and is written in Vienna; while the second is dated 
'June 1938%, and is written in London. There thus exists between them a hiatus,, which is 
marked by a change in geographical situation from Vienna to London, and a temporal 
gap of some three months. In the two notes, Freud recounts the historical events that 
mark his life at these two dates - the former is significant for the infiltration of Nazism 
into Austria, which causes Freud to suppress the text of 'Moses and Monotheism' from 
publication. By June 1938, however, Austria has been invaded by Germany and Freud 
has reached asylum in London. Now that Freud himself is safe and the psychoanalytic 
2Sigmund Freud, 'Moses and Monotheism', The Origins of Religion, trans. James Strachey, ecL Albert 
Dickson. Penguin Freud Library 13. (Harmondsworth: penguin, 1985), 237-386. Prefaces and summary 
are on pp. 295-297,298-299 and 349-350 respectively. Further references to this essay are given after 
quotations in the text. 
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movement in Austria is effectively in ruins, Freud feels free at last to bring his text to 
publication. 
Freud is seerningly able to write in his two prefatory notes a straightforward 
narrative account of the historical events surrounding the publication of his text. 
However, the importance of his writing, for the purposes of my analysis, lies in 'the short 
space of time between the two' notes, which is only briefly acknowledged by Freud 
Noses and Monotheism', 298). It is during this interval that Freud undergoes the 
devastating and catastrophic experience of departing from the city that has been his 
home for the majority of his life, and witnessing the collapse of the psychoanalytic 
community in Vienna, that represents his life work. He reports simply but movingly: 
In the certainty that I should now be persecuted not only for my line of thought 
but also for my'race'- accompanied by many of my ffiends, I left the city which, from 
my early childhood, had been my home for seventy-eight years. ('Moses and 
Monotheism', 298) 
The trauma thus expressed is one of departure ('I left'). Caruth observes in her 
essay that this connects to Freud's description of trauma itself, which also represents a 
site of departure: 
It may happen that a man who has experienced some frightful accident -a 
railway collision, for instance - leaves the scene of the event apparently uninjured. In 
the course of the next few weeks,, however, he develops a number of severe psychical 
and motor symptoms which can only be traced to his shock, the concussion or 
whatever else it was. He now has a'traumatic neurosis'. ('Moses and Monotheism', 
309) 
The two scenes of departure differ in a number of respects: Freud was forced to 'leave 
the scene' of his life and work by the German invasion and consequently the trauma lies 
for him in the act of departure itself In the railway collision, the 'frightful accident' 
occasions the trauma; the point of departure appears to follow on from this. The two 
descriptions are connected, however, by an act of departure which is only 'apparent': 
both Freud and the man involved in the collision are only seemingly able to depart from 
the scene because, due to the 'shock, ... concussion or whatever else it was', they have 
not experienced the event at all. At the heart of both descriptions, the trauma is 
inscribed in the unlived nature of the event that has taken place. In place of an 
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immediate understanding of what has happened, there is a temporal delay before 
psychical and motor symptoms insistently recur. Following Caruth, I wish to argue that 
it is in Freud's failure to describe the scene of his departure from Vienna (he remarks 
simply, 'I left'), that the trauma is inscribed in the text as that which cannot be graape . 
about leaving ('Unclaimed Experience', 190). In the place of understanding, there arises 
a hiatus ('the short interval between the two prefaces'), which also marks the temporal 
gap between 'before March 193 8' and 'June 193 8' ('Moses and Monotheism', 298). 
The description of trauma which Freud outlines above indicates that the period of 
temporal delay is concluded by the insistent and repetitive return of the event in the form 
of psychical and motor symptoms. This repetitive or compulsive behaviour seems to me 
to be marked in Freud's text by the 'Summary and Recapitulation' with which he 
interrupts the third section of the work. This brief passage in the text is a repetition of 
the content of the first two prefaces to the third section, and is itself a preface to the 
repetition ('recapitulation') of the material on Moses which Freud has already expounded 
at length. This appears to be strangely compulsive behaviour. Freud himself seems 
struck by the incongruity of his writing at this point and is quick to offer apology and 
explanation to the reader: 
The part of this study which follows cannot be given to the public without 
extensive explanations and apologies. For it is nothing other than a faithful (and often 
word-for-word) repetition of the first part [of the third Essay], abbreviated in some of 
its critical inquiries and augmented by additions relating to the problem of how the 
special character of the Jewish people arose. I am aware that a method of exposition 
such as this is no less inexpedient than it is inartistic. I myself deplore it unreservedly. 
Why have I not avoided it? The answer to that is not hard for me to find, but it is not 
easy to confess. I found myself unable to wipe out the traces of the history of the 
work's origin, which was in any case unusual. (Moses and Monotheism', 349) 
What is this apology if not an admission of traumatic symptomatology? Although 
'inartistic', the passage cannot be 'avoided' by Freud: its repetitions are compulsive and 
find their root precisely in'the traces of the history of the work's origin'. Again trauma 
problematizes the notion of historical process: the event that is at the origin of the work 
- the gradual invasion of the Austrian culture and territory by Nazism - cannot be 
relegated to the past in any straightforward manner. its 'traces' remain tangibly in the 
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present and are impossible to 'wipe out' even for Freud, the founder of psychoanalytical 
treatment. 
A keynote of the text of Moses and Monotheism', which is not mentioned by 
Caruth, but which seems to me to be extremely important to any analysis of the work, is 
the refrain of apology that recurs throughout. In the passage quoted above, from the 
'Summary and Recapitulation', Freud does not find it 'easy to confess' that he himself 
may be subject to the 'traumatic neurosis' which he helped to discover. The repetitions 
into which this leads him are clearly unacceptable to him, although he is seemingly 
unable to excise them from the text: 
There are things which should be said more than once and which cannot be said 
often enough. But the reader must decide of his own free will whether to linger over 
the subject or to come back to it. He must not be surreptitiously led into having the 
same thing put before him twice in one book. It is a piece of clumsiness for which the 
author must take the blame. Unluckily an author's creative power does not always 
obey his will: the work proceeds as it can, and often presents itself to the author as 
something independent or even alien. (Moses and Monotheism, 350) 
Here, the indication is that what is disturbing Freud is the compulsive behaviour of his 
material, which, like hysterical symptomatology, 'presents itself to the individual 'as 
something independent and even alien' to the will. Elsewhere in the work, however, 
Freud is concerned that the text is not grounded in a proper scientific basis. It seems in 
places as if, with the collapse of the psychoanalytic movement in Vienna, Freud's 
rigorous methodology, which arose with the founding of psychoanalysis in 1896, has 
slipped away from him. He acknowledges that the structure of his argument has its 
'weak spots' ('Moses and Monotheism', 28 1), and elaborates further in a footnote to the 
text: 
I am very well aware that in dealing so autocratically and arbitrarily with Biblical 
tradition - bringing it up to confirm my views when it suits me and unhesitatingly 
rejecting it when it contradicts me -I am exposing myself to serious methodological 
criticism and weakening the convincing force of my arguments. But this is the only 
way in which one can treat material of which one knows definitely that its 
trustworthiness has been severely impaired by the distorting influence of tendentious 
purposes. It is to be hoped that I shall find some degree ofjustification later on, when 
I come upon the track of these secret motives. Certainty is in any case unattainable 
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and moreover it may be said that every other writer on the subject has adopted the 
same procedure. ('Moses and Monotheism', 265) 
Aware that he is not adhering to any rigorous scientific procedure (I am exposing myself 
to serious methodological criticism'), Freud objects defensively that the material on 
which he is working is 'untrustworthy', and that he is therefore following the standard 
practices for that particular field of inquiry ('every other writer on the subject has 
adopted the same procedure'). It is interesting that it is precisely in this text, which 
combines historical fact with fictional interpretation, and allows itself to creatively 
challenge notions of narrative, memory and history, that Freud so clearly feels uneasy 
with his writing. 
In a fascinating essay, entitled 'Dance and the History of Hysteria', Peggy Phelan 
observes the paradoxical attitude that Freud held in relation to 'Moses and Monotheism', 
writing that it is 'a text that Freud cannot quite believe, and yet cannot quite leaveoff .3 
Phelan closes her essay with reference to the second prefatory note to the third section 
of 'Moses and Monotheism', in which Freud is once more plunged into uncertainty and 
apology about the text that he writes. Here, however, he introduces an interesting 
metaphor to express his doubts: 'To my critical sense this book, which takes its start 
from the man Moses, appears like a dancer balancing on the tip of one toe' ('Moses and 
Monotheism', 299). Again, the problem is that Freud is forced to suspend his rigorous 
methodology (his 'critical sense) for a far more creative process. The unease that he 
feels in this situation is expressed through the metaphor of precarious balance - the book 
must maintain its weight and stature 'on the tip of one toe'. What is of primary interest, 
however, is the figure which has unexpectedly appeared in the midst of Freud's text, and, 
in a reversal of the figure, has seemingly caught him off balance. The metaphor thus 
introduces a body, which is dancing. Unfortunately the body is not explicitly gendered 
by Freud, nor is it certain whether the body is in motion (performing a pirouette while it 
balances), or whether it is held in a static pose in the midst of a dance. Two facts are 
3peggy Phelan, 'Dance and the History of Hysteria', Corporealities: Dancing Knowledge, Culture and 
power, ed- Susan Leigh Foster. (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 90-103, (p. 101). Further 
references to this essay are given after quotations in the text. 
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evident, however: the body is succeeding in holding its balanced posture, and it is 
therefore a highly skilled body which is envisioned. It is precisely this image of a skilled, 
dancing body which, as I shall demonstrate, continues to pose a challenge to 
contemporary trauma theory. 
Phelan is explicit in her essay about the importance of the figure of the dancing 
body in Freud's text. She returns to the site of Freud's earliest published text on trauma, 
the 1895 Studies on Hysteri , 
in which he collaborated with Josef Breuer. Reading the 
case studies contained in this volume, through the symptomatic bodies of the women 
that are so carefully inscribed, Phelan notes a strange choreography in operation. She 
observes that the cramps and paralyses, the contractions and the dragging feet lend to 
the Studies on Hysteri a 'strange rhythm and a rocky gait' (Dance and the History of 
Hysteria', 90). She notes particularly the case of Anna 0., who was treated by Josef 
Breuer, and whose tussis nervosa, (nervous cough) originated when she heard the sound 
of dance music coming from a neighbouring house. Anna O. 's story is an exemplary case 
study of hysteria. Nursing her father through severe illness, Anna 0. first develops the 
somatic symptom of paralysis. Phelan interprets this as an attempt to substitute her own, 
youthful body for her father's dying body - as if by holding herself as still as possible, 
Anna 0. could will her father into activity once more. A conflict arises, however, as 
strains of dance music reach Anna 0., where she nurses her father, and she wishes she 
could participate in the activity. Her foot starts tapping involuntarily. A part of her 
moves in time with the rhythm of the music. It is at this point that the second somatic 
symptom arises - she stills the movement of her foot and instead reacts throughout her 
illness to the sound of markedly rhythmical music by a nervous cough. In his case notes, 
Breuer concludes by noting the conflict of duty ('her twinges of conscience) and her 
bodily desires ('motor impulses') that gives rise to Anna O. 's symptoms: 
The patient could not understand how it was that dance music made her cough; 
such a construction is too meaningless to have been deliberate. (It seemed very likely 
to me, incidentally, that each of her twinges of conscience brought on one of her 
regular spasms of the glottis and that the motor impulses which she felt - for she was 
very fond of dancing - transformed the spasm into a tussis nervosa). (Studies on 
Hy-steria, 98-99) 
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The importance for my analysis lies in the sequences of temporality that are 
involved in the case history of Anna 0. Her father's illness is one which leaves him 
struggling to breathe. Anna O. 's paralysis (her body stilling its activity or 'holding its 
breath') represents her attempt to substitute her body for her father's and so give him 
more time. The somatic symptom arises as an attempt to delay temporality or hold off 
the event of her father's death. The intervention of the dance music operates against this 
counter-rhythm, and contrary to her own will, Anna O. 's body taps the rhythm or joins in 
with the movement of temporality. The symptom of the cough represents the attempt to 
return to a counter-time - the body still joins in with the music (the cough is stimulated 
only by a marked rhythm) but it is no longer 'in time' with the tune. In the words of 
Peggy Phelan: 'By coughing instead of dancing, Anna 0. changes the music's beat within 
her body. Her timing, one could say, is off (Dance and the History of Hysteria', 93). 
This topic of temporality combines with a further theme in the case histories 
contained in Studies on Hysteria. This is the point which has been noted previously that 
in Freud's earliest work, the body insists on being heard. It is only with the founding of 
psychoanalysis in 1896 that Freud begins to silence the body and to focus exclusively on 
linguistic concerns (the 'tafldng cure'). The symptom of the cough itself is vital in this 
respect - in coughing, air is expelled abruptly and explosively through partially-closed 
vocal chords. This gives two indications of the nature of the body's articulations - firstly, 
that it resembles but significantly differs from the productions of speech, for the vocal 
chords are only partially in use; and relatedly, that it does not produce the narrative in 
time that is the linguistic phenomenon - it speaks its own off-beat rhythm or counter- 
time. The final point that I wish to note here about the hysterical symptom is that it 
articulates on the level of the organism as a whole - it arises out of the conflict of the 
desire of the will to paralyse or delay temporality and the desire of the body to 
participate in the rhythm or movement of time. It expresses perfectly the conflict of the 
two in its partial-ly vocal, partially somatic acoustics; and in its paradoxical, reluctant 
participation. 
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Hysterical symptornatology thus arises as that which is temporally off-beat; it 
operates according to its own rhythms and is independent of the regular flow of time. 
This clearly connects to Freud's definition of trauma in Moses and Monotheism', in 
which the site of trauma was similarly marked by a temporal delay - the man walked 
away from the railway collision apparently unharmed and it was only after an interval of 
several weeks that symptoms began to become apparent. Even more revealingly, the 
temporal hiatus of a few months between March and June 1938, which is the site of 
Freud's own traumatic departure from Vienna, is not susceptible to narrative 
interpretation: the interval is left as a break in the text between the two prefatory notes. 
The traumatic event cannot be linguistically formulated, for it does not accord with the 
conventions of narrative or temporal flow; instead its 'traces' intrude into the text in a 
compulsively repetitive manner. 
It has been demonstrated in relation to Janet that the intrusive and repetitive 
forms of hysterical symptomatology must be spoken, or organized in a narrative account 
of the event. This of necessity involves introducing an element of flexibility into the 
fixed temporality of the traumatic symptom. Where trauma repeats compulsively, in 
narrative, details can be re-ordered and time lengthened or shortened depending on the 
emphasis desired. This is because the event has been understood and experienced by the 
individual and assimilated into consciousness. Returning to the case study of Anna 0., 
this unhinged temporality of trauma is dramatically demonstrated. Anna 0. thus relives 
the time surrounding the traumatic event of her father's illness with such intensity that 
there is literally a temporal delay of one year - she lives the daidy routine of the winter of 
1880-1881, although it is now the winter of 1881-1882 - and her reliving compulsively 
repeats the exact events of the previous year, without allowing for any variation in 
sequence or duration. 
A year had now passed since she had been separated from her father and had 
taken to her bed, and from this time on her condition became clearer and was 
systematized in a very peculiar manner... [N]ow... she lived, like the rest of us, in the 
winter of 1881-1882, whereas [under daily hypnosis ... ] she lived in the winter of 
1880-1881... She was carried back to the previous year with such intensity that in the 
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new house she hallucinated her old room, so when she wanted to go to the door she 
knocked up against the stove which stood in the same relation to the window as the 
door did in the old room... But this transfer into the past did not take place in a 
general or indefinite manner; she lived through the previous winter day by day. I 
should have only been able to suspect that this was happening, had it not been that 
every evening during the hypnosis she talked through whatever it was that had excited 
her on the same day in 1881, and had it not been that a private diary kept by her 
mother in 1881 confirmed beyond a doubt the occurrence of the underlying events. 
This re-living of the past year continued till the illness came to its final close in June 
1882. (Studies on Hysteria, 86-87) 
In the text of Moses and Monotheism', this enactment of compulsive repetition is 
momentarily broken by the dancing figure, who balances on one toe. Phelan suggests 
that this metaphorical figure also carries a more practical application. She indicates that 
dance is the body's performance of movement in time and space. The symptoms of the 
hysteric, and in this case of Anna 0. specifically, demonstrate clearly that the body in 
motion does not of itself necessarily conform to the outward restrictions of temporality 
and spatiality. Anna O. 's movements are temporally of the previous winter and are 
spatially performed in the co-ordinates of her 'old room'. By consciously exploring and 
performing the body's own spatial and temporal dimensions, dance performance helps to 
anchor the body in these dimensions. In many cultures, dance adopts narrative forms for 
its temporal organization. However, even without narrative, dance organizes its 
movement across time. The project of dance is therefore very much implicated in the 
project of psychoanalysis. Phelan writes of the two performance modes: 
It is in this theory of the body's time that dance and psychoanalysis meet. If the 
body is not, a priori, in time, then dance can be said to be the elaboration of possible 
temporalities for the body that are interpreted in movement; and psychoanalysis can 
be said to be the elaboration of possible narrative interpretations of the body's 
symptom... 
Psychoanalysis is the performance in which the doctor and the patient create an 
interpretation of a symptom that gives the body temporal coherence. ('Dance and the 
History of Hysteria', 92) 
Faced with the off-beat timing of the hysterical symptom, Phelan suggests that 
psychoanalysis can benefit from working alongside dance and movement performance, 
for both are concerned with re-orienting the body in the temporal structures that it has 
lost in the traumatic event. Her essay suggests that in his earliest works, Freud 
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succeeded in listening to and recording the body's rhythms and flows. Indeed,, the text of 
Studies on Hysteria closes with a sequel to Freud's treatment of Elisabeth von R, which 
remarkably locates her on the dance floor: 
In the spring of 1894 1 heard that she [Elisabeth von R] was going to a private 
ball for which I was able to get an invitation, and I did not allow the opportunity to 
escape me of seeing my former patient whirl past in a lively dance. Since then, by her 
own inclination, she has married someone unknown to me. (Studies on Hysteria, 230; 
quoted in 'Dance and the History of Hysteria', 100) 
The cure for the 'former patient' is clearly to regain those temporal and spatial rhythms 
that are so notably absent from the hysterical symptom and to rejoin the dance once 
more. Phelan eloquently observes: 'Psychic health is in part contingent upon the body 
finding its rhythm in words and time. Choreography and psychoanalysis would do well 
to join in a conversation about the body's time' ('Dance and the History of Hysteria', 
100). The problem, of course, is that while Freud in 1894 was open to this 
'conversation' between dance and psychoanalysis, by 1896 he was already silencing one 
half of the dialogue. It is only in the most contemporary treatments of trauma that 
'choreography' is re-surfacing, in the form of Dance Movement Therapy. It is fascinating 
to observe, however, that in the text of 'Moses and Monotheism', where Freud seems so 
overwhelmed by his own material, the dancing figure re-emerges, as if to insist on its 
own re-appearance. 
An alternative staging of the themes of trauma, disappearance and repetition is 
provided by Heidi Gilpin in her essay on Tadeusz Kantor (1915-1990), a contemporary 
Polish choreographer whose compulsively repetitive performances arguably originate in 
the traumas of twentieth-century Europe, most specifically the Holocaust. 4 If dance is 
considered as performance, it may also be theorized as a form of disappearance; 
accordingly, Gilpin argues that the fascination of movement arises from the fact that it 
has vanished in the very moment that it has been apprehended. Even so-called repetitive 
movement is never really the same, but merely displaces the previous movement (Gilpin, 
4Heidi Gilpin, 'Lifelessness in Movement, or How Do the Dead Move? Tracing Displacement and 
Disappearance for Movement Performance', CoMprealities: Dancing Knowledge, Culture and Power 
ed. Susan Leigh Foster, (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 106-128. Further references to this 
article are given after quotations in the text. 
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108). As a strategy, however, repetitive movement serves the impossible function of 
attempting to stop disappearance. Repetition gives the illusion of control, at the same 
time as it calls attention to the fact of disappearance by manifesting once more what was 
previously present. It thus simultaneously prevents and perpetuates the anxiety of 
disappearance. 
Gilpin's analysis of disappearance is rooted in Freud's observation of the fort-da 
game, his analysis of the processes of repetition linked to trauma. The game was noted 
by Freud in his observations of his grandson Ernst, who embarked on the curious activity 
when his mother disappeared from view. Familiarly the trauma is one of departure, this 
time of the mother's presence. Faced with the trauma of absence, the little boy threw out 
a reel attached to a piece of string, so that it was no longer within his viewing range, and 
then retrieved it by pulling on the string. This activity was accompanied by the sounds 
'fort' ('gone') and 'da' (there'), and was performed in a repetitive manner. Freud 
interpreted this as an attempt by Ernst to gain control over a situation of perceived 
abandonment, in which he felt helpless - the reel substituted for his mother whose 
movements he could now control with ease. However, the paradoxical nature of 
repetitive activity is not ignored by Freud - the game may give the illusion of control, but 
simultaneously each disappearance and reappearance of the reel are a reminder of the 
original object (the mother) who has departed and not returned. 
If the previous examples of repetition in this section have been largely connected 
to the problem of temporality, and the disruption by trauma of the body's rhythms and 
flows in time, the fort-da game focuses more particularly on the body's relation to space. 
The body movement of Ernst is choreographed to take control of the spatiality which 
has suddenly become so threatening to him, and Freud's description of the scene 
accordingly gives the precise spatial co-ordinates of its staging. But it is significant that 
underlying this description is another dancing body that waits to re-surface in the text of 
this thesis. This body is that of Irigaray's little girl, who is also faced with the departure 
of her mother. However, her relation to the spatiality that surrounds her, as envisioned 
by IrigaraY, is entirely different from that of Ernst: 
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She dances and thus forms a vital subjective space open to the cosmic maternal 
world, to the gods, to the present other. This dance is also a way for the girl to 
create a territory of her own in relation to the mother.... 
Furthermore, the sexual movement characteristic of the female is whirling round 
rather than throwing and pulling objects back as little Ernst does. The girl tries to 
reproduce around and within her an energetic circular movement that protects her 
from abandonment, attack, depression, loss of self Spinning round is also, but in my 
opinion secondarily, a way of attracting. The girl describes a circle, while soliciting 
and refusing access to her territory. She is making a game of this territory she has 
described with her body. There is no object here, in the strict meaning of the word, 
no other that has had to be introjected or incorporated. On the contrary, girls and 
women often set up a defensive territory that can then become creative, especially in 
analysis. ('Gesture in Psychoanalysis', 97-98) 
The dancing figure again enters the text surreptitiously. Faced with the traumatic 
absence of her mother, the little girl spins around, creating her own territory. Again 
certain assumptions can be made about the movement that is being performed. Most 
importantly, perhaps, it is the whole body that is in motion, in an energetic whirling 
movement; in contrast Ernst sits stationary and moves only his arm and hand. Secondly, 
the circling activity that is engaged in requires some degree of skill - it can only be 
performed over a duration of time if the head is kept as steady as possible, and turned in 
a different rhythm to the rest of the body. Like Freud's dancer in Moses and 
Monotheism% a delicate balancing act is required. 
In conclusion to this section, I would like to indicate another consequence of 
Freud's rejection of the body's choreography from his analytic work after the founding of 
psychoanalysis in 1896.1 have already examined the performance and staging of the 
analytic session from the point of view of its origins in hypnosis. However, another 
important point can be made about the technique of the couch, which is practised almost 
universally by Freudian analysts. Irigaray is concerned throughout her writing with 
exactly what happens to the body during the analytic session, and she is perturbed by the 
prevalence of the sense of hearing at the cost of all the other senses. In the 'talking cure', 
the sounds of speech are almost all that is heeded and those sensations and perceptions 
that are needed for the subject to come into existence are ignored. Even more 
importantly for my argument, even hearing is not utilized in all its dimensions: 
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There is another point to consider- hearing is also necessaty for balance. When 
patients are lying down, they feel no occasion to worry about this: hence they are in 
some danger of losing the bearings they need for balance. This can lead a patient to 
take off from reality, to construct an artificial reality, to relapse into theoretical 
delusions, etc.... The patient is induced to lose his roots, his balance, and something 
of his hearing_ 5 
Irigaray's claim that the territory described by the little girl's spinning can be highly 
creative in analysis must therefore be heavily qualified. In Freudian psychoanalysis, 
which excludes the body as much as possible from its sessions, there can be no place for 
the rhythms that this body produces. By implication, Freud has rejected not only the 
dancing body that was present in his earliest work and that provided such a useful model 
by which trauma could be explored and analysed, but he has also excluded a specifically 
female mode of creativity and experience. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to 
examining those modes of analysis which are still in dialogue with the techniques of 
choreography and the issues of trauma and gender that they are able to highlight and 
explore. 
CHOREOGRAPHING PSYCHOANALYSIS: DANCE MOVEMENT THERAPY 
The model of psychoanalysis that has been inherited ftom Freud is one from 
which bodily movements and gestures have been specifically excluded. Irigaray points 
out that in the psychoanalytic session today, the issue of physical activity comes up only 
as a marginal concern: it may be incorporated into the treatment of patients who present 
a particular difficulty or resistance to the exclusively linguistic emphasis of analysis (such 
as children or psychotics); otherwise it is only utilized extensively in those methods of 
therapy that have moved away from the traditional modes of psychoanalysis ('Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis', 91). Since the 1940's, however, there has been a steady growth in 
awareness of the importance of the need to integrate in treatment both mind and body, 
and to focus on physical activity and modes of expression in conjunction with linguistic 
and verbal articulation. A survey of this growing enthusiasm for somatic expression in 
the therapeutic context will follow in the second half of this section. At this point I wish 
5Luce IrigaraY, 'Flesh Colors', Sexes and Genealogies, trans. Gillian C. Gill, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), 151-166, (p. 154). 
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to note, however,, the leading role that the treatment of trauma has played in these 
developments. The problems and issues that are specific to trauma are particularly 
susceptible to treatment by physical movement - the spatial and temporal dislocation that 
have been identified as characteristic of the traumatic neurosis benefit particularly from 
the co-ordination required in movement and dance exercises. 
Trauma therapy plays a vital and pioneering role in contemporary analytic 
treatment. In 1894,, Freud was similarly at the forefront of the treatment of traumatic 
neuroses, working alongside and in awareness of the most eminent clinicians of his day - 
Jean Martin Charcot, Pieffe Janet and William James. In dialogue with the body and 
observing and noting carefufly its choreographies, Freud uncovered the widespread 
incidence of childhood sexual abuse. It was this that led him to turn his back on his early 
researches and to found the psychoanalytic movement in 1896, based on the premature 
development of sexuality in the child (the Oedipal complex), which then fies latent until 
the body reaches sexual maturity. Any disturbing memories or emotions that arise in 
adolescence can subsequently be disregarded as the resurfacing of these premature 
sensations of early infancy. In a fitting reversal, it was the rise of the women's movement 
in the 1960's and the resulting awareness of feminist issues and concerns, that led to a 
revived focus on the prevalence of childhood sexual abuse. More credibility was 
awarded in analysis to those patients who were able to formulate a narrative of the 
event; previously, such cases had often been dismissed as manifestations of a latent 
Oedipal complex. Over time, it was noted that these groups of patients displayed a 
specific set of physical symptoms, which led to the widespread acceptance that trauma 
affected every aspect of a person's being, and invaded both physical and emotional 
boundaries. From here, it was a relatively small step to the realization that treatment for 
these patients should incorporate an awareness of bodily modes of expression and 
articulation, in addition to the verbal. 
From the late 1960's there was thus a focused attempt on the part of clinicians to 
operate in dialogue with the body: by observing the range and choreography of the 
bodily movements and gestures that these patients manifested, it was hoped that a 
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symptomatic profile of the survivor of sexual abuse could be compiled. This project has 
taken on a particular urgency in the light of recent problems surrounding children's and 
survivors' evidence in legal proceedings. Although therapy cannot be used to gain 
disclosure information, which may subsequently act as evidence in court, there has been 
increasing clinical interest in locating behavioural symptoms which may support or refute 
other indications that abuse has occurred. 6 Three characteristic movement profiles have 
been recognized as specific to the abused child. 7 Firstly, there is a tendency to 
disconnect movement from the torso, or centre of the body. This is accompanied by 
slow, listless activity and a minimum of initiation in the chest or pelvic area. In this 
example, then, movement is reduced to a minimum and is kept away from those areas of 
the body which function to co-ordinate a large or decisive action. In the second 
characteristic pattern, movement does originate in the torso, but it is awkward, and 
consequently the accompanying movements of the limbs display a fragmented and stiff 
quality. The overall impression is of a lack of integration of the body, and a feeling of 
being 'all over the place' (Stanton-Jones, 23 8). These two movement profiles therefore 
demonstrate an inability to function with the specific area of the body (the torso), in 
which the sensation of abuse was centred. This is especially clear in the case cited by 
dance-movement therapists Joan Lavender and Wendy Sobelman: 
Another patient, with a history of physical abuse, had difficulty initiating 
movement from any part of her body other than hands or feet. When asked by the 
therapist to create 'movement that starts from the centre of your body', she became 
upset and said she could sense only a 'gaping hole' in the center of her body. 
Numbness is a somatic form of denial. This individual, in order not to feel the pain of 
her abuse, had blocked out all sensations in the center of her torso. 8 
6This observation is indebted to Kristina Stanton-Jones, An Introduction to Dance-Movement The 
in 1! 5ychiga, (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), 237. Further references to this book are given 
after quotations in the text. The approach to child sexual abuse and the law which is articulated by 
Stanton-Jones reflects the findings of the Butler-Sloss Report on the Cleveland Crisis (see Chapter One). 
As in the instance of the 'anal dilatation reflex', physical signs of abuse are regarded as indicators that 
an event may have occurred, in conjunction with a broad range of other factors - they are not awarded 
the status of legal evidence. 
7 These categories are based on the work of the dance movement therapist Marcia Weltman, in her 
work with abused children at the NeuroPsYchiatric Institute of California. Her findings have been 
published in Marcia Weltman, Movement Therapy with Children who Have Been Sexually Abused. 
Aacrican journal of Dance TheWy, 9 (1986), 47-66. 
8 Joan Lavender and Wendy Sobelman, ' "I Can't Have Me if I Don't Have You": Working with the 
Borderline Personalityý, ' Dance and Other Expressive Aft Therapies: When Words are not nou 1, ed. _E__ gh 
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This form of physical symptom originates in the experience of the abuse itself during a 
sexual (or other) trauma, dissociation serves as an adaptive survival strategy. While the 
body is being violated, the survivor seeks to preserve the integrity of her personality by 
'splitting off from her body. When the traumatic event is over, the defence often 
persists, resulting in the physical symptom of deadness or numbness of the body, or of 
feeling'spaced out'. It can clearly be seen, here, how vitally important it is that physical 
activity is incorporated into the analytic session: traditional psychoanalysis, by excluding 
the issue of bodily sensation from the treatment session, would merely re-inforce the 
symptoms that are presented. 
The third movement profile that has been connected with sexual-abuse survivors 
originates in a different aspect of the traumatic neurosis. In this instance, movement 
behaviour is focused on the centre of the body, particularly on the genital area, either in 
inappropriate self-stimulatory or sexual activity, or in seductive gestures. In female 
survivors, this is typically accompanied by a body posture which is characterized by a 
slight pelvic tilt, with the chest pushed forward (Stanton-Jones, 238). This behaviour 
exactly opposes that of the former two categories and appears to correlate with a way of 
dealing with trauma which repeats the sensation of abuse. The complexity of response 
to the traumatic event incorporates both dissociation or denial, and intrusive symptoms 
which repeat the original experience on a physical or psychological level. Clinicians 
seeking to comprehend the confusing array of symptoms presented by survivors of abuse 
were aided by the increasing awareness and understanding of 'post-traumatic stress 
disorder'which was occurring in other areas. The inclusion of PTSD in DSM-HI gave a 
much more prominent position to traumatic neuroses than they had previously been 
awarded and highlighted the range of responses to severe trauma. The characteristic 
symptoms included both dissociative disorders, such as inability to recall specific time 
periods and important events, avoidance of stimuli associated With the event, or a 
numbing of general responsiveness; and intrusive symptoms, such as repeated re- 
Fran Levy, %ýith Judith Pines Fried and Fern Leventhal, (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 69- 
82, (p. 78). 
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experiencing of the traumatic event, or a state of increased arousal. Combining these 
new and increasingly complex sources of information about the variety of response to 
trauma, with their own observations of physical symptomatology in survivors of sexual 
abuse, clinicians arrived at an advanced understanding of the nature of the traumatic 
neuroses. 
It became especially evident that trauma altered not only the emotions but also 
the relationship to the body. The flow of bodily movement was restricted and physical 
sensation numbed; and body boundaries were particularly ill-defined. It was found that 
survivors of sexual trauma could either be overly intrusive with others, lacking any sense 
of their personal boundaries; or very distant, not easily allowing another person into their 
own personal space (Stanton-Jones, 239). 9 Therapy for survivor groups therefore aimed 
to address these problems on the physical level. Through movement, patients were 
helped to recognize and change the ways in which they used, abused or inhibited their 
bodies. The interaction of psyche and body was encouraged, and the exploration of 
dance elements - rhythm, space, dynamics and body movement - was increasingly 
regarded as of key importance to trauma resolution, in which all of these categories were 
affected. 
In an essay entitled 'Dancing beyond Trauma: Women Survivors of Sexual 
Abuse', Bonnie Bernstein (a dance therapist based in California, who specializes in 
working in conjunction with Rape Crisis Centres) outlines the basic principles of her 
therapeutic practice, and provides a useful introduction to the ways in which dance and 
movement are seen to facilitate recovery ftom trauma. 10 It is surely no co-incidence that 
the first principle she outlines is the fundamental importance of regarding and treating 
the organism as a whole, thus distinguishing her practice from traditional 
psychoanalytical concepts: 
9 These observations are based on the research findings of Sharon Goodill, who worked with abused 
children at the I-Iahnemann University in Philadelphia. Her findings are published in Sharon Goodill, 
'Dance/Movement Therapy with Abused Children', Arts in p chothe py 14 (1987), 49-68. ýy !aý 
10 Bonnie Bernstein, Dancing beyond Trauma: Women Survivors of Sexual Abuse', Dance and Other 
es: When Words are Not Enough, eds. Fran Levy, Judith Pines Fried and Fern 
Leventhal, (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 41-58. Further references to this article are given 
after quotations in the text. 
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Psycho-physical refers to an experience that occurs concurrently on 
psychological and physical levels and describes the complex impact that the body has 
on the psyche, and that the psyche has on the body. A fundamental concept..., 
pUcho-physical implies that all human experience including emotional response, 
memory, and thoughts contain kinesthetic components. Body movement is a direct 
outlet for the psyche, thus, through dance, the psycho-physical realm can be fully 
expressed and explored to stimulate insight and mobilize therapeutic change. 
(Bernstein, 42) 
The basis of dance-movement therapy is the belief that body and psyche act as a complex 
whole; and that in treating the body, change is also effected on the level of the psyche. 
By stimulating body awareness and increasing movement vocabulary, Bernstein also 
aims to facilitate psychological insight and emotional expression. 
Bernstein terms as 'mobilization' the sequences of directives that are given to help 
to expand movement range and to explore the elements of dance. It is fascinating to 
examine the specific body parts and qualities of movement that Bernstein uses as her 
focus in the exercises that she adopts as 'warm-up' to the session. The initial emphasis is 
on body structure, and particularly exploring the range of movement of the spine (ie, the 
torso). Bernstein elaborates on the specific methods she uses to 'mobilize' the group: 
I then directed the group to explore a new range of movement facilitated by the 
terms bend, reach, wiggle and dart. In addition, qualities such as wild, explosive, 
gentle, rigid, and strong were also suggested. Such movement challenges increase 
body awareness, enliven numbed areas, and help the survivor experience her physical 
boundaries. 
To enhance boundary definition I introduced Functional Technique sequences 
that focused on exercise to strengthen the spine and torso: undulations of the spine 
that articulated movements of individual vertebrae, rotations of the spine through 
different planes, and unified spinal action with the limbs. We then broadened the 
exercises to the alignment of the head, neck, shoulder, and torso. (Bernstein, 49-50) 
it is immediately evident that the directives given by Bernstein focus on the 
dissociative symptoms manifested on the body of the survivor. Sensation in the torso is 
emphasized, as is its alignment in function with the limbs. Physical boundaries are also 
strengthened, so that spatial awareness is enhanced. It is worth noting at this point that 
the therapeutic emphasis is not on any specific content or memory, but aims at altering 
habitual and constricted movement patterns. The underlying assumption is that a change 
in movement will bring about a change in emotion. In stretching the muscles of the 
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arms, torso and legs, body strength is increased, which reshapes the perception of the 
body through movement and leads to sensations of power and control. Similarly, the 
survivor learns that control derives not from withholding movement and sensation (the 
techniques of dissociation), but from an awareness of which parts of the body to move 
and how movement is performed. In both cases, the immediate aim is to restore those 
positive feelings towards the body which were lost at the time of the abuse. 
Other directives outlined by Bernstein are aimed specifically at the spatial and 
temporal dislocation which characterizes the traumatic neurosis. Thus she encourages 
exploration with movement dynamics - leaping, sliding, lunging, exploding - which 
provide the survivor with new ways of occupying space. Alternatively, a directive aimed 
at expanding the use of dance elements can become a focus for strengthening temporal 
awareness - Bernstein's example is of a gradual variation in the tempo of movements 
performed, from the very fast to the very slow (Bernstein, 43). Whatever the specific 
focus of the individual directive, the assumption which underlies all of Bernstein's 
'mobilizations' does not vary: each of the activities is rooted in the belief that the body is 
essential to psycho-physical health; and that through stimulating physical activity, 
psychological change can also be effected. 
The assumption of the dance therapist is always that treatment operates on the 
psycho-physical level; that through the treatment of the body, there is a simultaneous 
change in psychological functioning. However, the connection between body and 
psyche is never assumed to be straightforward. There is no direct mode of access 
between bodily movement and the functions of memory. Thus the physical 'acting out' 
or re-living of the traumatic event is not a goal of the therapeutic process. This would 
be to consolidate the symptom rather than to facilitate a cure. Instead the focus is on 
expanding movement patterns and exploring movement potential, as a means of 
mobilizing individuals to overcome the fear and isolation that results from the traumatic 
incident. In Bernstein's account of the dance therapy session, 'acting out' (or giving 
physical form to psychological experiences) is referred to as 'improvisation'. However 
the emphasis is not on the direct re-experiencing or re-living of the traumatic event, but 
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on changing it or introducing variety into the patient's account. Looking back at the 
analogy of Anna 0, the compulsive re-living of the event demonstrates an 'off-beat' 
timing; the therapist's aim is to re-introduce the survivor to the more variable rhythms 
and flows that characterize the narrative account. Bernstein thus cites four examples of 
improvisation technique that can be utilized in the therapeutic session; the aim of each is 
to introduce flexibility into the patient's account of the trauma: 
Four examples of improvisation techniques... are 'externalizing, 'enacting', 
physicalizing', and 'rehearsing 1. In externalizing the client might 'dance out' a dream, 
fantasy, or physical memory. In enacting, the client recreates a significant life 
experience, perhaps her assault, and while dancing, she may embellish the life 
enactment with movement derived from previously unexpressed feelings. 
Physicalizing involves putting into movement an idea, a memory, or a feeling that has 
been previously stored in a cognitive realm. Rehearsing involves an improvisation in 
which alternative responses are created and practiced in order to prepare for changes 
in behavior outside of the therapy session. (Bernstein, 43) 
'Externalizing' is the closest directive to straightforward re-experiencing of the 
traumatic event; the 'physical memory' is 'danced out' as if it were being relived. 
However, it is important to note that the client is encouraged to incorporate 'fantasy' or 
'dream' material, in order to introduce new perspectives. Similarly in 'enacting', the 
'dancing out' of the event incorporates the expression of feelings which could not be 
articulated or even experienced during the originating incident. 'Physicalizing' involves 
putting into movement what previously existed only on the cognitive level; namely, those 
feelings, memories or ideas that pre- or post-date the traumatic incident, which is 
characterized precisely by its incapacity to be registered or stored on the cognitive level. 
Finally, in 'rehearsing', the emphasis is on looking forward not back; a variety of 
responses are created and practised to an actual situation or event which will occur in 
the future outside the context of the therapy session. Again the aim is to demonstrate 
the flexible nature of the event itself, so that the outcome is not determined in advance 
but depends on the actions and responses of the individual. 
The reason that the emphasis in dance therapy is so strongly weighted towards 
introducing variety and flexibility into the survivor's memory of the traumatic incident is 
because the physical movement enacted is regarded as an intermediate step towards the 
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production of a verbal narrative. Thus the dance therapist does not only utilize the 
resources of movement and physical activity, but also continually encourages the client 
to connect verbal insight with the movement experience produced. This may take the 
form of free association by the client; or it may be an inter retation of the ongoing p 
movement. The therapist may ask questions about the quality of the action performed, 
or encourage an image to be put to the movement. The resulting images and 
interpretations provide a focus for discussion between therapist and client, and the client 
becomes aware of how emotional and bodily experience are connected; how movement 
can yield images, which are then analysed as a means to psychological understanding. 
The process of dance and movement therapy is thus invariably one which progresses 
from movement to image to interpretation (Stanton-Jones, 1-3). 
It is precisely this verbal aspect of dance therapy which distinguishes it from pure 
dance,, and aligns it with other forms of psychotherapeutically informed work. Martha 
Graham, one of the foremost founders of contemporary modem dance, provided her 
definition of what should constitute dance: 
It is not important that you know what a dance means. It is only important that 
you should be stirred. If you can write the story of your dance, it is a literary thing, 
but not dancing. " 
Although aimed at the narrative traditions of classical ballet, against which Graham was 
defining her own modes of performance, this quotation proves particularly apt in the 
context of my argument. The primary goal of dance therapy is not to produce a dance, 
but to provide the 'story of your dance'. The elements of dance are employed - the 
exploration of space, tempo, rhythm, co-ordination - as a means of approach to 
narrative. It is when the temporal and locational. shifts, and the varying perspectives of 
the 'story' or narrative can be produced in relation to the traumatic event, that the 
therapeutic goal has been achieved. In this sense, dance therapy would not be classified 
as 'dancing', but as more of a 'literary thing'. 
II Quoted in Elizabeth Rosen. Dance in PUchothegM, 2nd ed., (New york: Dance Horizons: 1974), 
49. Attributed in Rosen to a statement made in 1934, and quoted by Merle Armitage in Martha 
_Graham. 
(U. S. A: copyright 1937). limited first edition. 
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Now that I have provided some indication of the ways in which dance and 
movement are used in the therapeutic session, and incorporated into the analytical 
framework, I would like to provide a brief survey of the history of Dance Movement 
Therapy, and to examine the influences and origins of the movement. At the risk of 
using too simPlistic a literary formula of history, narrative and events, I feel that this 
survey is essential to the argument of my thesis. It demonstrates clearly that if 
movement and dance were excluded from the therapeutic session by Freud's founding of 
psychoanalysis in 1896, it is by aligning themselves with the alternative tradition of the 
'body image' - which originated in Janet's work and was expanded by Schilder - that 
dance and movement once more find a place within analysis. Stanton-Jones, in her 
account of the origins of Dance Movement Therapy in psychiatry, clearly locates its 
beginnings in the researches carried out in the second half of the nineteenth century, into 
the symptomatology arising out of hysteria and related conditions: 
Eugen Bleuler in Switzerland, Jean-Martin Charcot in France and Henry 
Maudsley in England meticulously observed their patients' bizarre movements, fits, 
stereotypies [5Lc] and gestures. They did this in the hope that they could turn these 
phenomena into clear diagnostic criteria that could help predict the course of the 
disease 'dementia praecox', now known as schizophrenia. They would then be able to 
differentiate it from categories such as 'mania!, 'melancholia' (now known as 
depression) and hysteria. (Stanton-Jones, 13) 
Freud and Janet are the inheritors of this methodology, which focuses on the physical 
expression and manifestation of emotion. Initially, both displayed the same concern to 
observe and record the bodily movements and gestures of their patients, to listen to their 
off-beat rhythms. However, Freud suppressed this aspect of his practice in 1896, with 
the founding of psychoanalysis, and Janet's subsequent work was almost entirely eclipsed 
by the new ideas and methods arising out of the psychoanalytical circles in Vienna. 
It was not until the 1940's that dance and movement once more began to be 
considered as a valid form of treatment for those with primarily psychological problems. 
It was first introduced in the treatment of psychotic patients, - who were out of contact 
with reality and in a state of catatonic withdrawal. The aim was to encourage social 
participation and responsiveness to movement. In terms of physical symptomatology, 
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the emotional disturbance of these patients manifested itself in the persistent hypertonus 
of their muscular structures. " This is characterized by two distinctive patterns of 
movement behaviour. in the hyperactive patient there is excessive activity and 
restlessness, ticks and a variety of involuntary grimaces; while in the catatonic patient, 
static rigidity of the body, inflexibility of joint action and postural distortions are equally 
common reactions. The physical effects of continued hypertonus result in exhaustion. 
Treatment therefore aimed on the physical level to restore to these patients the normal, 
rhythmic functioning of the body, which is based on an alternation between relaxation 
and contraction. Techniques such as hydrotherapy, massage, and drug sedation helped 
to relieve the physical symptoms of tension and to bring about relaxation. Dance 
techniques were also incorporated, which utilized simple, loose-swinging locomotor 
movements; and normal reflexive movements of the body were practised, such as 
stretching and releasing exercises, in order to stimulate the circulation. Such rhythmic 
activity helped to bring about relaxation, but as long as the mental conflict remained 
unresolved, the effect on the patient was temporary. Dance was used as a purely 
physical modality for the release of tension; the physical activity produced normal 
muscular fatigue from which the body recovered naturally during periods of rest. 13 The 
potential of dance as an expressive medium, which could release both physical and 
psychological tension was not yet realized. The gulf in treatment between mind and 
body still remained to be bridged. 
The catalyst to this change in awareness of the potential of dance in therapy 
occurred in the work of Paul Schilder on the body image. During the 1940's, Francizka 
Boas taught creative modem dance to children at Bellevue Psychiatric Hospital in New 
York. Her ideas are vital to the development of Dance Movement Therapy, because she 
combined her extensive personal experience of therapeutic practice and psychiatric 
concepts, with dance and movement in her treatment of both child patients at Bellevue 
12' The term 'hypertonus' refers to a state of abnormally high muscular tension. 
13 The information in this paragraph is taken from Elizabeth Rosen, Dance in PUchotheMpy, 2nd ed, 
(New York: Dance Horizons, 1974). 52-53. Further references to this book are given after quotations in 
the text 
143 
and adult dancers in her studio. From the beginning, Boas incorporated into her work 
ideas from her colleague at Bellevue, the psychiatrist Paul Schilder; in particular, his 
seminal work The Image and Appearance of the Human Bod provided her with a full 
and comprehensive theoretical system on which to base her ideas. She understood the 
concept of the body image as it was presented by Schilder and incorporated it into her 
therapeutic work with children. It provided the connection between psychiatric concepts 
and movement techniques, which became the basis for Boas' work and subsequently for 
Dance Movement Therapy as a whole. 
In The Image and Appearance of the Human Bod , Schilder expanded at 
length 
on his notion of the body image. The body image is continually built up from a 
physiological basis in the tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, proprioceptive and visual 
systems. The vital point in Schilder's explication, however, is that it is only through 
movement that the body image is constructed. In infancy its development parallels that 
of the sensorimotor system, while in adulthood it remains plastic and changes with every 
new movement situation that is experienced: 
It is remarkable... that movement leads to a better orientation in relation to our 
own body. We do not know very much about our body unless we move it. 
Movement is a great uniting factor between the different parts of our body. By 
movement we come into a definite relation to the outside world and to objects, and 
only in contact with this outside world are we able to correlate the diverse 
impressions concerning our own body. The knowledge of our own body is to a great 
extent dependent upon our action. (Image and Appearance, 112-113) 
Movement not only contributes to the construction of the body image, but Schilder 
clearly states that it can produce a change in psychological attitude via a change in the 
body image. Every emotion and expressive attitude is connected with a characteristic 
change in the postural model of the body, which is experienced as an alteration in the 
heaviness or lightness of the diverse parts of the body. Each of the characteristic 
changes is a total figure, with its own distinctive sequences and shapes. In normal 
movement, the postural model of the body changes continually from crystallized, rather 
closed entities, which reflect one of the typical Primary images of the body, to a state of 
dissolution, which reflects a stream of less stabilized experiences. Movement is therefore 
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the continual building up of a shape, which is immediately dissolved and built up again. 
There are two important theoretical conclusions to be drawn from this. Firstly, there is 
nothing automatic in this continual process, - 
it is influenced by the emotions, which are all 
connected with expressive movements or at least impulses toward them. Every emotion 
therefore changes the body image. This, in turn, signals an openness in Schilder's work 
to the event, so that the continual process which forms the body image is determined by 
the arbitrary series of events which structure the life of each individual, and produce 
emotional response. Each emotion that is experienced is registered on the body image, 
which therefore shows the characteristic features of an entire life. 
Schilder insists on an intimate interrelation between psychological and physical 
functioning. Every emotion changes the body image and produces its own characteristic 
postural attitude. In hatred, the body contracts and becomes firmer, and its outlines 
towards the world are strongly marked. In friendliness, however, there is a sensation of 
expansiveness as the muscles relax and the borderlines of the body lose their distinct 
character. Conversely, a shift in movement can produce its own emotional reaction: 
There is no question that the loosening of the body-image will bring with it a 
particular psychic attitude. Motion thus influences the body-image and leads from a 
change in the body-image to a change in the psychic attitude. 
We now come to the problem of expressive movements and their relation to the 
postural model of the body. According to Flach, every change in the psychic attitude 
provokes a change in the dynamic situation as a whole, which is experienced as a 
change in the muscular tension as pull, striving, or loosening. Single elements of 
muscle-tension are not experienced, but there are specific sequences which form a 
whole when an expressive movement like entreaty, defiance, or sadness takes place. 
We have here a specific sequence of muscular states which are experienced... There 
is so close an interrelation between the muscular sequence and the psychic attitude 
that not only does the psychic attitude connect up with the muscular states, but also 
every sequence of tensions and relaxations provokes a specific attitude. When there 
is a specific motor sequence it changes the inner situation and attitudes and even 
provokes a phantasy situation which fits the muscular sequence. (Image and 
Appearanc , 208) 
Clearly this theoretical model provides an excellent basis for the aims and structures of 
the dance-therapy session. The interrelatedness of physical and psychological elements 
which is so fundamental to the work of the dance therapist is clearly evidenced. The 
potential of movement to alter psychological attitude is converted in the dance-therapy 
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session to the expansion and exploration of movement range, in order to open up relaxed 
and easy postural attitudes, which will then produce a more positive inner situation. 
Conversely, the registering on the body image of every emotion that is experienced 
provides the dance therapist with a storehouse of postural and muscular attitudes 
deriving from events throughout the client's life experience, and supplies a rich and 
almost inexhaustible fund of material with which to work. 
The potential of his own material for use in the area of dance does not appear to 
have been lost on Schilder. In The Image and Appearance of the Human Bod , he 
argues that the techniques of dance and movement are a highly effective means of 
encouraging the body into those looser states of dissolution which reflect a stream of 
less stabilized experiences, and relaxing the closed and constricted postural attitudes 
which derive from a specific emotional state: 
There is another way of dissolving or weakening the rigid form of the postural 
model of the body, and that is movement and dance. I have mentioned above that, - 
whenever we move, the postural model of the body changes. The previous scheme of 
the postural model remains in the background and upon this previous scheme the new 
scheme is built up. When we move, we depart from the comparatively rigid primary 
picture; it seems in some way loosened and partially dissolved till the body returns 
into one of the primary attitudes. As Goldstein has mentioned, movement and 
especially dancing often use postural reflexes which are not fully in our 
consciousness. Image and Appearance,, 206-207) 
Dance is therefore a particularly suitable method for exploring bodily potential. Dance 
movement in particular incorporates new postural and muscular reflexes, and so 
increases the range of movement of the body. It is by expanding the range of movement 
that the knowledge of the body is increased; but it is also by loosening and dissolving the 
primary structures of the body that changes in the psyche are effected. There is no 
question for Schilder that the loosening of the body image in dance will bring about a 
change in psychic attitude: motion influences body image, which in turn brings with it a 
particular psychological reaction (Image and Appearance. 208). 
it is worth noting briefly at this point that Schilder indicates with particular 
emphasis the effect of spinning and circular motions in dance, which are seen to have an 
especially loosening quality. Due to vestibular irritation, the perception of the mass and 
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substance of the body is altered, which gives an increased feeling of freedom concerning 
gravity and the cohesion of the postural model of the body: 
It is perhaps worth while to mention that the optical picture during every quick 
movement tends in itself to multiplication. When one sees dancers on the stage 
turning rapidly around their longitudinal axis, provided the movements are rapid 
enough, one sees (also monocular) two heads instead of one. During rapid 
movement, the optic impression tends already to multiplication and loosening of the 
postural model. But I have already mentioned that these movements also have an 
influence from the kinaesthetic side on the perception of the body. Every rapid 
movement, especially when it is circular, also changes the vestibular reaction and with 
it the lightness and heaviness of the body. This is partially due to the muscular action, 
but also to the vestibular irritation.... That so many dances are connected with 
circular movement has a deep meaning connected with the vestibular irritation, which 
gives a greater freedom concerning the heavy mass and substance of the body. It is 
remarkable that in cult-dances drugs are often taken which affect the equilibrium via 
the vestibular apparatus. Dancing is therefore a method of changing the body-image 
and loosening its rigid shape. Image and Appearance, 207-208) 
This provides a new insight into the activity of Irigaray's little girl, who whirls and spins 
in rapid motion. In terms of the body image, her actions provide the most effective 
means of loosening and dissolving the primaiy structures of the body and of achieving a 
sensation of freedom and lightness. It is this that Irigaray connects to a specifically 
female mode of experience. 
Francizka Boas,, in her work, adopted from Schilder the notion that the body 
image could be altered through movement exploration. Many of her child psychiatric 
patients manifested a distorted body image in their restricted movements; consequently 
Boas used new movement experiences to expand and explore the range of movement 
potential. The interrelation of body and psyche - the expression of emotion in physical 
attitudes and postures, and the potential of movement to influence subjectivity - that was 
so vital to Schilder's work was not lost on Boas. Even in the early 1940's Boas was able 
to define dance as fbHows: 
dance is the expression of human fantasy and emotion using as its medium the 
motility of the body passing through space and time. This process of formulation of 
movement concerns itself not only with the form and action of the joints and muscles, 
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but also with the subjective concept of the body, and with the body as seen and 
interpreted by the observer. 14 
Boas thus made a remarkable contribution to the early development of Dance Movement 
Therapy. By incorporating the theoretical insights of her colleague Paul Schilder into 
her own therapeutic work, Boas succeeded in bridging the gulf in treatment between the 
body and the mind and establishing dance therapy in the form in which it is recognizable 
today. 
In the 1950's, the theoretical basis of Dance Movement Therapy was firmly 
established; however, it was far from being accepted by the psychiatric institution. While 
it was acknowledged that the reactions of patients in dance and movement sessions 
might be significant, psychiatrists were rarely present to observe such sessions at first 
hand. Simultaneously the dance therapist, along with many other auxiliary specialists 
who formed the complex of the psychiatric team, was consciously excluded from the 
insulated and private domain of the psychiatrist, whose treatment was strictly on a one- 
to-one basis (Rosen, 'Foreword to 1974 edition'). It was not until the 1960's that dance 
therapy became professionalized, and by a gradual process of acceptance, was 
increasingly incorporated into the programme of treatment for the psychiatric patient. 
Progress in the 1960's was aided by developments occurring within the sphere of dance 
itself Elizabeth Rosen points out that the emphasis of modem dance on the natural, 
dynamic rhythms of the body (contraction and release, fall and recovery) was particularly 
adaptable for use by the developing dance-therapy movement (Rosen, 45). Bound only 
by the limitations of the body itself, the form of modem dance was flexible and creative 
and aimed to give expression to those ideas, emotions and attitudes which could best be 
articulated in movement. 
Since the 1960's the history of Dance Movement Therapy has been one of 
increasing consolidation and incorporation into the psychiatric sphere. The exciting and 
challenging aspect of the movement is that it is continually evolving to include new areas 
14 This reference is quoted in Kristina Stanton-Jones, An Introduction to Dance-Movement TheM in 
ychigyy, (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), 23. Stanton-Jones cites as her source Francizka ps k 
Boas, quoted in Lauretta Bender. Child PVchiatric Techniques, (Illinois: C. C. Thomas, 1952), p. 258. 
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of practice. Although the basic reliance on movement to re-integrate emotional 
experience remains a constant, dance therapists are able to incorporate an increasing 
range of existing psychological frameworks; for example, there has been the recent move 
to treat sexually abused patients. In conclusion, however, it is notable that throughout 
the history of Dance Movement Therapy, it has been unable to incorporate or work 
productively alongside the theoretical framework of Freudian psychoanalysis, which 
specifically excludes the body from its sessions and rejects its choreographies. It has 
been in conjunction with the alternative tradition of the body image (which originated 
with Janet and was subsequently expanded by Schilder) that Dance Movement Therapy 
has been able to operate productively in dialogue with psychiatric practice. The question 
which I propose to explore in the final chapter of my thesis is whether the growing 
enthusiasm for somatic expression in the therapeutic context has also mobilized a 
renewed consideration of issues regarding the gendering of the subject. In other words, 
I am interested in exploring whether the inclusion of the body in the psychotherapeutic 
framework has also extended to the notion of bodily difference. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE GENDERED BODY 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FEMIMST PHENOMENOLOGY 
CHOREOGRAPHIES OF GENDER 
Over the last decade, the body has increasingly been assimilated into critical 
theory; over a remarkably short space of time, bodies have become the subject of intense 
cultural, philosophical and feminist speculation. Janet Wolff has pointed out that at a 
time when the body is the focus of ideology, representations and social relations, it 
seems increasingly anomalous to ignore dance in critical studies. I Dance (and dance 
studies) have previously been marginalized by critics, either construed as esoteric or 
highbrow or relegated to popular culture. Both of these strategies render dance 
harmless, and contain the subversive possibilities of the moving body. However with an 
increased interest in representations of the body, dance has crucially been appearing on 
the edges of critical theory. The problem which I wish to explore in this section is the 
very precise location of dance in critical theory; it is intimately and integrally allied to the 
project of feminist deconstruction, and consequently the dancing body has become a 
highly-charged locus of social representation. 
The metaphor of theory as 'choreography' first entered philosophical and cultural 
discourse in 1982,, in a written interview between Jacques Derrida and Christie 
McDonald, 2 
., entitled 
'Choreographies'. In this influential interview dance was 
immediately and indissolubly linked with issues of the gendering of the subject. Derrida 
uses the figure of the dancing body, which is in motion and hence cannot be fixed in one 
place or at one time, as a mode of expression for his radical view of gender, which is 
similarly fluid and mutable. In the interview, Derrida opens up a space for a divergent 
sexuality (or more properly, divergent sexualities) and thereby effects a dissolution of the 
I Janet Wolff, 'Foreword, Women and Dance: SYlPhs and Sirens, Christy Adair, (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), xi-xiv (p. xi). Further references to this preface are given after 
quotations in the text. 
2 Jacques Demda and Christie V. McDonald, 'From "Choreographies'l, ' Between the Blinds: A Derrida 
_Reader. 
ed- Peggy Kamuf, (New York: Columbia Press, 1991), 440-456. Further references to this 
interview are given after quotations in the text. 
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fixed cultural concepts of masculinity and femininity He posits instead a sexual 
indeterminacy, in which the genders intermix to play with, and become, a number of 
different sexualities. 
Susan Bordo, in her recent study of the body in relation to contemporary critical 
theory, has argued impressively that this view of the gendering of the subject arises 
directly out of the application of deconstructionist postmodernism to feminist concerns 
and paradigms. 3 The deconstructionist model of interpretive multiplicitY, of the 
heterogeneity and indeterminacy of meaning and meaning production, is applied to 
questions of the gendering of the subject. The role of the body is crucial in this process: 
deconstructionist postmodernism (rightly) opposes the ideal of disembodied knowledge, 
and declares the disembodied viewpoint of traditional science and philosophy to be a 
mystification and an impossibility. In its place, deconstructionists have introduced the 
metaphor of the world as text, as a means of undermining various claims to authoritative 
and transcendent insight into the nature of reality. If history and culture are texts, they 
adn-fit an endless proliferation of readings, each of which is itself unstable. The problem 
arises in relation to the role of the subject in this endlessly destabilized world: 
The question remains, however, how the human knower is to negotiate this 
infinitely perspectival, destabilized world. Deconstructionism answers with, as an 
alternative ideal, a constant vigilant suspicion of all determinate readings of culture 
and a partner aesthetic of ceaseless textual play. Here is where deconstruction may 
slip into its own fantasy of escape from human locatedness - by supposing that the 
critic can become wholly protean, adopting endlessly shifting, seemingly inexhaustible 
vantage points, none of which is 'owned' by either the critic or the author of a text 
under examination. (Bordo, 226) 
Deconstruction reacts against the disembodiment that characterizes traditional, 
I objective' accounts of reality, and insists on the partial and perspectival nature of 
embodied existence. However, Bordo suggests that in its own aesthetic of ceaseless and 
inexhaustible shifting of perspective and vantage point, deconstruction is equally guilty 
of its own'fantasy of escape'from human embodiment, which is always 'located', or fixed 
3 Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the B, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 217-229. Further references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
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within the boundaries of its own somaticism - even if these boundaries are 
conceptualized as fluid and unstable, as in theories of the body image. 
Deconstruction has profoundly influenced certain feminist approaches to the 
gendering of the subject. Deconstructionist feminists, for example Susan Suleiman, have 
criticized the model of gender for its fixed, binary structuring of reality, which can only 
reproduce the dualistic logic which has characterized traditional Western modes of 
thought. In its place Suleiman would instate the deconstructionist ideal of ceaseless, 
textual play. In '(Re)Writing the Body: The Politics and Poetics of Female Eroticism', 
she observes of contemporary feminism: 
The dream,, then, is to get beyond not only the number one - the number that 
determines unity, of body or of self - but also beyond the number two, which 
determines difference, antagonism, and exchange conceived of as merely the coming 
together of opposites. That this dream is perhaps impossible is suggested. Its power 
remains,, however, because the desire it embodies is a desire for both endless 
complication and creative movement. 4 
For Suleiman, contemporary feminism should not only leave behind the fictions of unity 
and stability of identity which characterize the phallocentric world view; but also the grid 
of gender, which feminists have used to expose the hierarchical, oppositional structure of 
phallocentrism. Beyond the number two is not some other number, but 'the innumerable' 
and 'the incalculable', so that difference is engulfed in multiplicity (Suleiman, 24). 
Suleiman quotes directly here from Derrida's interview with Christie McDonald, so that 
it becomes evident that the project of feminist deconstruction is firmly grounded in and 
inseparable from this text. 
Before I move on to outline the thoughtful and impressive critique of the feminist 
deconstructionist project, which Bordo includes in her volume Unbearable Weight 
(1993), 1 would like to pause for a moment to examine in detail the ways in which the 
dancing body is mobilized in the text of Derrida! s interview, and the critical implications 
that this carries. The dancing figure is first introduced by Christie McDonald, who 
4 Susan Rubin Suleiman, '(Re)Writing the Body: The Politics and poetics of Female Eroticism', The 
Fern e Bo! t in Wwcstern_Culture- Qo r , male _L_ ed. 
Susan Suleiman. (Cambridge, Njass: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), 7-29, (p. 24). Further references to this article are given after 
quotations in the text. 
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quotes a phrase from Emma Goldman, a 'maverick feminist' at the turn of the century: 'If 
I can't dance, I don't want to be part of your revolution' ('Choreographies', 44 1). Dance 
is immediately created as a space apart from the mainstream feminist project (the 
'revolution'). In his response, Derrida expands on this and mobilizes dance as a space 
apart, a locus of textual play and uncertainty,, in which authoritative and transcendent 
notions of reality are destabilized and undermined. For Derrida, the women's movement 
is implicated in the determinate and transcendent readings of culture which history 
mobilizes, even if the 'revolution' appears to provide a break in the continuous progress 
of history - the 'revolution, is thus oriented towards the (re)appropriation of woman's 
own specific difference, her truth. Dance provides an alternative mode to this, which is 
inseparable from Derrida's own deconstructionist project: 
Perhaps she [Goldman] was thinking of a completely other history: a history of 
paradoxical laws and nondialectical discontinuities, a history of absolutely 
heterogeneous pockets, irreducible particularities, of unheard of and incalculable 
sexual differences; a history of women who have - centuries ago - 'gone further' by 
stepping back with their lone dance, or who are today inventing sexual idioms at a 
distance from the main forum of feminist activity with a kind of reserve that does not 
necessarily prevent them from subscribing to the movement and even, occasionally, 
from becoming a militant for it. ('Choreographies', 442) 
In its entry into critical theory, dance thus becomes implicated in the 
deconstructionist metaphor of the world as text. In this infinitely perspectival, 
destabilized world, the human subject must become protean, adopting endlessly shifting, 
seemingly inexhaustible vantage points. Clearly, dance can easily be incorporated into 
this theoretical structure, for it is concerned with the body in motion. In relation to 
feminism, Derrida clearly states that this ceaseless motility is what he considers to be the 
most exciting and challenging dynamic for the revolutionary project. He argues that 
woman no longer has a 'place', for this is to subject feminist politics to a determinate 
view of the world. The woman should not be confined to any one place, but should 
assume a protean, shifting identity. For Derrida this ceaseless mobility is what is most 
'affirmative' in the metaphor of dancing: in 'dancing otherwise', feminism is entering the 
endless play of the deconstructionist enterprise ('Choreographies', 443). 
153 
Arguably, Derrida's concern in using the metaphor of dance is to incorporate the 
feminist revolutionary project into his own deconstructionist framework. He is 
concerned with the difficulty and the challenge of bringing the 'dance' (the endless 
shifting and mobility of deconstruction) into a 'tempo' which is 'in tune' with the feminist 
revolution. The political project of feminism must of necessity struggle against 'real 
conditions' which are in turn grounded in 'metaphysical presuppositions'. The 'front' on 
which the 'women's struggle' develops is the 'economic, ideological and political 
assumptions of the dominant system'. Deconstruction can therefore 'compromise the 
political chances of feminism' - its projects and aims are not compatible with feminism, 
even to Derrida himself Nevertheless, he still urges that feminists enter the 'dance' or 
space of deconstruction which he has established: How can one breathe without such 
punctuation and without the multiplicities of rhythm and steps? How can one dance, 
your "maverick feminist" might sayT ('Choreographies, 446) 
The rest of the interview is devoted to Derrida's often quoted and influential 
illustration of how deconstruction might be brought 'into tune' with feminism, how they 
may join the same 'tempo'. Derrida thus produces a 'choreographic text', in which 
feminism joins in the 'dance' of the deconstructionist project. The ceaseless textual play 
of deconstruction is here used to disrupt the gender opposition on which sexual 
difference is founded, so that there are no longer two genders but an indeterminate 
number of 'sexually marked voices': 
This indeed revives the following question: what if we were to reach, what if we 
were to approach here (for one does not arrive at this as one would at a determined 
location) the area of a relationship to the other where the code of sexual marks would 
no longer be discriminating? The relationship would not be a-sexual, far from it, but 
would be sexual otherwise: beyond the binary difference that governs the decorum of 
all codes, beyond the opposition feminine-masculine, beyond bi-sexuality as well, 
beyond homosexuality and heterosexuality, which come to the same thing. As I 
dream of saving the chance that this question offers I would like to believe in the 
multiplicity of sexually marked voices. I would like to believe in the masses, this 
indeterminable number of blended voices, this mobile of nonidentified sexual marks 
whose choreography can carry, divide, multiply the body of each 'individual', whether 
he be classified as 'man' or as 'woman' according to the criteria of usage. 
('Choreographies', 455) 
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As Derrida himself indicates in the interview this is a deeply problematic theoretical 
framework, particularly in terms of the feminist project. 
The primary problem is outlined by Elizabeth Grosz, in her book Space, Time 
and Perversion (1995). She contests that Derrida's description places at risk the concept 
of sexual difference (which is fundamental to the feminist project) and collapses it into 
sexual neutrality. The problem centres on what happens to the body in Derrida's text. 
Grosz validates Derrida's 'dream' of 'sexually marked voices' as 'worthy of careful 
consideration': each sex has the capacity to (and frequently does) play with, become, a 
number of different sexualities. However, this play is not ceaseless or 'protean' (as 
deconstruction would argue) but finds a limit to its possibilities in each (sexed) body 
(Space,, Time and Perversion, 77). Grosz reinstates here the framework of sexual 
difference, which implies an irreducible specificity of each sex relative to the other. This 
is not to pre-determine how one 'is' male or female, but to suggest an ineradicable rift 
between the two, in whatever forms they are lived. One can still live one's sexual 
indeterminacy, one's possibilities for being sexed otherwise, but this will be experienced 
differently, depending on whether one is male or female. At the most fundamental level, 
Grosz argues that each sex plays with a number of different sexualities, but cannot take 
on the body and sex of the other. 
It is notable that Derrida's text continually attempts to move beyond this limit or 
restriction, which is precisely marked as the site of the body: 
Of course, it is not impossible that desire for a sexuality without number can still 
protect us, like a dream, from an implacable destiny which immures everything for life 
in the figure 2. And should this merciless closure arrest desire at the wall of 
opposition, we would struggle in vain: there will never be but two sexes, neither one 
more nor one less. Tragedy would leave this strange sense, a contingent one finally, 
that we must affirm and learn to love instead of dreaming the innumerable. Yes, 
perhaps; why not? But where would the'dreamof the innumerable come from, if it is 
indeed a dream? Does the dream itself not prove that what is dreamt of must be there 
in order for it to provide the dream? Then, too, I ask you, what kind of a dance 
would there be, or would there be one at all, if the sexes were not exchanged 
according to rhythms that vary considerably? In a quite rigorous sense; the exchange 
alone could not suffice either, however, because the desire to escape the combinatory 
itself, to invent incalculable choreographies, would remain. (Choreographies', 455- 
456) 
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It is not enough that the 'sexes',, irreducible to each other, should 'exchange' their 
differing 'rhythms' in a 'dance' which respects otherness and difference. This does not 
'suffice' for Derrida, who desires only the 'incalculable choreographies' arising out of the 
protean motility of deconstruction. 
The second problem with Derrida's 'choreographic' project is outlined by Bordo, 
in Unbearable Weight. She provides a comprehensive and insightful criticism of 
Derrida's enterprise, which reveals the project to be self-contradictory. Again the 
problem centres on what happens to the body in Derrida's text. Deconstructionist 
postmodernism thus arises out of a critique of the ideal of disembodied knowledge. 
Traditional (most particularly Cartesian) images of knowing conceptualize the body as a 
site of epistemological limitation, as that which fixes the knower in time and space and 
therefore relativizes perception and thought. Transcendence of the body is required if 
one is to achieve an objective view, which is undistorted by human perspective. For 
deconstructionist theorists, there is no escape from the human perspective, and they 
accordingly emphasize the continual processes of the human making and remaking of the 
world. The body is accordingly reconceived: no longer an obstacle to knowledge, it 
becomes a vehicle by which the human subject is able to constantly shift location, and it 
reveals endlessly new points of view (Bordo, 226-227). 
However, Bordo indicates that this enterprise is animated by its own 'dream' of 
attaining an epistemological perspective which is free of the limitations of embodied 
existence - in this instance, the locatedness of the body. Bordo argues that 
deconstruction paradoxically practises as radical a denial of the actual nature and 
limitations of the body as the Cartesianism against which it defines itself The metaphor 
of dance is profoundly implicated in this deconstructionist project, and is particularly 
problematic in its entry into critical theory. The metaphor of dance has provided 
deconstructionist theorists with an image for the mobile and protean body. However, 
reading the dancing body 'otherwise', it is clear that the protean movements and activity 
of deconstruction require the installation of a limit. Grosz has indicated that the 
incalculable 'sexed voices' of Derrida's dream find a limit in the sexed nature of the body. 
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In a similar way, Bordo locates a limit to the dancer's movements, so that it is impossible 
to go everywhere and to become anyone: it denies the body's inherent locatedness in 
space and time. This acknowledgement of a limit, a point beyond which the dancer 
cannot go, also entails an appreciation of difference: if the dancer is not able to travel 
everywhere, then difference is possible as something that eludes. The epistemological 
fantasy of limitless multiple embodiments, and dancing from place to place and from self 
to self, thus places at risk not only the notion of difference, but also the body itself 
What sort of body is it that is free to change its shape and location at will, that 
can become anyone and travel anywhere? If the body is a metaphor for our 
locatedness in space and time and thus for the finitude of human perception and 
knowledge, then the postmodem body is no body at all. 
The deconstructionist erasure of the body is not effected, as it is in the Cartesian 
version, by a trip to 'nowhere', but by a resistance to the recognition that one is 
always somewhere, and limited. Here, it becomes clear that to overcome Cartesian 
hubris it is not sufficient to replace metaphors of spectatorship with metaphors of 
dance; it is necessary to relinquish all fantasies of epistemological conquest, not only 
those that are soberly fixed on necessity and unity but also those that are intoxicated 
with possibility and plurality. (Bordo, 229) 
Derrida (rightly) argued that woman should not be confined to any 'one place', 
but should possess her own freedom of motility; however, his project of deconstruction 
also challenges the very 'idea of the locus and the place', so that woman must 'dance 
otherwise' (Choreographies', 443). The problem for feminism is that in this protean and 
shifting'other realm', woman is without a place: in a familiar move, she is denied a space 
of becoming through modes of expression based in her own lived experience. The 
incorporation of dance into critical and cultural theory, practised by deconstructionists in 
the 1980's, has thus now been revealed as a radical denial of the inherent qualities of the 
body itself, and of the potential of dance as a conceptual framework. Critics in the field 
of dance studies are calling for a new articulation of dance in critical theory, which is 
respectful of the structures of dance performance. In the 'Introduction' to Corporealities 
(1996), a volume of essays in contemporary dance studies, Susan Leigh Foster asserts: 
The essays in this volume refuse to let bodies be used merely as vehicles or 
instruments for the expression of something else. They acknowledge that bodies 
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always gesture towards other fields of meaning, but at the same time instantiate both 
Physical mobility and articulability. 5 
Susan Leigh Foster argues that dance in critical theory has thus far been a 'mute event', 
incorporated not for its inherent interest, but as a mode of exploring 'more concrete data 
or more abstract concepts' (Foster, xii). She urges that dance be aflowed its own 
'articulability'; if critical attention is paid to the dynamics of dance performance - 'the 
body's spatial, temporal and tensile qualities, the patterns of shape and rhythm it 
constructs alone and alongside other bodies' - then dance is able to lend a new exactitude 
to the widespread use of the body as a critical term in contemporary cultural theory 
(Foster, xi). 
Janet Wolff supplements this by a consideration of dance in relation to feminist 
theory. In her 'Foreword' to Christy Adair's volume Women and Dance: Sylphs and 
Sirens (1992), she observes the potential of dance in feminist studies: 
Most importantly, feminist cultural studies can begin from the insistence of some 
writers that we start from the body, and consider the role of dance, and the potential 
of dance, in the project of a feminist cultural politics. Here, I am thinking less of so- 
called French feminism,, with its various calls to a politics of the body (with the dual 
risks, often pointed out, of essentialism and mysticism associated with this project), 
but rather of the more pragmatic formulations of those who work with Adrienne 
Rich's recommendation of a 'politics of location', firmly grounded in the corporeal 
experience. But bodies are not static. A feminist analysis of the dance can expand 
this work to demonstrate the nature and power of the moving body and the dancing 
body. (Wolff, xii) 
Dance is able to provide a conceptual framework in which to theorize the 'performativity' 
of the body. It is able to analyse the 'nature and power of the moving body' in a mode 
which is 'firmly grounded in the corporeal experience'. In relation to gender, dance 
mobilizes an exploration of the ways in which the sexed body moves in space and time, 
the patterns of shape and rhythm it constructs both alone and in interaction with other 
bodies. Dance as performance opens up a space in which the sexed body is able to 
express its own range of movement potential, or to live out its difference. 
5 Susan Leigh Foster, 'Introduction', CoMgrealities: Dancing KnowlOge, Culture and Power ed. Susan 
Leigh Foster, (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), xi-xvii, (p. xi). Further references to this 
preface are given after quotations in the text. 
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This new incorporation of dance into feminist critical studies is not the project of 
a feminist deconstruction but of a feminist phenomenology. Phenomenology (like 
deconstruction) bases its investigations within the limited and partial human perspective; 
it does not attempt to transcend the body, but locates the subject in time and space, and 
perception and thought are accordingly relativized. However, it also recognizes the 
locatedness and limitations of bodily existence; it adheres to a 'politics of location, firn-fly 
grounded in the corporeal experience' (Wolff, xii). Unlike deconstruction, it does not 
succumb to 'dreams' of endless relocation and proteanism of form, and it therefore 
provides a productive theoretical model by which notions of bodily difference may be 
conceptualized and articulated. 
In Space, Time and Perversion,, Grosz indicates an urgent need for feminist 
studies to incorporate the insights of phenomenology. She argues that an exploration of 
the conceptions of space and time is essential to the feminist project, for women have 
largely been denied a space and time of their own. This enterprise is inextricable from 
the exploration of corporeality. Grosz points out that not only is the body always 
understood within the spatio-temporal context; but more importantly, space and time 
only remain conceivable insofar as corporeality provides the basis for their perception 
and representation Space, Time and Perversion, 84). Grosz is crucially incorporating 
into her analysis at this point the phenomenological insight that phenomenal space or 
lived space (the ways in which the body's movement and orientation organizes the 
surrounding space as a continuous extension of its own being) is prior to objective space 
(the uniform space of geometry and science, in which all positions are external to one 
another and interchangeable). According to Merleau-Ponty, temporality and spatiality 
are inherent structures of the human consciousness-body, more abstract notions of 
objective time and space are built up on the foundation of immediate, lived experience. 
Merleau-Ponty thus summarizes his discussion of the phenomenon of space- Everything 
throws us back on to the organic relations between the subject and space, to that gearing 
of the subject to his world which is the origin of space' (Phenomenology of Perception, 
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25 1). Grosz accordingly argues that the sense of spatiality is derived not from an 
objective and external ftamework, but from the lived experience of the body- 
Form and size, direction, centeredness (centricity), location, dimension and 
orientation are derived from perceptual relations. These are not conceptual 
impositions on space, but our ways of living as bodies in space. They derive from the 
particular relations the subject has to objects and events; for example, its perceptions 
ofsounds... Their correlation with tactile and visual sensations forms the basic ideas 
of localization and orientation; place and position are defined with reference to the 
apparent immediacy of a lived here-and-now. These are not reflective or scientific 
properties of space but are effects of the necessity that we live and move in space as 
bodies in relation to other bodies. (Space, Time and Perversion, 93) 
The phenomenological insight that lived space is prior to objective space is vital to the 
feminist project which Grosz defines. It not only implies that by changing phenomenal 
space, alteration can also be effected in the way that objective space is conceptualized. 
More radically, it places in question the very possibility of 'objective' space, which is 
fundamentally challenged by the suggestion that space might be a subjective category. 
The vital concept for Grosz in relation to phenomenal space is that it does not 
become comprehensible to the subject by being the space of movement; rather, it only 
becomes space through movement itself (Space, Time and Perversion, 92). Phenomenal 
space arises out of the motility of the body, and the lived relations of space emerge out 
of the body's capacity for motion and the intentional relations which that motion 
constitutes. In short, the ways in which the subject 'performs' movement are able to 
effect alteration in spatial perception. Operating within this phenomenological 
framework, causing a shift in the ways in which the female subject performs movement 
and occupies and creates space, would also effect change on the cultural level at which 
space is occupied and shared out: 
The project ahead, or one of them, is to return women to those places from 
which they have been dis- or re-placed or expelled, to occupy those positions - 
especially those which are not acknowledged as positions - partly in order to show 
men's invasion and occupancy of the whole of space, of space as their own and thus 
the constriction of spaces available to women, and partly in order to be able to 
experiment with and produce the possibility of occupying, dwelling or living in new 
spaces, which in their turn help generate new perspectives, new bodies, new ways of 
inhabiting. (Space. Time and Perversion, 124) 
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Dance theorist Christy Adair acknowledges that this alteration and exploration of 
movement capacity is important to the feminist project: 'It can be an important aspect of 
change to alter physical behaviour patterns, for example, so that women take up more 
space and men stop invading women's space ... 16 However she warns against employing 
such action as a substitute for changing the social order, rather than as an intermediate 
step towards it. What Adair crucially misses at this point is the feminist 
phenomenological insight that the two modes are indissoluble from each other. Gender 
is theorized as a mode of 'performativity', so that gender relations at the broadest cultural 
level arise out of the modes in which the sexed body moves, and occupies and creates 
space. 
In creating a feminist phenomenology, Grosz thus prioritizes the lived experience 
of the body. Phenomenal space (which arises out of bodily motility and intentionality) is 
prior to and constitutive of 'objective' space, the possibility of which is thereby radically 
placed at risk. A vital theoretical implication of this conceptual framework is that it 
allows for difference between the male and female conceptions of space and time. Grosz 
indicates that unless the possibility is explored that women may operate on a different 
space-time framework to men, then there is a risk that (once again) women will not 
occupy a viable space and time of their own: 
It is not clear that men and women conceive of space or time in the same way, 
whether their experiences are neutrally presented within dominant mathematical and 
physics models, and what the space-time framework appropriate to women, or to the 
two sexes might be. One thing remains clear: in order to reconceive bodies, and to 
understand the kinds of active interrelations possible between (lived) representations 
of the body and (theoretical) representations of space and time, the bodies of each sex 
need to be accorded the possibility of a different space-time framework. 
To transform the castrated, lacking, inadequate representation of female 
corporeality, not only do the relations between the sexes and the dominance of 
masculine [sic] in the formation of universal models need to be questioned, the 
overarching context of space-time, within which bodies function and are conceived 
also needs serious revision. The possibility of further alternatives must be explored... 
This may amount to a scientific and conceptual revolution alongside sociopolitical 
transformations, but without questioning basic notions of space and time, the inherent 
masculinity of the 'hard sciences' and of philosophical speculation will proliferate 
6 Christy Adair, Women and Dance: Sý-Iphs and Sirens, (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), p. 
33. Further references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
161 
under the banner of the human. Women, once again, may be granted no space or 
time of their own. (Space, Time and Perversio , 100- 10 1) 
Grosz is explicit here that the project of feminist phenomenology is not merely 'to 
understand the kinds of interrelations possible between (lived) representations of the 
body and (theoretical) representations of space and time', but by 'reconceiving' the body, 
to challenge and dispute theoretical conceptions of space-time. Once again phenomenal 
space, or the organization and creation of space by the body's movement and orientation, 
is prioritized. 
Grosz is clear that in feminist phenomenology it is imperative to accord the body 
of each sex the possibility of a different mode of inhabiting and moving in space. It is 
also vital to acknowledge, however, that this recognition of difference extends to the 
level of the space-time framework: if it is allowed that there are particular modalities of 
feminine bodily comportment and motility, then it follows that there are also particular 
modes of feminine spatiality and temporality. The foremost proponent of a feminist 
phenomenological standpoint is the theorist, Iris Marion Young. In her most widely 
known article, 'Throwing Like a Girl' (1989), she incorporates her reading of 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty into a feminist theoretical framework. 7 The 
essay provides a comprehensive phenomenological description of the 'castrated, lacking, 
inadequate' modes of feminine motility, which are experienced and lived by women in a 
predominantly patriarchal culture (Grosz, Space, Time and Perversion,, 100). It also 
reveals the failure of traditional phenomenology to take into account the notion of 
difference, in relation to the lived experience of the (always) gendered body. 
Young bases her feminist phenomenology on the same challenge to the objective 
space-time framework which has been so eloquently articulated by Grosz. She quotes 
the findings of 'numerous psychological studies' which indicate that there is a difference 
in the conceptualization of space between the sexes: 
7 iris Marion Young, -Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, 
Motility and Spatiality', The Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern French Philosoph, . Jeffner m -A eds Allen and iris Marion Young. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 51-70. 
Further references to this article are given after quotations in the text. 
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There have been numerous psychological studies which have reported differences 
between the sexes in the character of spatial perception. One of the most frequently 
discussed of these conclusions is that females are more often 'field dependent'. That 
is, it has been claimed that males have a greater capacity for lifting a figure out of its 
spatial surroundings and viewing relations in space as fluid and interchangeable, 
whereas females have a greater tendency to regard figures as embedded within and 
fixed by their surroundings. ('Throwing Like a Girl', 64) 
These scientific researches reveal that in relation to objective space, women do not 
perceive a fluid system of potentially alterable and interchangeable relations, but instead 
experience 'closures of immobility and fixity' ('Throwing Like a Girl', 64). In line with 
her phenomenological project, Young indicates that this 'objective space' is underpinned 
by a difference in phenomenal or lived space, which is prior to and constitutive of 
theoretical categories. Her essay reveals that the 'field dependency' of women in 
psychological studies is indissoluble from a specifically feminine bodily motility and 
comportment. Like Grosz, she grounds her analysis in the lived experience of the body 
and consequently conceives of space as a subjective category. The spatiality which is 
perceived by woman therefore derives from her living her bodily motility as enclosed or 
confining, and experiencing her body to be positioned, outside of her own intentionality. 
Young takes as her starting point a study by the eminent psychological 
phenomenologist Erwin Straus, in which he remarks on the notable differences in the 
style of throwing between the two sexes. She quotes Erwin Straus as follows: 
The girl of five does not make any use of lateral space. She does not stretch her 
arm sideward; she does not twist her trunk; she does not move her legs, which remain 
side by side. All she does in preparation for throwing is to lift her right arm forward 
to the horizontal and to bend the forearm backward in a pronate position... The ball 
is released without force, speed or accurate aim... A boy of the same age, when 
preparing to throw, stretches his right arm sideward and backward; supinates the 
forearm, twists, turns and bends his trunk; and moves his right foot backward. From 
this stance, he can support his throwing with almost the full strength of his total 
motorium... The ball leaves his hand with considerable acceleration; it moves toward 
its goal in a long flat curve. (7hrowing Like a Girl', 5 1) 
What Young finds remarkable in Straus' observations is the inadequacy of his 
explanation. He refers to a 'feminine attitude' in relation to space and to performing 
movement, which is explained by the tautological fact that girls are 'feminine' ('Throwing 
Like a Girl', 52). What surprises Young in this transparently inadequate account is its 
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phenomenological context. It derives from a perspective which takes bodily 
comportment and motility as decisive for the structure and meaning of human lived 
experience; yet faced with a 'remarkable difference' between masculine and feminine 
styles of body comportment and movement, the phenomenologist entirely fails to 
describe the modalities, meaning and implications of this difference (7hrowing Like a 
Girl', 52). Young's project is therefore to 'begin to fill a gap that thus exists both in 
existential phenomenology and feminist theory' ('Throwing Like a Girl', 53). In a novel 
blend of feminism and phenomenology, she aims to trace the basic modalities of feminine 
bodily comportment, the manner in which women move and their relation to space, and 
to bring intelligibility and significance to this description. This project is not a denial of, 
but a postscript to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. as account of the 
relation of the lived body to its environment applies to the male experience of acting in 
the world. However, there is a particular style of bodily comportment which typifies the 
ways in which women act in the world, and this style consists of particular modalities of 
the lived experience which Merleau-Ponty outlined. 
Straus' description of 'throwing like a girl' reveals two characteristic modalities of 
the female performance of bodily movement. Firstly, there is a failure to make ful-1 use of 
the body's spatial and lateral possibilities. In throwing, the girl does not stretch her arm 
sideways, twist her trunk, or extend her legs. This also typifies women's locomotor 
movements, which are much more constricted than those of men, so that the movement 
of legs and arms is restricted and less space occupied. Secondly, each sex typically 
performs bodily movement differently in approaching tasks. The girl of five only 
prepares for the activity of throwing by adjusting that part of her body which is most 
intimately connected with the task; in this instance, her arms. The boy, however, 
positions his body so that his action is supported with almost the full strength of his body 
as a whole. This typifies the female performance of physical tasks, so that the full 
possibilities of muscular co-ordination, poise, position and bearing are not realized. The 
third characteristic of female motility is that it typically experiences the space available 
for movement as a constricted space. An imagined space surrounds women in 
164 
movement which they do not feel free to move beyond. This is exemplified in 'catching 
like a girl', an activity in which women will typically wait for an object to enter their 
immediate bodily field, rather than move out towards it. Young suggests that the 
woman experiences herself as positioned in space, so that she will remain partly 
immobile in the performance of a task which requires the movement of the whole body. 
In line with her phenomenological project, Young does not merely describe these 
modes in which women move and occupy space (this would be to arrest the project at 
the level which Straus reached), but also brings intelligibility and significance to this 
description. She argues that the lived body which Merleau-Ponty describes in The 
Phenomenology of Perception acts in an open and unbroken intentionality on the world. 
The lived body is the continuous calling forth of capacities which are applied to the 
world. As I have emphasized it is a skilled body, which acts on a pre-reflective or 
automatic level. One of the reasons which Young articulates for the characteristic 
modes of female bodily performance is that women are typically unpractised in using the 
body and performing tasks. Lacking in physical skills, the woman must approach tasks 
on a reflective level, which manifests itself in a movement performance which is timid, 
uncertain,, hesitant. The body, while understanding the intentional act, is not yet able to 
co-ordinate its gestures to realize that act. Attention is divided between intention (the 
aim to be realized in motion) and the body which must accomplish it. In this reflective 
mode, concentration is directed on the body, to ensure that it is performing correctly, 
rather than on achieving an aim through the body ('Throwing Like a Girl', 57). This lack 
of physical skill is undoubtedly a valid problem for women in the performance of tasks; 
there is still a need for reform in the movement education of women, so that their bodies 
can be experienced as a site of skilled activity. However, I would add that the woman's 
body is highly skilled in areas, such as childcare, which are not recognized in a male- 
dominated society as skilled labour, and so are not accorded an economic status. It is 
only as women are able to 'reconceive' their own bodily performances as skilled, and 
therefore as labour, that a transformation can be effected in social space, and the home 
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(the 'woman's place'), as well as the male workplace, can accordingly be 
reconceptualized as a shared space of labour. 
In Merleau-Ponty's description of the lived body, it unproblematically moves out 
to master a world which is constituted by its own intentions and projections. The lived 
body also exists as a material thing, like other objects in the world, but is normally only 
experienced as such at times of dysfunction - either in times of pain or illness, when the 
body insists on its own material existence; or in the process of learning a new skill. 
However, Young contends that for women the body is more often lived as an object, 
which is other to the subject or alien to its intentions. This is due to its location within 
patriarchal culture as an object which exists to be looked at and acted upon. Woman 
learns to live out her existence as physically inhibited, confined, positioned and 
objectified, which problematizes the relation to the lived body ('Throwing Like a Girl', 
62). 
In relation to phenomenal space, the woman therefore typically lives out a 
contradictory experience. As a subject, the woman lives her body as intentionality, so 
that she actively constitutes space and projects spatial relations and positions in accord 
with her intentions. However in living her bodily existence as an object, she experiences 
herself to be already positioned in space, by co-ordinates which are outside of her own 
intentional capacities. This contradictory relation to the lived body results in the 
emergence of what Young terms a 'double spatiality' ('Throwing Like a Girl', 63). In 
Merleau-Ponty's account, the uninhibited intentionality of the lived body projects an aim 
to be accomplished and calls forth the body's capacities, in an unbroken performance. 
The unity of intention and bodily movement creates an immediate link between the body 
and the surrounding space, such that the bodily performance structures or creates its 
own perceptions of spatiality, as the projection of future possibilities and capacities for 
action ('Throwing Like a Girl', 59-60). However, in the female performance of 
movement a discontinuity typically arises between intention, and the bodily movement 
called forth in order to realize the aim projected. Young terms this disjunction between 
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aim and enactment an 'inhibited intentionality' ('Throwing Like a Girl', 58). In relation to 
phenomenal space, this results in the emergence of a corresponding 'double spatiahty': 
In feminine existence there is a double spatiali1y as the space of the 'here' which is 
distinct from the space of the 'yonder'. A distinction between space which is 'yonder' 
and not linked with my own body possibilities, and the enclosed space which is 'here', 
which I inhabit with my bodily possibilities, is an expression of the discontinuity 
between aim and the capacity to realize the aim which I have articulated as the 
meaning of the tentativeness and uncertainty which characterize the inhibited 
intentionality of feminine motility. The space of the 'yonder' is a space in which 
feminine existence projects possibilities in the sense of understanding that 'someone' 
could move within it, but not 1. Thus the space of the 'yonder' exists for feminine 
existence, but only as that which she is looking into, rather than moving in. 
('Throwing Like a Girl, 63) 
Women thus typically experience their own performance space to be enclosed or 
restricted. Spatiality is 'doubled', so that there is an outer radius which others use and 
inhabit, while it is only in the enclosed space which is 'here' that the woman is able to act 
out her possibilities. Young has clearly demonstrated that this spatial perception is 
embedded in the 'inhibited intentionality' which characterizes the female performance of 
bodily movement. This in turn emerges out of the objectification of the woman's body, 
which is such a foundational structure of modes of patriarchy. 
Young closes her essay with a recognition of the limitation of her analysis: she 
has concentrated only on those bodily activities which are skilled tasks, and which 
mobilize the whole body in movement ('Throwing Like a Girl', 67). She suggests that a 
fuller account of woman's lived experience would explore the body in its sexual aspect, 
as well as structured body movement which is less task-oriented - for example, dancing. 
As I have indicated, dance possesses a highly transformative potential, which is able to 
radically explore and expand movement awareness and capacity. Dance theorist 
Margaret H' Doubler eloquently describes the ability of dance to transform bodily 
movement and thereby to effect change in spatial perceptions. She provides a moving 
afterword to Young's descriptions of the 'double spatiality,, which typifies the female 
lived experience within the patriarchal system- 
Sensitivity to spac is another important factor contributing to the emotive 
power of movement. Essentially it is an awareness of the variety of directions that 
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the body and its parts can take when moving through space. It is a feeling of 'out- 
thereness'. It is a sense of relationship between the self and space, considered as 
extensiveness rather than as something having boundaries-' 
It is clear that for IT Doubler the performance of dance movement involves the body in 
open and direct action in the world, which affects the perception of spatiality, so that it is 
experienced as 'extensiveness', rather than as 'something having boundaries'. There is, 
however, a problem in relation to dance which is integral to the notion of performance. 
It thus refers not only to the mode or manner in which an activity or movement is carried 
out, but also to the presentation or display of the body in the performance of dance. In 
this sense, dance risks objectifying the body once more, or subjecting it to the gaze. 
In Sexes and Genealogies (1993), Luce Irigaray is concerned with precisely this 
problem of 'performance', which is Teconceived' in relation to female subjectivity, so that 
it is no longer linked with the display of the body and subjection to the gaze, but is a 
mode of becoming through an exploration of the manner in which a movement is carried 
out. 9 Young has argued that the objectifying regard in which women are commonly held 
in patriarchal culture, can account for the spatial modality of being positioned and for the 
spatial restriction of women's motility: to open her body in free and active extension and 
outward directedness only invites objectification. It also furnishes an explanation for the 
'double' nature that frequently characterizes the female lived experience. As a 
subjectivity, woman is unable to live herself as a mere, objectified body; however, 
experiencing her body as objectified, she cannot be in unity with herself, but must take 
distance from and exist in discontinuity with her body. This is manifested in the woman's 
characteristic relation to her body as one of self-consciousness. Young also indicates 
that this objectified bodily existence is exemplified not only in the attitude of others 
regarding her, but is also lived by the woman herself, who often takes up her body as an 
object. In her relation with the mirror, the body is often gazed on by the woman as an 
object, rather than as a living manifestation (7hrowing Like a Girl', 66-67). 
8 Margaret N. H' Doubler, Dance: A Creative Art Eagriencc, (Madison, Milwaukec and London: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 139. 
9 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies ' trans. Gillian C. Gill, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993). Further references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
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It is this problem of women's relation to the visible which is taken up by Irigaray 
in Sexes and Genealogies, where she suggests that female lived experience is much 
nearer to the sense of touch,, and should therefore be reconceptualized. In a revealing 
passage she describes the woman's relation with the mirror as one of objectification,, 
which causes a crucial splitting or fracture: 
We look at ourselves in the mirror to please someone, rarely to interrogate the 
state of our body or our spirit, rarely for ourselves and in search of our own 
becoming. The mirror almost always serves to reduce us to a pure exteriority - of a 
very particular kind. It functions as a possible way to constitute screens between the 
other and myself In a way quite different from the mucous membranes or the skin 
that serve as living, porous, fluid media to achieve communion as well as difference, 
the mirror is a frozen - and polemical - weapon to keep us apart. I give only my 
double up to love. I do not yield myself up as body, flesh, as immediate - and 
geological, genealogical - affects. The mirror signifies the constitution of a fabricated 
(female) other that I shall put forward as an instrument of seduction in my place. 
(Sexes and Genealogie , 65) 
There are two modes of splitting enacted here - there is a fracture of relationship 
between 'the other and myself, but this itself derives from a 'doubling' of the subject, so 
that it is the body as object which is offered to the other, while subjectivity is held back. 
However, even this description is inadequate to Irigaray's meaning, for in this process of 
objectification, there can be no subjectivity. For Irigaray, the (gendered) subjectivity is a 
mode of performance in space, and the mirror frequently acts as a 'superficial' mode of 
performance, which does not 'relate to space and to other people', and hence is not a 
mode of 'becoming' - it is not related to subjectivity: 
Though necessary at times as a separating tool, the mirror - and the gaze when it 
acts as a mirror - ought to remain a means and not an end that enforces my 
obedience. The mirror should support, not undermine my incarnation. All too often 
it sends back superficial, flat images. There are other images that generate volume 
better than the reflection in the glass. To work at beauty is at least as much a matter 
of working at gestures as they relate to space and to other people as it is a matter of 
gazing, usually in anxiety, at one's mirror. The mirror freezes our becoming breath, 
our becoming space. (Sexes and Genealogies, 65) 
Ifigaray is therefore not opposed to 'mirroring' per se as a mode of performance 
of the self, but it is a mode which should 'support... incarnation'; it should not be 
relegated to the purely visual. She is concerned here to 'reconceive' the bodily 
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performance which underlies subjectivity (our mode of 'becoming'), so that it signifies 
not the display of the self to the gaze, but an exploration of the quality and manner of 
movement performance. A related passage in An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993) 
clarifies Irigaray's meaning: 'As for mirrors, they give access to another order of the 
visible. Cold, icy, frozen-freezing, and with no respect for the vital, operative qualities 
of laterality'. 10 Bodily performance in space (or an exploration of the 'operative qualities 
of laterality' in bodily motility), is vital to the formation of gendered subjectivity. 
Particularly close to Irigaray's concentration on the sensation and bodily experience of 
the performer is the notion of 'mirroring' activated in sessions of Dance Movement 
Therapy. This is a technique of reflecting back to the patient his or her own movement, 
but it is a process which is primarily concerned with the development of motility in 
space. Kristina Stanton-Jones describes the procedure as follows: 
Mirroring is not simply imitating or mimicking the patient's movement; it is a 
sympathetic reflection and a structure in which interaction can take place. [Marion] 
Chace's knowledge of dance enabled her to extract the quality of the movement and 
subtly extend it, or take it to a conclusion. This broadened the patients' expressive 
movement potential, because their movement altered as they interacted with her. 
Mirroring also elicits more movement, and promotes movement dialogue... 
... 
The nature of synchrony and mirroring in DMT interaction is not merely 
'copying' another's behaviour, but rather constitutes a system of complementary 
complex fluctuations in various movement elements (effort-shape, attitude, body 
posture, gesture, etc. ); this means that the therapist is not only reflecting the patients' 
movements, but is actively entering into a nonverbal dialogue and interaction with 
them... In DMT, the therapist mirrors some aspects of the patients' movements, while 
retaining elements of their [sic. ] own movement style. This means that patients 
perceive the therapists' movements as in sympathy with... their own. Dance 
movement therapists are therefore taught to recognize their own effort-shape profiles, 
and they gain extensive experience in active mirroring of movement. (Stanton-Jones, 
16 & 74) 
In contrast to Irigaray's description of the woman's relation with the mirror in the realm 
of the visible, 'mirroring' in Dance movement Therapy operates on the level of 
#expressive movement' (the body is related to subjectivity and not distanced from it as an 
object); and consequently there is no fracturing of the relationship between self and other 
10 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 170. 
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- there is a 'movement dialogue' and an 'interaction' between therapist and patient. In 
terms of bodily performance, 'mirroring' enables a 'broadening' or an expansion of 
movement potential and capacities; it is therefore a mode of 'becoming'. The entry of 
dance into critical theory therefore acts in a dynamic and challenging way - if the 
gendered subjectivity is conceived as a mode of performance in space, it provides a locus 
in which bodily motility and its constitution of the surrounding space can be explored, 
and transformation potentially effected. 
WEIGHTY MATTER(S) 
In 1988, a space was opened up specifically for the exploration of the 
performance of gender, when a 'roundtable discussion' was staged to debate the 
problematic relation between movement and gender in dance. II Contributors to the 
discussion included the choreographer Arthur Jones, who explores issues relating to the 
(male) homosexual body and its performances of gender, in his dance company, the 
Jones-Zane Company, which he created in collaboration with Arnie Zane. The other 
participant was Johanna Boyce, who has worked since the mid-1980's with an all-female 
dance company of largely untrained dancers, and experimented with movement to 
explore relationships between and among women. The discussion was chaired by dance 
theorist, Ann Daly. 
My primary interest in this discussion lies in the observations made by Johanna 
Boyce. She appears to be attempting to articulate in the discussion an exciting and 
challenging vision of women's performance of gender, which has emerged in her own 
explorations of movement in dance performance. She gestures first towards the 
'detailed' and 'miniaturized' mode of motility which typically characterizes women's 
movement quality (Boyce and others, 98). She explicitly connects this to the 'masculine 
gaze', as a source of the positioning and restriction of feminine motility (Boyce and 
IIA transcript of this discussion is contained in Johanna Boyce, Ann Daly, Bill T. Jones and Carol 
Martin, 'Movement and Gender: A Roundtable Discussion', The Drama Review, 32, (1988), 82-101. 
Further references to this article are gi%, en after quotations in the text. 
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others, 100). However, in a notable passage in the debate, Boyce also gestures beyond 
this sense of objectification: 
There's something about bearing a child that really freed me up to feel myself in a 
way that was different from feeling myself observed, in the way that I felt defined by 
the masculine gaze for a lot of my experience... I felt like a very powerful terminal 
station emanating controls and strengths. (Boyce and others, 100) 
She clearly posits the experience of pregnancy as a liberation from the processes of 
objectification of the female body. This may initially appear to be an essentializing 
gesture: in a familiar move, woman is reduced to her reproductive capacity. However, 
in a conceptual framework which theorizes gender as a mode of bodily performance in 
space, this interpretation can be radically reviewed. It is clear that for Boyce, pregnancy 
is seen in this framework as a uniquely female mode of bodily performance: 
I see dance as primarily the embodiment of feelings... For me, woman relates to 
what I can do and how my experience is different ftom what man is. And that's 
different from what personness is. There's a lot of personness we share, but I can 
bear children. That experience taught me a lot about my differences from men. And 
how that informs my dance work is not so much physical as it is emotional. (Boyce 
and others, 99) 
For Boyce, dance performance arises out of her own bodily experience and skills (it is 
'what I can do'). Much of this experience is felt by Boyce to be neutral in gender terms 
(arising out of 'personness'); pregnancy, however, is an unambiguously female mode of 
performance. Furthermore, it is posited by Boyce as an 'emotional experience; it is 
outside of the processes of objectification, which fracture the unity of the subject. It is 
experienced by Boyce as an intimate connection of her (female) body with her 
subjectivity. 
Boyce is also explicit in stating the precise quality with which pregnancy is able 
to invest female movement: she refers to a sense of weightedness or 'solidness', which 
recurs throughout her articulations of the motility of the female body (Boyce and others, 
94). it is from this gravitational sense that pregnancy provides, that she is able to 
emanate 'controls and strengths' and to feel 'powerful' (Boyce and others, 100). In her 
study of women's relation to dance, Christy Adair broadens this relation between 
pregnancy and dance performance. For her, too, pregnancy becomes an invaluable 
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resource of discovery about the female body. Not only this, but it is explicitly related to 
modes of bodily performance, for she regards it as especially 'beneficial for the dancer' 
(Adair, 48). It provides a unique source of exploration in movement, a means by which 
the body image can be significantly enriched. Her example again emphasizes a sense of 
weightedness or 'gravity' as a mode of bodily movement which is specifically associated 
with the female lived experience. She indicates that one dancer discovered in pregnancy 
that for the first time in her career,, she 'really located her sense of gravity' (Adair, 48). 
Pregnancy here figures for the dancer as an alternative mode of bodily performance to 
dance, which supplements her ability to move her body in space, and expands her body- 
image awareness. 
Adair also indicates that in contemporary dance, pregnancy acts not only as an 
alternative and supplementary mode of bodily performance, but is also incorporated into 
the dance performance itself (Adair, 48). In this context, it is aimed specifically at the 
objectification of the female body by the male gaze. The pregnant body is frequently 
conceptualized as fragile, ungainly and limited in movement. it is typically positioned in 
space and restricted in movement. By incorporating the pregnant body into 
contemporary dance performance, an alternative choreography is produced, which 
reveals the grace, strength and range of movement which the pregnant body performs. It 
acts as a mode by which women are 'reconceptualizing' their bodies and movement 
performances, and is indissoluble from the transformation of cultural space. 
Performance of this unambiguously gendered body therefore begins to transform spatial 
polarities and to claim for itself a new space. It publicly displays in the performance 
space of dance a body which is frequently concealed and is primarily associated with 
private and domestic or clinical spaces. 
In an article entitled 'Pregnant Embodiment' (1984), Iris Marion Young has 
discussed the experience of pregnancy in relation to phenomenology and the lived 
experience of the (specifically female) body. 12 She argues that pregnancy provides a 
12 iris Marion Young, 'Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation'. Joumal of Medicine and 
philq5pý, 9, (1984), 45-62. My page references refer to the reprinted version in Iris Marion Young, 
(Bloomington and 
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unique mode of exploration of bodily motility, which can significantly only be allied to 
the performance modes of dance. She challenges the traditional conceptions of 
pregnancy, in which it is frequently viewed in terms of a fracture or splitting of the 
subject. In this view, the 'integrity' or unity of the body is thereby undermined not only 
by the growth and development of another being within, but also by the radical changes 
in body boundaries that are experienced during the course of pregnancy. In 
phenomenological terms, these changes 'dislodge' the habitual uses of the body, and a 
new series of bodily postures and movements must be learnt and registered on the body 
image, to co-incide with the pregnant body: 
The integrity of my body is undermined in pregnancy not only by this externality 
of the inside, but also by the fact that the boundaries of my body are themselves in 
flux. In pregnancy I literally do not have a firm sense of where my body ends and the 
world begins. My automatic body habits become dislodged; the continuity between 
my customary body and my body at this moment is broken. In pregnancy my 
prepregnant body image does not entirely leave my movements and expectations, yet 
it is with the pregnant body that I must move. ('Pregnant Embodiment', 163-164) 
This heightened awareness of the body in movement has led to the pregnant body 
being positioned in a clinical or medical framework of understanding, so that the 
experience of pregnancy is conceptualized in the same way as illness or fatigue. In the 
healthy functioning of the body, there is an active relation to the world, and the body is a 
transparent medium for the enactment of the subject's aims. In illness, this instrumental 
relation to the world breaks down, and the body enters awareness as weighted material, 
which hinders and disallows the enactment of projects. The subject cannot attend to the 
physicality of the body and simultaneously use it as the means to the accomplishment of 
his or her aims. Pregnancy has been incorporated into this model of understanding, so 
that the unfamiliar weightedness and bulk of the body enters consciousness and prevents 
an active relation to the surrounding space- this is the view of pregnancy as pathology, 
The extent to which this view of pregnancy is implicated in a positioning of the 
female body, and a restriction of its modes of motility by the 'masculine gaze', is 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 160-176. Further references to this article are given after 
quotations in the text. 
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revealingly suggested in Drew Leder's phenomenological study, The Absent Body 
(1990). 13 In this text,, Leder devises a new vocabulary for articulating familiar 
phenomenological concepts. In the healthy functioning of the body, in which the body 
acts as a transparent medium for the accomplishment of the subject's intentions, Leder 
conceptualizes the body in terms of its absence or 'disappearance'. The body is only 
present or visible to the subject in dysfunctional states (in situations of pain, fatigue or 
illness) or in the mastering of a new skill. Its appearance to the subject is therefore 
tenned by Leder a 'dys-appearance, because it invariably signals a breakdown in the 
functioning of the body. The importance of Leder's description is the visual dynamic 
that is revealed to be foundational to this clinical model of understanding. It is the 
presence of this 'masculine gaze' in his text, which leads Leder to consistently mis-read 
Young's essay on 'Pregnant Embodiment'. He repeatedly construes pregnancy as a mode 
of 'dys-appearance' of the body, so that the material presence of the pregnant body to the 
female subject can only be viewed in terms of dysfunction. It either signals a mode of 
sickness or pathology or it is connected with the effort required in the learning of new 
bodily skills of comportment and motility. 
In wrriting of pregnancy, Leder starts from a close reading of Young's article; 
initially taking into account Young's arguments, he wams against locating pregnancy as a 
form of sickness or pathology. The clinical model of understanding may not be the most 
appropnate contex-t. for thinking about issues relating to pregnancy: 
There are possible dangers in assimilating such situations to the model of dys- 
appearance. Phenomena such as aging, puberty, menstruation, and pregnancy are a 
normal and necessary part of the life cycle. They are not in themselves dysfunctional 
or alienating. As such they should not be associated with the notions of bad' or 'ill' 
that comprise part of the Greek meaning of dys. As Young forcefully argues, it is 
only adult males in the middle years of life who experience health as an unchanging 
state. From this standpoint any noticable changes do indeed signal disruption and 
dysfunction. However, for the young and the aged, for adult women as opposed to 
men, normal body functioning includes regular and even extreme bodily shifts. 
Cultural prejudices lead us to forget or devalue such changes. Old age is frequently 
equated with deterioration. Pregnancy and childbirth tend to be subsumed into the 
13 Drew Leder, The Absent BL& (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1990). Further references to 
this book are given after quotations In the text. 
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medical paradigm as if they were dysfunctional states. Yet... aging and pregnancy can 
be times in which one develops a new closeness to and valuation of one's body. 
(Leder, 89-90) 
There is clear evidence of a conflict in this passage between Young's article and Leder's 
project. In the vocabulary of visual dynamics which Leder has employed for 
phenomenological states, there is a strong etymological suggestion that pregnancy 
should be allied to pathology: if it is a mode of 'dys-appearance', then it should logically 
conform to the notion of 'illness' that this suggests. Young's article 'forcefully' leads 
Leder's argument away from its natural conclusion. 
However, it is notable that by the close of his description of the state of 
pregnancy, Leder has incorporated Young's essay into his own argument. Pregnancy 
enters the mode of 'dys-appearance' as a pathological state (it is associated with 'a loss of 
normal, functional synergy') which is evidenced in a fracturing of the subject, so that 'the 
body is then experienced as away, apart, from the I' (Leder, 90). Leder thus focuses 
attention on precisely those aspects of pregnancy which are modes of sickness, even 
though these commonly form only a minor aspect of the total experience: 
Moreover, such states [i. e., pregnancy] frequently do include moments of 
discomfort and dysfunction, though this hardly characterizes them as a whole. There 
is the morning sickness of early pregnancy, the uncomfortable and impeding bulk that 
comes later, all culminating in delivery pains... All such phenomena play a part in 
bringing the body to dys-appearance at such times. (Leder, 90) 
There is clearly no sense in Leder's description of the surprising ease and grace of 
motility in the pregnant body: he is only able to conceptualize an 'uncomfortable and 
impeding bulk'. This leads him to interpret the pregnant body as a hindrance to the 
accomplishment of the subject's intentions. It renders 'problematic' (or subject to 
conscious reflection) actions which were 'previously tacit', and occurred on a pre- 
reflective level: 
The pregnant woman must attend to her body as its new functions and shape 
require alterations in patterns of movement, diet, sleep, etc. The very temporal and 
spatio-functional unity of her body are called into question... The assumption of a 
novel body renders problematic what was previously tacit. (Leder, 90) 
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By incorporating the experience of pregnancy into a visual dynamic, or 
subjecting it to the 'masculine gaze', Leder ornits the crucial insight of Young's analysis; 
namely, that pregnancy is a unique state in which an awareness of the materiality of the 
body does not impede the intentional performance of the subject. In a revealing passage, 
Leder summarizes the processes of construction of his theoretical project, in The Absent 
Body: 
Beginning from etymology, I have thus catalogued the diverse ways in which the 
dys-appearing body is away, apart, asunder. The body emerges at times when it is 
away from an ordinary or desirable state, as in times of pain and disease. The body 
then may be experienced as away, apart, from the T. This can arise from a loss of 
normal, functional synergy, such that bodily organs operate apart from each other in 
an uncoordinated fashion. Through processes of change the momentary body may 
also grow away, apart, from the habitual body. (Leder, 90) 
Arguably, Leder's failure to understand the significance of the experience of pregnancy 
arises from the origins of his project in a concern with linguistics, which implicated him 
in a visual dynamic ('Beginning with etymology. --')- 
Perhaps the only valid starting point 
for a phenomenological study is to locate its origins firmly in an understanding of the 
lived experience of the body. 
This is the starting point from which Young radically challenges the view of 
pregnancy as pathology. She argues that the heightened awareness of the bulk and 
weight of the body during pregnancy does not impede bodily performance, or the 
accomplishing of aims. In illness and pain, the body is alienated from consciousness and 
so emerges as an object. In pregnancy, however, the body emerges as a source of 
considerable interest for the subject, but is crucially not objectified: 
In attending to my pregnant body in such circumstances, I do not feel myself 
alienated from it, as in illness. I merely notice its borders and rumblings with interest, 
sometimes with pleasure, and this aesthetic interest does not divert me from my 
business. ('Pregnant Embodiment', 165). 
In phenomenological terms, this creates a paradox. Phenomenologically, movement 
must occur on either a pre-reflective or a reflective level. At times of pain or illness, or 
in learning a new skill, movement is consciously performed, and so operates at a 
reflective level. In habitual or skilled activity, movement is incorporated into the body 
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image and so occurs pre-reflectively. In the terms of the psychological phenomenologist 
Erwin Straus, movement can be phenomenologically located in one of two centres of 
activity - at a reflective level of activity it is centred in the 'head', while at a pre-reflective 
level, it is located in the 'trunk' (? regnant Embodiment', 165). For Young, however,, the 
experience of pregnancy is radically located in both centres of activity. For the pregnant 
woman, locomotor movement is performed with an awareness of the body ('Pregnancy 
makes me conscious of the physicality of my body'), but it is simultaneously functional 
and carries out her intention (her 'movement... gets her where she is going') ('Pregnant 
Embodiment', 165). 
The only analogy that Iris Marion Young can find for this alternative nature of 
movement in pregnancy, is that it constitutes 'a kind of dance' ('Pregnant Embodiment, 
165). The subject is aware of her body in movement, but this does not prevent her from 
simultaneously acting on the pre-reflective level, which is necessary for an expressive 
bodily performance. Young is fascinated by the intensely subjective quality of pregnant 
motility, so that the woman 'glides through space in an immediate openness', in a manner 
which she has only encountered before in dance movement (Pregnant Embodiment', 
165). Perhaps the re-conceptualization which is occurring here is of the modes of 
awareness of the body. Normally, the entry of the body into awareness is conceived of 
in highly visual terms, so that it immediately becomes an object. Young appears to 
suggest that in pregnancy the woman is able to experience an alternative mode of the 
entry of the body into consciousness, which is not a visual dynamic and hence 
objectifying, but is a much more tactile perception of 'the material weight that I am in 
movement' ('Pregnant Embodiment', 165). This clearly relates to the experience of 
'pregnant embodiment' articulated by Johanna Boyce, who felt pregnancy to be a 
liberation from the awareness of her body as an object, and a simultaneous release into 
the perception of her body as 'material weight' or 'solidness. 
Pregnancy and dance are both bodily performances of the subject, modes by 
which the subject is able to explore and expand his or her own range of physical motility 
in space. At a basic level, gender can be conceptualized as a mode of becoming of the 
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subject through his or her bodily movement in space: gendering is indissoluble from the 
subject's ways of occupying and creating his or her own phenomenal space. Dance is 
thus intimately connected with gender: it is able to provide new modes of becoming for 
both sexes. The incorporation of the pregnant body into dance can enable a new mode 
of becoming, or an alternative choreography, which is based on a uniquely female mode 
of experience. It facilitates consciousness of the body, not as an object, but as a material 
weight, or a gravitational centre of solidity. 
I propose to close this chapter with the consideration of another remarkable 
convergence of dance and pregnancy, in the case history of Anna 0. At the close of her 
analysis, Anna 0. experienced a phantom pregnancy, which is clearly related by Peggy 
Phelan to her former, repressed desire to dance: 
... Anna O. 's phantom pregnancy is her body's long deferred, long desired and long renounced, dance. At the end of the cure, she partners herself and touches, 
perhaps for the first time, her feminine body. ('Dance and the History of Hysteria', 
100) 
Anna O. 's last recorded symptom thus constitutes the bodily performance which she has 
long denied herself, and which is moreover a uniquely female mode of bodily 
performance. One of the most fascinating aspects of Anna O. 's bodily symptom, 
however, is its staging, so that it is enacted within the performative space of the 
psychoanalytic session. 
What is immediately notable about Anna O. 's phantom pregnancy, which is a 
famous and frequently discussed symptom in histories of Freud's founding of 
psychoanalysis, is its complete absence from the text of Studies on Hysteri . It is not 
mentioned at all in Breuer's account of his treatment of Anna 0. It appears in the 
'Standard Edition' in the form of a footnote,, which is authored not by Breuer or Freud, 
but by the translator of the text into English, James Strachey: 
At this point (so Freud once told the present translator [James Strachey], with his 
fingers on an open copy of the book) there is a hiatus in the text. What he had in 
mind and went on to describe was the occurrence which marked the end of Anna O. 's 
treatment. The whole story is told by Ernest Jones in his life of Freud (1953,246ff. ), 
and it is enough to say here that, when the treatment had apparently reached a 
successful end, the patient suddenly made manifest to Breuer the presence of a 
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strong, unanalysed positive transference of an unmistakably sexual nature. It was this 
occurrence,, Freud believed, that caused Breuer to hold back the publication of the 
case history for so many years and that led ultimately to his abandom-nent of all 
further collaboration in Freud's researches. Studies on Hysteria, 95-96) 
There is thus a 'hiatus' or gap in the text of Studies on Hysteria, which marks the site of a 
temporal delay: it is only uncovered or made apparent by Freud some time after the text 
has been written, in conversation with the translator. Freud himself was only able to 
write of the event in a letter to Stefan Zweig, dated 2 June 1932, almost fifty years to the 
day after it occurred. 14 There is clearly therefore a problem of language in relation to the 
event: neither Breuer nor Freud can write the event into the narrative of the case history. 
Freud bequeaths the task to his translator, James Strachey, who in turn does not 
articulate the event within the text of Studies on Hysteria, but instead refers the reader to 
another text, the biography of Freud by Ernest Jones. The event is therefore not named 
anywhere in the text; it is activated as a site of trauma for Freud, who cannot contain 
Anna O. 's symptom within a narrative articulation. 
The event which cannot find expression within the text of Studies on Hysteria 
C. 
-it 
is enough to say here that... the patient suddenly made manifest to Breuer the 
presence of a strong, unanalysed positive transference of an unmistakably sexual nature') 
is therefore located by Ernest Jones as a phantom pregnancy, which Anna 0. suddenly 
and unexpectedly reveals. Jones' narrative account of the event, and its location within 
the temporal framework of Freud's founding of psychoanalysis, is the primary source for 
its status as 'mythology'. The standard interpretation of Anna O. 's symptom thus 
compacts it into a neat symbolism, so that it marks the closure of the case history and 
Anna O. 's treatment, the closure of the collaboration between Breuer and Freud, and the 
subsequent 'birth' of psychoanalysis. In this version, Anna O. 's symptom marks her body 
as a site for others (as it was given over to her father at the beginning of her treatment), 
rather than as a locus of her own bodily expression. Strachey's footnote to the text of 
Studies on Hysteria is also embedded in this version. Anna O. 's symptom thus manifests 
14 Sigmund Freud, The Letters of Sigmund Freud, 1873-1939, ed. Ernst Freud, trans. Tania and James 
Stern, (London: Hogarth Press, 1970), pp. 408-409. Further references to this volume are given after 
quotations In the text. 
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to Breuer the presence of a 'strong... positive transference of an unmistakably sexual 
nature'. However, Breuer does not 'analyse' the transference; he leaves the treatment 
incomplete. This is emphasized in Freud's letter to Zweig, fifty years after the event, in 
which he observes of Breuer's reaction to the phantom pregnancy: 'Seized by 
conventional horror he took flight and abandoned the patient to a colleague. For months 
afterwards she struggled to regain her health in a sanatorium' (Freud, Letters, 409). 
Ernest Jones adds a further,, not insignificant, detail to his version of the events: 
The patient, who according to him had appeared to be an asexual being and had 
never made any allusion to such a forbidden topic throughout the treatment, was now 
in the throes of a hysterical childbirth (pseudocyesis), the logical termination of a 
phantom pregnancy that had been invisibly developing in response to Breuer's 
ministrations. Though profoundly shocked, he managed to calm her down by 
hypnotizing her, and then fled the house in a cold sweat. The next day he and his wife 
left for Venice to spend a second honeymoon, which resulted in the conception of a 
daughter 
... 
11 
Combining the two accounts, it becomes clear that Breuer was faced with a 'strong 
positive transference', which simultaneously marked in symbolic terms the 'throes of .. 
childbirth' of the science of psychoanalysis. Being of a 'conventional' nature, Breuer 
took flight in 'horror' and so 'conceived' only a daughter, not a new scientific movement. 
The implication is clearly that it required Freud, who was of less 'conventional' outlook, 
to 'analyse' the transference and so to conclude the treatment. Simultaneously he acted 
symbolically as midwife, ministering to the 'throes of.. childbirth' and delivering safe and 
healthy the revolutionary method of treatment which was psychoanalysis. In his 
description of his own reaction to a 'strong... positive transference', Freud thus reacts 
'analytically'; he does not flee in 'conventional horror' or subjectively attribute it to his 
own attractions. The crucial point, however, is that as a result of his analytical 
approach, he abandons the 'hypnotic treatment' which Breuer administers to his patient in 
Jones' account, and which presumably leads to her languishing for months in a 
sanatorium. Freud focuses his treatment on the nature of the transference itself and so 
founds the psychoanalytical method: 
15 Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud: Life and Wolk, Vol. 1, (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), p. 247. 
Further references to this book are given after quotations in the text. 
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One of my most acquiescent patients, with whom hypnotism had enabled me to 
bring about the most marvellous results,, and whom I was engaged in relieving of her 
suffering by tracing her attacks of pain to their origins, as she woke up on one 
occasion, threw her arms round my neck. The unexpected entrance of a servant 
relieved us from a painýl discussion, but from that time onwards there was a tacit 
understanding between us that the hypnotic treatment should be discontinued. I was 
modest enough not to attribute the event to my own irresistible personal attraction,, 
and I felt that I had now grasped the nature of the mysterious element that was at 
work behind hypnotism. In order to exclude it, or at all events to isolate it, it was 
necessary to abandon hypnotism. (Freud, An Autobiographical Stu , 49-50) 
The consideration of Anna O. 's symptom through the genres of biography (Jones' 
account of Freud's life) and autobiography (Freud's sketch of his own past) therefore 
illustrates clearly the problem of the event in relation to narrative. The difficulty is not 
so much that Jones and Freud are wilfully transforming what occurred to fit the history 
of the founding of psychoanalysis; the problem is inherent in the nature of narrative itself 
In organizing its account, narrative always introduces its own fictions or alters the event. 
Narrative is one of the closest means of approach to the event; however, it can never be 
substituted for the event itself. The problem with the genres of biography and 
autobiography is that they rarely acknowledge the nature of the narrative on which they 
are dependent; in this sense they frequently seek to substitute an approach to the event 
(which is always partial and subjective) for the event itself, and so must be read with 
considerable caution. 
Phelan exercises precisely such caution in her reading of Anna O. 's symptoms. 
She indicates that the standard version of the event appropriates Anna O. 's phantom 
pregnancy as a metaphor for Freud's own founding of psychoanalysis; her bodily 
performance is interpreted in an identical way to her former symptoms, so that her body 
is substituted for another's use, and is not a locus for her own expression. Phelan re- 
introduces the notion of choreography into Freud's text and suggests an alternative 
reading of Anna O. 's phantom pregnancy which allies it with her former urge to dance. 
The traumatic symptom is read as a mode of bodily performance, which is able to 
reproduce the event but is not expressive. In Freud's early sessions, in collaboration with 
Breuer, the therapeutic mode of cure was thus performative: a crucial aspect of the cure 
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involved a re-enactment of the traumatic event. So in her therapeutic sessions, Anna 0. 
was engaged in a bodily performance, which was the exact reproduction of the events of 
the previous year. Phelan suggests that the cumulative effect of these bodily 
performances may have encouraged Anna 0. to regard her body itself as 'reproductive' 
(of the events of the past) in a mode which was outside of the normal order of human 
reproduction (Dance and the History of Hysteria', 97). This notion of bodily 
performance provides a conceptual framework in which to view the problem of Anna 
O. 's phantom pregnancy, which is not bound up with the notions of transference and 
counter-transference. It claims no definitive status, but provides an alternative means of 
approach to the event. 
As a mode of bodily performance, Anna O. 's phantom pregnancy differs crucially 
from the bodily performances produced in earlier stages of her traumatic 
symptomatology. The traumatic symptom thus marks the site of an event which is 
beyond the framework of understanding; overwhelming the consciousness, it is signalled 
by a linguistic breakdown, so that it cannot be articulated in a narrative formulation. In 
the case history of Anna 0., this aspect of the traumatic condition manifested itself in 
one of her most dramatic symptoms, an almost entire breakdown of linguistic capacity, 
so that communication was only possible in a superimposition of languages: 
It first became noticeable that she was at a loss to find words, and this difficulty 
gradually increased. Later she lost her command of grammar and syntax; she no 
longer conjugated verbs, and eventually she used only infinitives, for the most part 
incorrectly formed from weak past participles; and she onlitted both the definite and 
indefinite article. In the process of time she became almost completely deprived of 
words. She put them together laboriously out of four or five languages and became 
almost unintelligible. When she tried to write (until her contractures entirely 
prevented her from doing so) she employed the same jargon. For two weeks she 
became completely dumb and in spite of making great and continuous efforts to speak 
she was unable to say a syllable. 
... 
in March 1881 f, h]er paraphrasia receded; but thenceforward she spoke only in 
English - apparently, however, without knowing that she was doing so. She had 
disputes with her nurse who was, of course, unable to understand her. It was only 
some months later that I was able to convince her that she was talking English. 
(Studies on Hysteria, 77-78) 
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In her early traumatic symptomatology, Anna 0. manifested an increasing inability to 
articulate herself in language, as her linguistic structures gradually disintegrated. It is 
notable that when language returned to her she expressed herself only in English, which 
was accordingly the language of her initial conversations with Breuer. Anna O. 's bodily 
performance thus contains a 'birth' in her preferred language of communication with 
Breuer. Phelan points out that it is surely no accident that, in actuality, Anna 0. was 
named 'Bertha Pappenheim': her bodily performance not only signals a 'birth' but is also a 
reclamation of her identity ('Dance and the History of Hysteria', 99). Phelan suggests 
that Anna 0. closes her conversations with Breuer in the same language that they 
opened, and thereby signals a regeneration of language in and on her body. Although 
not yet a narrative formulation, Anna O. 's bodily performance is manipulating language 
in order to communicate or express her meaning. There is clearly a reclamation of 
language occurring here. 
An identical pattern can be witnessed in regard to issues of temporality. 
Narrative is thus characterized by an ability to alter and shift temporal sequences, and to 
expand or contract the duration of events, depending on the emphasis required. 
Inversely, the traumatic symptom was a mode of bodily performance which could only 
figure in the past: it took as long to perform as the original event and its staging only 
took into consideration the spatial co-ordinates of the past event. The phantom 
pregnancy begins to suggest awareness of a temporal sequence or framework. It 
gestures towards the past and suggests that Anna 0. is beginning to face the question of 
(her own) history, in the transformation of her body as a reproductive site. The body is 
no longer reproducing the events of the past in endless sequence, but is engaged in a 
much more positive reproductive process. In itself, the phantom pregnancy thus 
gestures towards the future, as a process of gestation or mode of coming into being of a 
subject. Her bodily performance is creating her own phenomenal temporality, and 
accordingly she effects her own coming into being. 
Another significance of the complex issues of temporality involved in Anna O. 's 
bodily performance is suggested by John Forrester and Lisa Appignanesi, in their 
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detailed and comprehensive historical study, Freud's Women. 16 They refer to the 
problematic discovery by Ellenberger, that the temporal sequences in Ernest Jones' 
account of Breuer's closure of the treatment of Anna 0., could not possibly be correct. 
Jones argued that the day after Breuer terminated Anna O. 's treatment, he left for a 
'second honeymoon, in Vienna with his wife, where he conceived a daughter. However, 
Ellenberger has pointed out that Dora Breuer was born on II March 1882, three months 
before the supposed scene of Anna O's phantom pregnancy (on 7 June 1882), not nine 
months after (Ellenberger, 483). The interpretation of this discovery which is provided 
by Appignanesi and Forrester is of crucial interest to an understanding of Anna O. 's 
bodily perfonnance. Referring to Freud's attribution to Anna 0. of the phrase, Now Dr. 
B's child is corning! ' (Freud, Letters, 408), they observe: 
We can venture a speculative explanation of how this phrase concerning Dr. B's 
baby became linked to Dora Breuer's birth - and in this way show how it so unnerved 
Breuer. Breuer recounted how Bertha's 're-living of the previous year continued right 
up until the illness came to a definitive conclusion in June 1882. ' If on 7 June 1882 
she was reliving the events of 7 June 1881, she might well have been re-living 
Breuer's (and his wife's) experiences of that day: 7 June 1881 is almost exactly nine 
months before Dora Breuer's birthday. With her cry Now Dr. B's child is coming! ', 
'she recognized (and wanted her doctor to know that she recognized) that events in 
his personal life as well as in her own had taken place at the time, 7 June 188 1'. The 
'now' of the baby that is coming was the 'now' of 1881, not 1882. (Freud's Women, 
83-84) 
The symptom of Anna O. 's phantom pregnancy differs crucially from her former 
symptoms, in that it does not repeat the past in an exact re-enactment, but uses events of 
the past as a mode of communication and self-expression. In relation to language, Anna 
0. manipulated her former symptom of speaking only in English, in order to 
communicate to Breuer a reclamation of language and her own identity. So in relation 
to time, Anna 0. here manipulates her former symptom of reliving the previous year, in 
order to communicate to Breuer in an intimate and personal manner that she is aware of 
his own life, apart from his treatment of her. Her bodily performance demonstrates a 
16 Lisa Appignanesi and John Forrester, Freuds Women, (London: Virago, 1992). Further references to 
this volume are given after quotations in the text. 
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new-found ability to manipulate temporal sequences as a mode of self -expression, which 
is essential before a narrative formulation can be reached. 
The final implication of Anna O. 's phantom pregnancy, which I propose to 
explore, is its uniquely female mode of bodily performance. As such, Anna O. 's 
symptom marks her body as unambiguously gendered. In this context, the primary 
interest of Anna O. 's bodily symptomatology is its staging, in the performative space of 
the analytic session. Phelan precisely locates the gendered site of Anna O. 's ('pregnant') 
body as the locus of Freud's trauma, which was evidenced in relation to the text of the 
case history. It is excessive to his psychoanalytical frame of reference, and so cannot be 
'contained or interpreted' by Freud, and must remain always outside of the narrative: 
Moreover, the pregnancy signifies the excess, the supplement that cannot be 
contained or interpreted by the talking cure, no matter how exhaustive, no matter 
how loving. This excess is femininity itself - that part of her that remains outside the 
discursive frame of the always already masculine case history. This excess is the 
place of trauma at the heart of Freud's theory of sexual difference. As Freud 
developed psychoanalysis, he constructed as well a theory of anxiety about sexual 
difference punctuated by penis envy, the castration complex, and so on -a set of 
psychic responses to the fear of absence. But as Anna 0. experienced the analysis, 
she performed a theory of sexual difference which rendered her body at once 
reproductive and living, and 'non-reproductive' and unliving. In short, her 
performance of a phantom pregnancy is both curative and traumatic. (Dance and the 
History of Hysteria', 98) 
In concluding her analysis, Anna 0. performed her own dance, and staged it 
within the psychoanalytic session. In so doing she 'performed a theory of sexual 
difference' which was alternative to the Freudian formulation. In place of a 'fear of 
absence'. Anna O. 's bodily performance insists on the female body as a site of presence: 
in pregnancy, the woman's body is the locus for the coming to presence of another 
('Now Dr. B's child is coming! '), at the same time as it is unusually present to the subject 
and to others as a material weight and solidity. The extent to which this is incompatible 
with Freud's project of psychoanalysis is evidenced in another narrative, in relation to a 
different moment of trauma. The dancing figure who unexpectedly disrupts the text of 
'Moses and Monotheism' is thus characterized precisely by her inability to sustain herself 
as a material weight. Balanced precariously on one toe, she does not appear able to 
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support her own weight in a sustained posture. This delicate balancing act arguably 
figures the Freudian psychoanalytic performance: reliant on 'a theory of anxiety about 
sexual difference', which is constructed on 'the fear of absence' (Dance and the History 
of Hysteria', 98), it is uncertain whether psychoanalysis is able to maintain its academic 
I weight' and 'posture', when confronted with the female body as material solidity and 
presence. 
In conclusion, this is the challenge which is offered to Freudian psychoanalysis by 
Irigaray's dancing girl. In her spinning activity, Irigaray figures yet another mode of 
female bodily performance. Again, it is crucially concerned with a sense of 
weightedness: Schilder has indicated that this mode of bodily performance effects 
vestibular irritation, which alters the subject's perception of his or her own gravitational 
solidity. It is inherently a mode of exploration of the material weight of the body in 
motility. Irigaray's little girl resists, in her spinning motion, the failure of Freudian 
psychoanalysis to articulate a theory of trauma, which takes into account (her own) 
sexual difference, as a materially present subject. She provides a modem re-formulation 
of the 'maverick feminist',, who was contemporary with Freud: 'If I cannot dance, I do 
not want to be a part of your revolution' ('Choreographies', 441). This challenge 
completely throws off-balance the entire weight and stature of the Freudian project. It 
crucially raises the question as to whether Freudian psychoanalysis can be truly 
'revolutionary', if it does not incorporate the 'revolutions' (spinning activity) of Irigaray's 
little girl. I have indicated throughout that there is a much more 'revolutionary' 
alternative to psychoanalysis, which is centred on theories of the body image and 
phenomenology. This provides far more challenging and dynamic modes of therapeutic 
practice in the field of trauma, and also furnishes a performative space in which both 
sexes can 'dance', or creatively explore and live out their difference. 
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CONCLUSION: THE PERFORMATIVE BODY 
THE POLITICS OF VISIBILITY 
In Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (1993), Peggy Phelan argues that 
there is an urgent need to re-formulate current theories of performativity. I In 
contemporary critical theory, performance is thought through the visible; Phelan 
contends that this results in a dichotomized approach to the performance arts. Critics 
align themselves in 'two camps' which are organized around the 'physical' and 'psychic' 
modes of approach to the body; consequently, critical theory assumes a body which is 
already split off from consciousness. In the words of Phelan- 
Performance commentators tend to open their critical cameras and set up their 
tripods on one side or the other - the 'physical' readers are usually trained in 
movement analysis and/or history, and the 'psychic' readers are usually trained in 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory (although rarely in practice). 
(Unmarked, 167) 
For Phelan, critical modes of approach to performance paradoxically deny the very 
nature of performativity itself In an arresting metaphor, she locates the dynamic of 
performance art in its 'suspension' between 'corporeal' and 'psychic', so that it radically 
disrupts a critical methodology which is based on binary opposition: 
Performance art usually occurs in the suspension between the 'real' physical 
matter of 'the performing body' and the psychic experience of what it is to be em- 
bodied. Like a rackety bridge swaying under too much weight, performance keeps 
one anchor on the side of the corporeal (the body Real) and one on the side of the 
psychic Real. Performance boldly and precariously declares that Being is performed 
(and made temporarily visible) in that suspended in-between. (Unmarked, 167) 
In Unmarked, Phelan proposes that contemporary critical modes of approach to 
performance should be rethought, so that theories of performativity n-fight reflect more 
accurately its inherent qualities. In other words, she is concerned to mobilize a critical 
methodology which creatively 'combines' physical and psychic readings of the body: 
Perhaps it would be worthwhile to experiment with the possibility of a different 
notion of the relation between these two camps. It might be fi-uitful to take the body 
I Peggy Phelan. Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). 
Further references to this volume are given after quotations in the text. 
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as always both psychic and material/physical: this would necessitate a combined 
critical methodology. One could employ both physics and psychoanalysis to read the 
body's movements and paralytic pauses. (Unmarked, 167) 
A radical reconception of critical methodology, such as Phelan is suggesting, 
would necessarily involve a dual strategy. Firstly, it implies a 'rethink [ofl the entire 
visibility-power game itself (Unmarked, 140). While the project of gaining visibility for 
the politically under-represented is undoubtedly laudable, Phelan is concerned by the 
'relations of visibility and power' which are inherent in visibility itself In patriarchal 
society, visibility characteristically operates within a binary structure, so that the body 
which is seen or displayed in modes of performance is 'crucially bound' up with another 
body which sees but itself remains unseen Unmarked, 26). Phelan names the visible 
body as the 'marked' body; its movements and gestures 'submit to the gaze' of the other 
arked, 139). The performances of the body which observes are typically 
'unmarked'; its movements and gestures are invisible (they do not submit to the gaze of 
the other) and Phelan observes that it is 'in this specific sense' that the observing body 
'functions as the ascendant term in the binary'. Accordingly, a politics which relies on a 
strategy of 'representational visibility' should simultaneously be vigilant over the power- 
relation between 'marked' and 'unmarked' bodies; there is a need to be aware of the 
hazardous nature of the visible: 
... [There are] 
disadvantages of staking too much on visibility as a means of 
achieving representational power. Visible to whom? Who is looking and who is 
seen? Unmarked, 140). 
More fundamentally, Phelan argues that the project ahead is to replace the oppositional 
binary which currently characterizes the realm of the visible with 'a much more nuanced 
relation to visibility and invisibility within representation itself (Unmarked, 140). 
Extending Phelan's tenninology, there must be a 're-marking' of the 'marked' and 
'unmarked' bodies which dichotomize the terms and approaches of current critical 
theory. This relates to the second strategy which Phelan outlines as necessary to a 
reconceptualization of critical methodology. As a means of 're-marking' the 
performative body, Phelan urges the exploration and mobilization of alternative 
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representational economies to the visible. A 'much more nuanced and complex 
approach' to the performance arts would recognize that the movements and gestures of 
the performing body are not 'singular or stable' in meaning; performance confronts 
theoretical criticism with 'a permeable and fluid set of meanings' which are 'resistant to 
singular interpretations' and pose a challenge to a simplistic (binary) approach. 
The theoretical model of the performative body which Phelan provides seems to 
me to bear a particular relevance to the project of my thesis. My work on trauma has 
been concerned to explore the bodily performances of its symptomatology. I have 
argued that all bodies move in time and occupy space; they are engaged in modes of 
performativity. In creative bodily performance, the subject is able to move freely in 
space and to explore alternative configurations of movement. I have theorized 
movement as a subjective category which is creative of space and new possibilities of 
becoming for the subject. The symptomatology of trauma displays a restricted mode of 
bodily performance. The movements of the body are split off from an intentional 
consciousness; in the terms of Phelan's metaphor, quoted above, the bodily performance 
loses its precarious balance or 'suspension' so that it retains only its 'corporeal' 
dimension. 'Psychic experience' is dissociated; consequently, the movement which is 
performed is activated at an automatic level and is characterized by repetitive, limited 
and non-exploratory gestures. 
The conceptualization of trauma as a mode of performance also entails a 
consideration of its staging. The survivor of trauma must routinely engage with the 
disciplines of law, medicine and psychoanalysis, which each affect/effect the bodily 
performances of the subject. Returning to Phelan's model, the symptomatology of 
trauma is caught within the realm of the visible; it is displayed before experts and 
professionals and clearly represents the site of a 'marked' performance. Conversely, the 
so-called 'theoretical' disciplines emerge as 'unmarked' performances, so that their 
apparent neutrality can be theorized as an invisible surveillance. My analysis has centred 
particularly on the founding of psychoanalysis as a scientific discipline. I have 
demonstrated that, in founding psychoanalysis, Freud confined his interest in the bodily 
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performances of the hysteric almost entirely to the realm of the visible, noting only those 
aspects of the case which could be observed. Simultaneously he founded the 'talking 
cure' and gave up the practice of hypnosis. Although the psychoanalytic session was 
based on a unique mode of bodily performance, this aspect of his work was suppressed; 
psychoanalysis had arguably become an 'unmarked' mode of performance. 
My primary concern in the writing of this thesis, however, has been less with the 
'visibility-power game' than with the exploration of alternative representational 
economies to the visible -I have been involved in a re-markinil of the performative body, 
so that it is no longer imprisoned in a binary structure but is approached in a 'much more 
nuanced and complex way' (Unmarked, 166). 1 have traced Phelan's notion of the 
'performing body' - balanced precariously between 'physical matter' and 'psychic 
experience' - in the tradition of thought on the body image, which extends from Janet's 
work in the late nineteenth century to contemporary Dance Movement Therapy. As a 
mode of bodily performance, dance facilitates the exploration of new spatial and 
temporal movement configurations and encourages the integration of the subject. In 
therapy it has the potential to transform the symptomatology of trauma, restoring the 
(ever precarious) balance between corporeal and psychic experience and expanding 
restricted movement patterns. 
The notion of dance performance also allows for the 're-marking' of the gendered 
body. Phelan's description of the 'performing body', which exists in alternative realms to 
the visible, utilizes the imagery of weight. In a metaphor of balance, the body is 
#precariously suspended' because it attempts to sustain 'too much weight' (Unmarked, 
167). 1 have mobilized this image of the weightedness or solidity of the body as a 
theoretical approach to gender, which allows for the exploration and conceptualization 
of difference, but is not confined to the visible. This notion of the 'performing body' 
conflicts with Derrida's construction of a choreography of gender(s); where Derrida's 
dancer passes easily ftom body to body and from gender to gender, in my construction 
the dancer sustains a precarious balancing act. I have argued that this is because Derrida 
does not 'anchor' the body of his dancer in the 'corporeal'; this is not to imprison it in 
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essentialism, but to take into account the ways in which gendered bodies are able to 
creatively live out and explore their difference. 
In conclusion, however, my analysis co-incides with Derrida's thought in its 
recognition of the profoundly subversive nature of the 'performing body'. For Phelan, 
the power of this body is that it 'can teach political ideology the generative powers of 
doubt and uncertainty' (Unmarked,. 17 1). The same claim can also be made of trauma: in 
the place of knowledge and memory it introduces 'doubt and uncertainty'. Dominick 
LaCapra has observed the conjunction of trauma and performativity in recent critical 
theory. 2 He argues that much current analysis and criticism is embedded in the notion of 
'acting-out', which represents for him the exact and inflexible reliving of the past in the 
traumatic symptom (LaCapra, 245). He recognizes that the phenomenon of 'acting-out' 
reflects the overwhelming nature of trauma, in which the past has not been assimilated or 
even experienced and so is perpetually relived. In this sense, 'acting-out' represents for 
LaCapra a necessary acknowledgement of the pain and confusion involved in the 
traumatic event. I-Es concern appears to arise out of the nature of 'representation' 
implied in the process of 'acting-out; he argues that 'the idea of representation or 
understanding' which is involved is 'restricted' - it suggests a straightforward notion of 
referentiality which allows a direct mode of access to past events (LaCapra, 245). 
LaCapra is therefore concerned to 'supplement' the 'truncated view' of 
performativity which is represented by 'acting-out', and which is 'prevalent in post- 
Freudian analysis or criticism', by introducing the notion of 'working-throught. This 
critical term appears to represent for LaCapra the attempt to replace the uncontrolled 
and repetitive symptoms of trauma with 'a measure of responsible control over one's own 
behaviour' - the emphasis is on regaining the ability to 'control' one's own somatic 
performances. His notion of 'working-through' concurs with my own account of dance- 
movement therapy, which aims to transform the compulsive reliving of the past into 
more flexible and expressive modes of performance. This performativity, in turn, 
2 I)ominick LaCapra, 'Lanzmann's Shoah: "Here There Is No Why"', Critical IggMin, 23, (1997), 23 1- 
269. Further references to this article are given after quotations in the text. 
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provides a means of approach to narrative. LaCapra is concerned with a process which 
is able to 'convert the past into memory' and provide a means of adaptation to 'the 
current demands of life' (LaCapra, 245). His interest is once more engaged by the issues 
of 'representation' which are involved in this process of transformation; 'working- 
through' provides LaCapra with a theoretical model which disrupts straightforward 
notions of referentiality and so gestures towards 'the nature of performativity' itself, 
which 'goes beyond any restricted idea of representation or understanding' (LaCapra, 
245). 1 have attempted throughout my thesis to maintain the precarious suspension 
demanded by current theories of trauma and performativity. While recognizing the 
overwhelming nature of trauma, not only for those who are involved in a traumatic 
event, but also for secondary witnesses who seek to treat and write about trauma, I have 
suggested that it is also characterized by a 'generative power'. It is able to instigate a 
new mode of thinking based not on proof and facts but on interpretation. This 
alternative hermeneutics disrupts claims of referentiality and direct access to the event; in 
their place, it is concemed with a more hazardous, but politically vital, mode of approach 
to an uncertain and contested past. 
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